

# The Month in Review



AS EXPECTED, the recent Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was on the whole a staid affair devoid of the kind of political pyrotechnics that enlivened the previous conclave three years ago. The speeches, including Khrushchev's marathon keynote address, hailed the accomplishments of the present leadership, supported its ambitious long-range economic plans to "overtake America," and endorsed policies, foreign and internal, which have long been evident. The Twentieth Congress had seen an attempt by Khrushchev to wrest the initiative from his competitors by tearing off the pall of Stalinism and producing a revolutionary line of his own making. The Twenty-First Congress, on the other hand, was almost entirely "constructive"; far less introspective, it was a sanctioning of policies forged by practice under the Premier's personal direction. Little was said of past "mistakes," and Nikita Khrushchev clearly emerged as the undisputed leader of his own Party and the oracle of world Communism. No reference was made to the fact that many of his original "liberal" premises had led Communism to the brink of disaster in the Hungarian Revolt. Unabashed by self-reversal and inconsistency, the peppery Party Secretary excoriated his erstwhile companions of what had once been a "collective leadership," even while endorsing (as in the case of Molotov's anti-Tito stand) many of their doctrines and policies. More confident than ever, Khrushchev added new theoretical interpretations to the "science" of Marxism-Leninism by outlining the expected course to be followed by "Socialist" countries in their progress toward "Communism."

These prophecies are of course also policy directives affecting all countries in the "Socialist camp." Khrushchev asked two rhetorical questions: "How will the development of Socialist countries proceed toward Communism?" and "Can a situation be imagined in which one Socialist country attains Communism and carries out Communist principles of production and distribution while other countries lag behind in the first stage of building a Socialist society?" His answers proclaimed a new line that is bound to have far-reaching repercussions in Eastern Europe: "If one takes into account the laws of economic development of Socialist systems, such a prospect is hardly possible. It would be theoretically right to assume that Socialist countries, correctly availing themselves of opportunities inherent in the Socialist order, will more or less simultaneously reach the highest phase of Communist society. . . . Hitherto economically backward countries, supported by the experience of other Socialist countries, by cooperation and mutual aid, quickly make up the time lost and raise their economy and culture, and thus the general line of economic and cultural development of all Socialist countries is levelled off."

The Soviet Premier added a few genuflections to practicality by referring to "the great variety of historical conditions," stressing that the Soviet example "cannot be mechanically applied" and that what is important are "the general patterns and not their particular manifestations." Nevertheless the meaning of this new "theory of simultaneity" is unequivocal: it compels each "Socialist" country (by whatever means deemed suitable to local conditions but in the shortest possible time) to strive for the attainment of the general economic foundations established in the Soviet Union. It also serves notice on China not to delude itself that its leaps forward can enable it to overtake the Soviet Union, "the most powerful country in the world Socialist system, and the first to enter a period of expanded construction of Communism."

As applied to Eastern Europe, the concept of uniformity is not new in practice. Stalin tried it and failed. Today, as a result of this failure, differences among the various countries are greater than they were at the beginning of this decade. The key area is, of course, agriculture. Discussing this question, the Soviet leader said: "The very difficult problem of Socialist construction, that of the peasantry going over to the collectives, is being successfully solved. In China, Bulgaria, and Korea collectivization has been completed. The process of the Socialist transformation of farming is nearing completion in Czechoslovakia and Albania. In East Germany almost half of the land is at the disposal of the collectives and State farms. . . . Some People's Democracies have already entered the concluding stage of Socialist construction. The time is approaching when they, just like the Soviet Union, will construct Communist societies. This is of tremendous international significance."

Premier Khrushchev failed to mention Hungary, Poland and Romania—understandably, since these countries are far behind in collectivization, Poland having almost none. But the omission must have held an ominous meaning for the peasants in these countries: surely they, too, would now be forced by their regimes to hasten the "Socialist transformation" of the land.

A number of recent developments in East European agriculture point to the regimes' determination to enforce conformity, even at the sacrifice of greater production or of policies previously laid down. Three countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—have recently decided to allow the Machine Tractor Stations to sell some or all of their machinery to collective farms, thus emulating the Soviet example. In Czechoslovakia, where a year ago officials argued against such a move, the decision apparently caused dissension in the highest reaches of the Party, some leaders fearing that a weakening of the MTS would result in a loosening of political control over the countryside. In Hungary, despite the disastrous reverses of the past, the Kadar regime has lately been clamoring ever more earnestly for re-collectivization, claiming, as does the Polish regime, that small farms are not viable; special committees were formed to convince farmers to join the collectives. Finally, in Albania the Soviet-Bulgarian process of amalgamation of collectives has already started, even though not all of its agriculture is as yet collectivized.

Poland thus remains the partial exception. Partial, in that, though there is much talk of re-collectivization, little has so far been accomplished. It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Congress and the Poles' own Third Congress, scheduled for this month, will change the situation. It is obvious that in this new period of "positive emulation," when every "Socialist" country is expected not only to shun revisionism but also to apply the tenets of orthodoxy, pressure on Poland is mounting. The latest phase of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, concentrating as it does on Yugoslavia's alleged deviations from "Socialist construction," must be particularly embarrassing to the Polish regime.

So far Party leader Gomulka, while suppressing signs of liberalism, has also apparently tried to buy precious time by obliging the Soviets and their satraps on relatively non-essential issues. At the Soviet Congress, for instance, he went out of his way to say that "enemies" of Marxism-Leninism "falsify reality by maintaining that the USSR and its Party impose their will on other Communist and Workers' Parties and on the countries of the Socialist camp." This stand was singled out for particular praise by the Czechoslovak Stalinists. Significantly, inside Poland the main stress of the propaganda organs was not on alleged "equality" or on the general question of Soviet-Polish relations but on Soviet internal achievements only.

In the immediate future, the main effects of the Soviet Congress on Eastern Europe are thus likely to be a closer emulation of and integration with the Soviet economic model, a further separation from Yugoslavia in the political and ideological fields, and, above all, more intensive work for the millions in the area. This is Stalin's blueprint shorn only of its terror.



Faces of Hungarian Gypsies.

Orszag Vilag (Budapest), April 16, 1958

## Minorities in Eastern Europe

*Because of the immense complexities of the problem and the dearth of information available, there has been a lack of the kind of objective discussion of minorities in Eastern Europe which can contribute to a clearer understanding of social and political realities in the orbit. The present two-part study is an attempt to help supply the basis for such an investigation. It is necessarily incomplete in that it concentrates on the present without appraising in depth the intricacies of the historical past; it is also shaped by the kind of information the Communist regimes see fit to release. The editors, aware of the many conflicting rights and interests involved, approach the subject with no parti pris: the intention is to present the latest information and to relate these facts to the nature of Communist administration in the area.*

*The present article discusses minority groups common to many of the countries of the area.*

*A second study will cover the remaining minorities, considering each country separately.*

THE SATELLITE REGIMES, like their non-Communist predecessors for centuries past, are bedeviled by the complex and perhaps insoluble problems caused by the presence of minority peoples throughout the area. Ranging in strength from the numerically predominant Magyars who inhabit Romanian-ruled Transylvania to barely surviving bands of Gypsy nomads roving each country, these minorities possess some or all of the following characteristics: a language and culture of their own; a religion different from that of the dominant majority of the State in which

they dwell; a proudly retained, if mythologized, history amounting in some cases almost to a racial mystique; a central loyalty to the goal of self-autonomy. Each minority, therefore, forms a compact island of potential danger to the Communist authorities, and—propaganda statements notwithstanding—both official and unofficial reports reveal enough of the continuing unrest and ferment among the various peoples to show that the problem their presence creates remains unsolved for many of the Communist regimes of East-Central Europe.

## Official Attitudes

SINCE THE END of World War II, Communist policy toward minorities in general has been—as in the USSR—at once discriminatory and elastic. Some of the peoples have been tolerated and even, seemingly, encouraged to retain their historic identities; this has been especially true when the minorities are strong, stubborn and angry, and when their resentment against prewar regimes was great enough to lend hope that they would be amenable to any change of rule, even to Communist authority. On the other hand, there have been systematic attempts to eliminate by expulsion and force certain minorities: for instance, in the early years after the war, the Germans. The latter, moreover, exemplify the elasticity of this aspect of Communist rule, for postwar policy is now largely reversed, and the Germans are no longer hindered from retaining their ethnic consciousness—under “Socialist” conditions, of course. Therefore, broadly speaking, the areawide policy on minorities has moved from arbitrary favoritism and repression to limited tolerance—compatible, as always, with Communist domination. (The most notable exception to this rule is the continuing anti-Semitism, usually camouflaged as anti-Zionism, in most of the Soviet bloc.)

It may be said that the policies of the various regimes toward minorities are similar to the line of action which the USSR has taken toward the Satellite States themselves. Like the latter, the minorities are allowed their own more or less nominal national identity, their own languages, and—under leaders who “cooperate” to a larger or smaller extent with the regimes—their own religions, schools, press, theaters, etc; and, like the local administrations, the minorities exist with the knowledge that real independence is forbidden. Concurrently, they are under a constant “educational” barrage which, even as it makes use of their self-identification as minority peoples, seeks ultimately to shift their primary allegiance to the Communist Party. Little success in this basic goal has been achieved as yet, but the regimes have managed to register a certain amount of propaganda mileage from the various “cultural” groups into which they have organized the minority peoples.

Functioning as component parts of the “Fronts,” these groups issue statements and participate in staged demonstrations on behalf of the regimes’ domestic measures and Soviet foreign policy maneuvers.\* Also, during local or areawide crises—the Hungarian Revolt of October 1956 is the prime example—the officials, press and puppet leaders of the minority groups greatly intensify their efforts to keep their groups “in line,” meanwhile denouncing all anti-regime manifestations as “chauvinism” or political “reaction,” both, of course, “financed by the West.” In this fashion, internal, contemporary troubles within the bloc are pictured as emanating from external or historically reactionary causes. The legitimate aspirations of the peoples for self-determination are never publicly acknowledged.

\* For a discussion of the various Front groups and other mass organizations in the area, see *East Europe*, October 1957, pages 3-13.

In an area with as much population diversity as Eastern Europe, the variety of minority peoples is almost bewilderingly large. Adding to the complexity of the problems faced by the various regimes on this score is the presence in many parts of the area of small groups, numbering sometimes only a few hundred. These must, nevertheless, be considered minorities, because they consider themselves as such. Certain of the mountain “tribes” of Albania may well come under this heading. Wars, migrations and shifting boundary lines have further confused the situation, turning majority peoples of one nation into minorities of another, leaving, for example, Turks in Bulgaria, Poles in Czechoslovakia, Czechs in Poland and Germans practically everywhere. Furthermore, each State has some minority problems indigenous to itself and some which it shares with its neighbors. Indeed, four particular groups—Germans, Magyars, Jews and Gypsies—inhabit several or all countries, and the attention which they receive from the authorities attests to the continuing importance of the problem they all—despite their dissimilarities—represent.\*

## Germans

THE DEATH TOLL of World War II and the subsequent mass exodus—both forced and voluntary—of Germans from the Satellite States has reduced the German minority population in the area to approximately one-sixth its prewar size. Along with this huge population drop, there has been a more than commensurate decrease in the influence of this ethnic minority on the policies of the local authorities.

During the period of Nazi rise and ascendancy, some Germans in Eastern Europe contributed to the areawide political upheaval. Backed by the threatening force of the Hitler regime, they were able to bring about major changes—desired by that regime—in East European governmental actions. Now, however, the political weight of local German opinion is of little consequence. Moreover, the influence of Germany proper is almost purely a negative one, artificially created by the USSR in order to paint West Germany as an “imperialist” menace to the “Socialist” countries, among which is included the weak, sycophantic East German puppet State.

The reduction in native German influence on East European governmental policies was brought about primarily by the establishment of postwar regimes which decimated the German populations in Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, the four Satellite States with heavy concentrations of this minority. To an ap-

\* A note on the appellations used in this article: people of German origin are called simply Germans; the best-known prewar categorization, Sudeten German—for those living in the Czechoslovak lands bordering Germany—has lost significance as a geographic-ethnic description applied to Czechoslovakia, due to expulsions and to the dispersal of the people throughout the country. The term Magyar, which historically preceded the word Hungarian, is used for all persons of Hungarian origin within and without Hungary. People of Jewish descent and identification—whether or not they practice their religion—are referred to as Jews. By the Jewish language, the various Yiddish and, in Bulgaria, Sephardic, dialects are meant.





The family of Rudolf and Maria Esterka, members of the ethnic German minority in Romania. From an article in *Rumania Today* (Bucharest), No. 4, 1957, entitled "The Same Homeland, The Same Aims," proclaiming the "Socialist unity" of Romania's minorities.

preciable extent, lessened German influence was also due to the Nazi collapse at the end of the war and the subsequent—if temporary—loss, not only of the "homeland's" high status among nations, but also of its active financing and direction of pro-German political movements. Moreover, many of the ordinary Germans remaining in the area lost or "abandoned" some of their German consciousness and have, outwardly at least, sought to identify themselves with the countries in which they live. It must be remembered, however, that the more militant Germans were, to a large extent, killed, imprisoned or deported, or else left the area of their own volition.

The policy of liquidating German minorities was halted throughout the area in the late Nineteen-Forties, and since that time most of the regimes have striven not to expel, but to retain their Germans. There are even propaganda campaigns to persuade those who have left for the West to return, and there is ever-increasing vigilance by the border guards to prevent flights from the area.

### Special Polish Conditions

One exception to the areawide policy of retaining minorities is found in Poland, where large-scale emigration to West Germany has been under way since the Gomulka regime came to power in October 1956. Previously, the Stalinist authorities had not only shut off emigration (since 1949), but had applied strong economic and political pressures on persons of German ethnic origin to make them assume "Polishness."

The Gomulka policy on emigration to Germany has entailed an easing of the process of nationality declaration, including a "change of heart" clause which allows those who had previously declared—or had been forced to declare—Polish nationality to revert to public profession of Germanism. Perhaps more important, the regime began

to allow emigration to Germany for "reunification of families." Under this provision, which was most liberally interpreted, nearly all persons with relatives in Germany were allowed to emigrate. The only exceptions appear to have been certain experts and technicians currently needed by the Polish economy.

Unofficial Polish complaints that West German authorities did not check to see that emigres from Poland actually had the relatives they claimed, as well as the liberal—even hasty—granting of exit permits by Polish officials also point to the probability that many emigres may not be of German origin, but have been attracted by the free economic and political conditions in the German Federal Republic.\*

It is not possible, at the present time, to estimate Poland's German population. The prewar minority (765,000, according to the last census taken before World War II in 1931) was hugely augmented when the Oder-Neisse and other German territories fell under Polish rule in 1945. The German population in these Western Territories, which had numbered eight or nine million before the war, was reduced—by war death, deportation and voluntary exile—to about 100,000 by 1948. Due to the Stalinist policy of quasi-denial of the existence of minorities, there was no official report on the number of Germans in Poland,

\* Other emigres whose "German nationality" is both averred and denied are the "Autochthons," who include the Mazurians of Olstyn (formerly East Prussia) and the Upper Silesians. A million or so of these people are historically native to the Western Territories, were claimed as Poles, but are now more or less fully accorded minority status. The natural antagonism between these well-established natives and the new settlers—whom the Communist regime sent to populate the Western Territories after the expulsion of the Germans—was augmented by the pressures for collectivization and other "Socialist" measures. The "Autochthons" speak a Polish dialect, liberally interspersed with words of Germanic origin.

until a PAP (official Polish News Agency) statement, August 17, 1957, that the total was 65,000. Since this announcement came during the new wave of German emigration, it had little meaning.

Nor can it be determined as yet how many persons of German origin will remain in Poland after the already-granted emigration permits have been used. That the number will be small is suggested by the statement that "90 percent of the Germans in Poland have applied for departure to Germany." (Sejm [Parliament] Deputy G. Skok, quoted in *Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], July 11, 1957.)

Although implemented during the Gomulka stewardship, the large-scale emigration to Germany was settled by an agreement between the Polish and German Red Cross organizations in December 1955 which stipulated that 160,000 persons would be allowed to go to Germany. In 1957, when the program got under way in earnest, 113,954 persons went to West and East Germany, according to *Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], January 26, 1958. The same newspaper stated, April 25, that another 34,500 had left for the same destinations in the first three months of 1958. (It may be taken for granted that the goal of the vast majority was the German Federal Republic.) From these figures and from the fact that emigration was to continue throughout 1958, it is apparent that the 160,000 total stipulated by the 1955 agreement would be exceeded. However, reports reaching the West by midsummer 1958 stated that the Polish authorities had put a stop to the issuance of further emigration permits, although they were still honoring those already granted.\*

Despite the relatively "easy" policy on German emigration, the regime has made some propaganda attempts to discourage those who would leave. For example, the January 24, 1958, issue of *Dziennik Baltycki*, which is published in Gdansk, a German minority center, claimed that "many people who left for West Germany returned within one year." The journal went on to speak of D. P. camps, language barriers and "anti-Communist propaganda . . . [which] breeds the unjustified fear of returnees to Poland being imprisoned." An article in *Slowo Ludu* (Kielce), June 3, claimed that 52 persons had returned to Poland from West Germany "recently." In 1957, the Party Central Committee set up a "Nationality Commission" to deal with the German emigration situation and with problems of other minorities, but its accomplishments, if any, have not been publicized.

Other indications of the regime's desire to hold some of its German minorities include the revival of "Cultural Houses" for the Germans; these institutions were propaganda centers for all people during the Stalinist area, but were ignored until recently by the Gomulka government. There is also a "German Social-Cultural Organization," which, according to *Trybuna Ludu*, January 25, 1958, had "increased" in membership and "gained great popularity." No figures on membership were given, however, and the account of the organization's activities made it appear a typical Communist-dominated mass front designed to propagate docility to the regime.

The number of German-language schools is difficult to determine, especially since the population has decreased



Folk costume of the Transylvania Saxons—the German minority in Romania. *Rumania Today* (Bucharest), No. 4, 1957

so greatly over the past two years. Both the above-mentioned issue of *Trybuna Ludu* and a May 23 Radio Warsaw broadcast stated that 67 such schools existed, while *Sztandar Ludu* (Lublin), April 28, 1958 claimed there were 117 German-language schools teaching 4,878 pupils. Also catering to the minority is a German-language daily newspaper, *Arbeiterstimme* (Wroclaw-Koszalin).

### Recalcitrance in Czechoslovakia

Although not rebellious in any organized fashion, the German minority in Czechoslovakia has shown a notable recalcitrance in accepting the restoration of full citizenship.\*\* So pronounced has this state of mind been, that the regime was forced to pass a law as far back as April 1953 automatically "conferring" citizenship on all Germans living permanently in the country. In the same year young members of the minority began serving their compulsory military terms in regular Army units, not in labor battalions as was the case during the early postwar era. Other evidence of German disinclination to take an active part in the affairs of State continues to appear, principally in the German-language thrice-weekly, *Aufbau und Frieden* (Prague), which has regularly published articles bemoaning

\* According to the West German Minister for Expellee Affairs, January 3, 1959, about 125,000 Germans returned from Poland in 1957 and 133,000 in 1958. The number of Germans still living in Poland, according to this same report, is 140,000.

\*\* The German minority was deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship by postwar legislation.

the lack of interest shown by its readers in national politics. On May 1, 1957, the newspaper criticized German apathy toward the trade unions, although, according to the journal, Germans are eagerly recruited for these regime-ruled organizations. The same newspaper, March 11, 1958, complained that "many Germans [in Czechoslovakia] are interested only in dances and stubbornly avoid interesting lectures and cultural functions." The journal then caustically asked whether "those Germans" preferred "incitements to war" to "peaceful appeals for cooperation with the working people of our country."

Czechoslovakia's German minority numbers 163,867, according to the official Party newspaper, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), January 1, 1957. This compares with the prewar German population of approximately 3,300,000, and the immense decline—which, of course, is similar to the area-wide drop in German residents—was brought about by the postwar policy of expulsion. After the mass exodus (which was both forced and voluntary) was stopped in the late 1940's, there was little further emigration until recent years. According to Western sources, 6,000 of the German minority were allowed to "request" permission to leave for West Germany in 1956, but less than half had arrived by mid-1958.

There are at present 3 members of Parliament of German origin. One of these, Rudolf Muller, recently extolled the "vivid cultural life" possible for his compatriots in Czechoslovakia. In a speech reported in *Rude Pravo*,

September 15, 1958, he said that public libraries in the Liberec region have 20,000 volumes in the German language or approximately one book for each member of the minority. He also spoke of "16 associations on folklore art" in the region and of recent exhibitions of art work by the German masters of the 18th and 19th Centuries. His German audience later passed a resolution "condemning the war efforts of West German imperialists."

Little is heard of Germans participating in mass movements, and such organizations as the Communist Youth League and the Cooperation with the Army League apparently have had small success in recruiting German youth.

The prewar German-language schools and colleges (one "classical," two technical) were abolished after the war. *Aufbau und Frieden* claimed schooling in the German tongue was available without charge in 65 localities, as of 1953. The same newspaper on May 15, 1956, complained of the "shirking" by German parents of the duty to inculcate German cultural standards in their children, apparently meaning that the parents did not take advantage of the existing facilities for learning the language. It may be assumed that the regime, while providing a minimum of training in German for those who are particularly anxious for it, is content to let time take its course, in the anticipation that the new generation of German youth will become more "Czechoslovak-minded" than its forebears.

That there is still resentment on the part of Czechoslo-

Polish Gypsies resting the horse of their caravan by the side of the road. The accompanying note, one of the very few admissions in the area press that Gypsies have not been absorbed into society: "The many years of attempts to settle [the Gypsies] have so far yielded no major results. Between 10 and 20 families settled in Nowa Huta and Walbrzych, and that's all. The rest continue to wander under heaven's roof."

Photo and quoted caption from *Swiat* (Warsaw), July 6, 1958





vaks for German Nazi activities during and before the war is evident from a May 17, 1957, article in *Cesta Miru*, the regional Party newspaper of Liberec, which chided some of its readers for objecting to signs in German in some factories and to the use of the language on the streets. On schooling, the paper said, "We will not open special schools for German children, but it is our duty to see to it that they master their mother tongue."

### Germans in Hungary

In Hungary, there have been fewer outward indications of minority ferment than elsewhere in the area. This may be due to the fact that there is only one significantly large minority group in the country, the Germans; or it may be attributable to the very large and overshadowing amount of trouble caused the regime by the Hungarians themselves.

Postwar deportations of Germans ended in nearly all cases as far back as 1947 (Western estimates put the figure of Germans "resettled" out of the country at approximately 200,000), and since that time the minority's population strength has probably remained constant. Regime statements on the number of Germans remaining in Hungary have varied wildly, from a few hundred, as recorded in the 1949 census, to 500,000, according to the official Hungarian News Agency, November 12, 1954. The 200,000 figure quoted by *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), August 20, 1958, through probably low, is likely to be nearest to the truth.

From most reports it can be gathered that the German minority has been, at least in substantial part, willing to give the appearance of "assimilation" with Hungarian neighbors. Probably this is a heritage of the Rakosi regime, which left office shortly before the Revolt and which operated in an atmosphere of the most intense Stalinist terror. It may be taken for granted that many Germans shunned the bogus "cultural" institutions and organizations of that period for fear of being identified with a minority and subject to present and future repressions. This state of mind still seems to exist on the part of the Germans, despite the Kadar regime's relative cordiality toward minorities and its public exhortations that they take advantage of the "opportunities" provided by the authorities for the continuation of national cultures. For example, the newspaper *Vas Nepe* (Szombathely), April 23, 1958, urged its readers to improve attendance at "German Cultural Evenings," sponsored by one of the branches of the puppet Patriotic People's Front, the German Democratic Workers' Federation. One reason for German lack of interest in such regime-sponsored minority meetings probably lies in the "hope" stated by the *Vas Nepe* article that the group's problems will be solved by the "Socialist transformation of agriculture." Most of the minority farms for a living.

It is also possible that a certain amount of real assimilation may have taken place. This is indicated by the fact that only a handful of Germans, according to the most reliable Western sources, took the opportunity, provided by the tumultuous aftermath of the Revolt, to flee the country.

Unlike the other, much smaller, minorities in Hungary, the German youth has no newspaper of its own, although

there is an "adult" German-language paper, *Freies Leben* (Budapest). There are relatively fewer German schools in comparison with those of other minorities, and many of the institutions which do exist were founded only a few years ago during the first premiership of Imre Nagy. In 1953 there were 60 such schools, and "an insufficient number," according to *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), January 26, 1958, have been established since that time.

### Transylvanian Germans

The bulk of Romania's German population is concentrated in Transylvania and numbers 365,000 persons. (*Revista de Statistica* [Bucharest], Number 4, 1957.) This compares with a wartime figure of 535,000, and the drop was accounted for by the regime's aping of the areawide policy of liquidating great portions of the German minorities after the war.

There seem to be extensive German-language schooling facilities. On January 17, 1957, Radio Bucharest claimed 329 such schools accommodating 38,000 German pupils, and at the end of that year another broadcast by the same station, December 17, averred "14 professional and technical schools taught in the German language." Also "serving" the minority is a newspaper, *Neuer Weg* (Bucharest), and one of the familiar puppet mass organizations, the German Anti-Fascist Committee, headed by an ex-Nazi named Stoffel.

In the wake of the Hungarian Revolt, the regime, frightened by the possibility of a similar occurrence in Romania, began returning properties confiscated after the war from members of the German minority. *Agerpress*, the official Romanian News Agency, November 6, 1956, an-



Tirgu-Mures, capital of the Magyar Autonomous Region in Transylvania, Romania, home of the largest Hungarian minority group. *Rumania Today*, No. 10, 1957





Library in the House of Culture for Hungarians in Komárno. In their collection are complete works of Shakespeare in Hungarian, a joint Bratislava-Budapest publishing effort.

Czechoslovakia: photo and caption from an article on Hungarians in Slovakia, which stresses the complete loyalty of the Hungarian minority to their country of residence. The sign in back reads: "In the Service of Peace and Socialism."

*Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), January 1957

nounced that 21,000 separate "properties" had been returned and that 9,200,000 lei would be distributed to those who could not be indemnified by the return of real estate.

West German sources reported that Bonn temporarily discontinued trade relations in January 1959 until the Romanian government shows "more understanding" in the question of repatriation of German families whose members have been separated for fourteen years.

## Magyars

NOT SO WIDELY DISPERSED as the Germans, the Magyar minorities have been more successful in retaining their ethnic characteristics and way of life in the two Satellite States in which they dwell in large numbers. Indeed, they are so deeply ensconced in one sizeable region—a part of Romanian-ruled Transylvania—as to have been granted a situation as close to autonomy as any people might expect under Communist control. In the rest of Romania (total Magyar population, including Transylvania, 1,650,000\*) and in Czechoslovakia (inhabited by 400,000 Magyars\*\*), they are treated as are most of the other minority groups. There are no significant numbers of Magyars living in the other Satellite States, although 100,000 dwell in Soviet

\* *Revista de Statistica* (Bucharest), November 4, 1957.

\*\* *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague), September 7, 1957. 600,000 Magyars are listed in *Hospodarska Geografie Ceskoslovenska* (Prague), 1953. The difference of 200,000 stems from the fact that a so-called process of re-Slovakization occurred between 1946-1947; as a result, in Slovakia today there are 200,000 persons whose mother tongue is Hungarian, but whose nationality is uncertain.

Carpatho-Ruthenia\*\*\* and some 500,000 are outside the Soviet bloc in Yugoslavia.\*\*\*\*

The official Communist attitude is that the problem of the Magyar minorities has been solved, that whatever uneasiness or dissatisfaction still exists results from "bourgeois nationalism," "chauvinism" or "imperialist provocateurs." This attitude has been adopted not only by the Romanian and Czechoslovak authorities, but also by the Hungarian regime in public "explanations" which have had to be made in the face of obvious minority ferment.

The October 1956 Revolt, which stirred the sympathy of the Magyar minorities outside the country, brought the expected strictures from the regime press, but the tone varied. For example, *Nepakarat* (Budapest), May 24, 1957, admitted that "sparks of quarrelling" did appear during the "counterrevolution" between Magyars living in other Satellite countries and "the neighboring peoples," but said that the trouble was caused by "chauvinist-nationalist sentiments," as well as by those hopeful of "opportunities for the profitable business deals which would come about through the cutting off and annexation of various territories." The latter is, of course, a reference to the centuries-old desire of Magyar minorities to break away from the "foreign" governments which rule them. The Kadar regime and its pre-Revolt predecessor, acceding to Soviet desires for stability under the present Communist order in Eastern Europe, are the first Hungarian rulers to disavow in this fashion the apparent desires of their compatriots in Transylvania.

On August 24, 1957, *Nepakarat*, in a milder article than the one quoted previously, advised its readers not to worry about the fate of Hungarians in the neighboring countries, and not "to wish that every Hungarian-speaking person could be a citizen of Hungary." According to the journal, both the worry and the wish are "ridiculous and false when harbored in connection with friendly countries . . . [which] have solved the minority problem by the workable method of the Leninist minority policy." The same article also took the Hungarian pre-Revolt regime to task for "avoiding the issue" of minorities and for "failing during an entire decade to clear up the situation."

## Transylvanian and Czechoslovak Magyars

Of the entire Magyar minority in Romania, only 33,000 live outside Transylvania, and almost half of those in Transylvania live in the Autonomous Region. There, where Magyars outnumber Romanians by 567,000 to 145,000,\*\*\*\*\* Magyar Communists are in charge of all the administrative organs and the social and cultural institutions. Both Hungarian (Magyar) and Romanian are the official languages of the region, and the schools are taught in Hungarian. There is a Hungarian-language university in Cluj, a State publishing house printing works in the language, and two Hungarian State theatres.

Although there have been no reports of large-scale demonstrations in Transylvania during and after the Hungarian Revolt, the amount of undercover ferment appears

\*\*\* Radio Budapest, November 25, 1956.

\*\*\*\* Official Yugoslav census, 1953.

\*\*\*\*\* *Revista de Statistica*, Number 4, 1957.

to have been substantial. A year after the uprising, the Bucharest Party organ *Scinteia* devoted two articles, October 16-17, to denouncing "nationalism" and "bourgeois chauvinism" as detailed by "self-criticism" at a Party regional Committee meeting in Cluj.\*

Most of the 4-600,000 Magyars living in Czechoslovakia are in the Slovak part of the country in and around Bratislava, on the plain of the left bank of the Danube, and in the southern and southeastern part of the country. There are many Hungarian-language schools—555 elementary, 119 high schools and a teachers' college (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], February 4, 1954), a Party daily *Uj Szó* (Bratislava) and a certain amount of representation in the Communist government. Nine members of the Magyar minority were "elected" to the National Assembly on the single slate National Front ticket in 1954, and one of the five Deputy Chairmen of the Slovak National Council is of Magyar background. A "cultural society" represents the minority and is part of the Front; it is called "Csemadok" and claims 33,000 members.

Relations between the Slovak and Magyar populations were bad after the war, because Hungary itself was for a time in alliance with Nazi Germany, and because of the Slovak memory of centuries of Hungarian rule. After the war, the Magyar population in Czechoslovakia was reduced some ten percent by population exchange, as well as the "cession" of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the USSR. Since then, the population has remained relatively stable, and there has been no significant agitation for frontier revision. It may be assumed that the Magyars of Czechoslovakia feel little incentive to have their section of the country under a "homeland" Hungarian Communist regime which is basically like their own with living conditions which are worse. Unrest, however, continues to exist, as indicated by the words of no less an authority than the First Secretary of the Slovak Party, Karel Bacilek: "Bourgeois nationalism is rampant not only among Slovaks, but also appears among our Hungarian-speaking citizens." (*Pravda* [Bratislava], May 23, 1958.)

Possibly the best indication of the feelings of the Magyar population is the fact that so many of them have refused to apply for restoration of Czechoslovak citizenship. This condition, similar to that prevailing among the Germans in the country until the 1953 decree automatically conferred citizenship (see above), was discussed in the Slovak Party organ, *Pravda*, October 3, 1958. The newspaper admitted that there were in the country "some 20,000 Stateless persons of Hungarian nationality, mainly in Slovakia." Two weeks later the National Assembly passed a law stating that all members of the minority who had fulfilled residence requirements were to be considered Czechoslovak citizens. No oath of allegiance, no application for papers are necessary. (*Rude Pravo*, October 18.)

### Jews

NO COMMUNIST REGIME has ever officially admitted that any of its policies are motivated by, or even tinged

\* For further details on the Cluj meeting, see *East Europe*, December 1957, page 52.



"El Mole Rachmim," Prayer for the Dead, a painting by B. M. Linke commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. The painting appeared in the English-language propaganda magazine *Poland* (Warsaw), April 1956, with an article on the Uprising by B. Mark, "director of the Jewish Institute of History in Warsaw," author of the book "Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto" which was awarded a State prize in 1955.

with, anti-Semitism. Yet evidence to the contrary has piled up in the USSR from the time of Stalin's struggle against Trotsky over three decades ago, through the bogus Jewish "doctors' plot" in the postwar period, to the present quashing of Yiddish-language cultural activities and organs, as well as the refusal to permit Jews to emigrate to Israel. The Satellite States have, by and large, followed the Soviet trend.

Anti-Semitism on the part of Communist officials in Eastern Europe is a modified brand of the traditional discrimina-

tion against Jews. Overt racism is avoided, as are the blunt and unconcealed penalties against Jews as such, which were a feature of prewar Fascism. Instead the Jews—when not condemned as outright “anti-Party elements”—are damned as “cosmopolites” or “Zionists.” When they are excluded from leading posts, from advanced schools or universities, or arbitrarily arrested, it is not their Jewishness, but their “foreignness” from the Communist ethos which provides the regimes’ rationale. Such discrimination occurs even though many of those affected are not religious and most—both practicing and non-practicing Jews—have roots in the East European countries going back hundreds of years and consider themselves patriotic citizens of those countries. Even those who totally abandon both their religion and their sense of Jewishness for a militant avowal of Communism do not find complete exemption from basically racist strictures. In the USSR this is exemplified by an unofficial but markedly obvious quota system in the universities and other institutions of higher learning which now accept a disproportionately low number of Jewish students.\*

In the Satellites, Rudolf Slansky, once Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak Party, was hanged—together with other Communist Jews—not only because he was “convicted” on charges of “Titoism” and enmity to the Soviet Union, but also as a “Zionist agent of the international Jewish conspiracy” in the service of the “capitalist” West.

## Background and Rationale

The chronic Communist fear of any form of “internationalism” divorced from direct Party control probably provides the chief basis for continuing anti-Jewish policies. The kinship which some Jews feel for their coreligionists in other countries, their “cosmopolitanism” which is often reflected in awareness of Western intellectual movements, the very timeless and frontier-less qualities of their religion, all are anathema to the insularity of the Soviet-trained official. In the establishment of the State of Israel, toward which most East European Jews feel some affinity, the

\* The Soviets also require the word “Jew” to be stamped on identity papers, a practice which lends itself to the furtherance of discriminatory measures in all branches of national life. Jewish citizens are not publicly labeled in this manner in the Satellites.

### Jewish Population in Satellite States

	prewar*	postwar**	1957
Bulgaria	48,000	43,000	5,000
Czechoslovakia	360,000	45,000	15,000
Hungary	435,000	140,000	80,000
Poland	3,350,000	50,000	25,000
Romania	757,000	400,000	200,000

\* Prewar statistics are taken from *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites* by Peter Meyer, Bernard D. Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky and Nicolas Sylvain, Syracuse University Press, 1953.

\*\* Postwar and 1957 statistics are taken from *The Jewish Communities of the World*, published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress, 1958.

Communists—though they were among its first backers—now profess to see a “capitalist” menace to the “Socialist camp.” Of course, the present anti-Israeli attitude of the Soviet bloc also fits into USSR foreign policy goals *vis-a-vis* the Arab States.

Anti-Jewish policies also stem from the linking of Jews to capitalism, although poverty has been for centuries the natural state of many Jews in the area. The regimes, however, make the most of their propaganda opportunities at the expense of former Jewish businessmen and landlords. Historic anti-Semitism in many sections of the area is also used by unscrupulous officials who unofficially blame Jews—as did the Polish Stalinists who fought Gomulka—for all the ills of “Socialist” bad management and “imperialist” penetration.

## Emigration

Satellite policy toward emigration as a whole is, for the most part, prohibitory, like that in the Soviet Union. The postwar relaxation of frontier barriers was ended after the Communists had consolidated their domination of the area, and in recent years only the October 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary—and an apparent about-face in Romanian policy beginning in late summer 1958—have brought a significant resumption of emigration, much of it Jewish.

The reasons for the off and on refusal to allow Jews to leave the area include the desire to retain some Jews who possess special skills useful to the economy, the reluctance to admit that a large segment of the population wishes to leave the “Socialist” order and the continuing state of mind—held over from the Stalinist years—which seeks to prevent defection because of the possibility that some “State secret” might be transported across the borders.

Jewish emigration has been virtually halted in Czechoslovakia since 1954 and in Bulgaria and Hungary since 1957.\* In the latter country no appreciable number of Jews had been allowed to cross the frontiers after 1950, until the 1956 Revolt. During the uprising and immediately after its quashing by Soviet troops, some 20,000 of the nation’s 100,000 Jews fled the area.\*\* Previously, the Jewish population had decreased some 40,000 between the war’s end and 1950, due to legal and illegal emigration and to the fact that the death rate of the survivors of the Nazi terror far exceeded the birth rate. For the same reasons a 30,000 population decrease has been registered among Czechoslovak Jewry up to the present time. In Bulgaria, large-scale emigration to Israel shrank the Jewish total from 43,000 at the end of the war to about 6,000 in 1955,

\* Statistics on Jewish emigration, as well as those coming later in this article on schools, publications and the number of ordained rabbis, are taken from *The Jewish Communities of the World*, a pamphlet published in New York (1958) by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress.

\*\* *The New York Times*, October 28, 1958, quoted “a spokesman for the Jewish Agency, the Zionist group that arranges all migration to Israel” in a statement that “Jews in Hungary may soon be permitted to emigrate to Israel.” However, the Hungarian regime’s Jewish newspaper, *Uj Elet* (Budapest), November 15, 1958, stated that “no agreement on Jewish emigration has been concluded.”

when the frontiers were closed. Some 2,000 are now reportedly registered for emigration to Israel, but are prohibited from leaving the country.

Between the end of World War II and 1952, approximately half of the 400,000 Jewish survivors in Romania left; after 1953, emigration had been limited to only a few hundred a year. In September 1958 the Romanian government suddenly relaxed restrictions on emigration, allowing 1,700 Jews to leave for Israel. Since then, according to *The New York Times*, January 27, 1959, the number of emigrants per month increased to 8,000 in January; 10,000 were expected in February. Not only are the aged given visas, but even professional people, such as doctors, pharmacists and students, are permitted to join the exodus.

Poland presents the most complex and varying patterns of Jewish emigration. The survivors of World War II were augmented by 150,000 returnees from the USSR immediately after the war, but large-scale emigration, both legal and illegal, reduced the total number to somewhat more than 50,000 by 1951, when the regime virtually closed its borders to Jews. Between October 1956 and January 1958, however, a liberal policy was adopted and over 32,000 Jews were allowed to go to Israel. Of these, 30,331 went in 1957, according to the official Polish News Agency, January 25, 1958. The overall total included about one-half the 10,000-12,000 "repatriated" from the USSR in 1956-57. It was expected that 12,000 more would leave Poland for Israel in 1958, but the first six months' unofficial total indicated a rate far short of this goal. Western sources say that 2,730 arrived in Israel from Eastern Europe in that period; although there is no available country-by-country breakdown, it may be assumed that almost all of these came from Poland. *Trybuna Ludu*, April 25, stated that "1,000 had left for Israel in the first quarter of 1958."

Evidence of a nearly unanimous Jewish desire to leave Poland may be adduced from an article in *Zycie Warszawy*, February 17, 1957, which averred that "over 90 percent of the Jews in Lower Silesia—which contains the largest Jewish minority—have expressed a desire to depart." (Interestingly, this regime-admitted percentage is the same as that [noted above] for Germans wishing to emigrate.)

### Present Status

Native anti-Semitism, as well as official anti-Jewish policies, continue in evidence throughout the area, though to a lesser extent in two of the countries. The small number of Jews living in Czechoslovakia (15,000) and Bulgaria (5,000) somewhat minimize the problem in those States. During the war, Bulgaria afforded its Jewish population greater protection than any other country in the area, and even postwar Bulgaria put fewer restrictions on emigration visas. The few remaining Jews in the country do not appear to be as discriminated against as some of their compatriots elsewhere in the orbit; however, there is apparently only one ordained rabbi in the entire country.

In Czechoslovakia, especially in the Bohemian and Moravian sections of the country, the Jews were and are assimilated to a greater degree than in any other Satellite na-

tion. This has not, however, reversed a trend toward elimination of the minority from the huge government bureaucracy, a trend begun after the Slansky trial in 1952. A large proportion of the Jews remaining in the country register with the authorities as Czechs, Slovaks or Hungarians. There are only four rabbis in the country and no Yiddish-language newspapers or schools.

A significant indication of discrimination against the relatively large Romanian Jewish population (200,000) is the number of Yiddish-language schools (three of them), miniscule in comparison with special schools available to other minorities. (As has been stated, there are 329 German-language schools in Transylvania serving a 365,000 minority.) There exist, however, two Yiddish theaters in the country, apart from the one in Poland the only such organizations entirely devoted to the once-flourishing Jewish drama in the Satellite area. There is also one monthly publication which contains some printed matter in Yiddish, some in Hebrew and some in Romanian. Thirty-six rabbis minister to the spiritual needs of the minority.

Before the Hungarian Revolt, there were two Jewish schools in Budapest, and these continue to exist, although their activities have been somewhat reduced, due in part to the emigration of approximately 20 percent of the population after the uprising. There is no Jewish-language news-



Warsaw: the monument to the Jews who died in the Ghetto Uprising against the Germans. *Nasza Ojczyzna* (Warsaw), April 1958



paper in the country; there were 89 rabbis at the time of the Revolt, but—it is believed—this number has since been considerably reduced.

## Changes in Poland

One of the more serious areas of continuing anti-Semitism is Poland. This fact has been recognized in a number of outspoken press articles and in speeches by officials. The Warsaw weekly, *Przegląd Kulturalny*, January 13, 1957, for instance, said: "The exodus of Jews from People's Poland embodies in itself an accusation against our People's authorities, our Party and all of us. . . . Some of the centers of authority are still following the old habits and instructions and have not taken up a decided fight against anti-Semitism."

As may be inferred from the above quotation, the present regime has made efforts to disown and combat anti-Semitic policies and attitudes instigated by its Stalinist opponents. Nevertheless, there have been reports of "hooligan attacks on Jews," of desecrations of cemeteries and of unjustified firings of Jews, as well as complaints that local officials have shown toleration of anti-Semitic activities. Generally speaking, most reports from Poland reveal a slackening of anti-Semitic incidents during the past year.

One of the more troubled areas in Jewish relations in Poland concerns the recent repatriates from the USSR. Most of these consider themselves in transit to Israel and resent the necessity of a waiting period—sometimes as long as two years—in a Communist country, after having been held for so many years in the Soviet Union. Some are not really Poles at all, but have represented themselves as such in order to leave the USSR. All of these "repatriates" are under the jurisdiction of SCUJ (the Social-Cultural Union of Jews in Poland), a regime-created organization, frequently attacked by Jews inside and outside the country for placing obstacles in the way of emigration, as well as for parroting the Communist line. There have been unofficially reported instances of repatriated Jews physically attacking SCUJ functionaries, and one SCUJ clubhouse was said to have been renamed "The Chaim Weizman House" after the first President of Israel. This, of course, exemplifies considerable defiance toward the anti-Zionist attitudes of SCUJ and other regime officials.

Since the October events some international Jewish organizations, previously banned by the Stalinist regime, have been allowed to resume work in Poland. Among these are the American Joint Distribution Committee, and "Ort," which has taught trades and handicrafts to many Jews in the country.

There were seven Yiddish-language schools in Poland at the beginning of the post-October rise in emigration; decreased Jewish population may endanger the existence of some of these schools. Yiddish-language radio broadcasts were discontinued without explanation in January 1958, but *Folks-Shtyme* (Warsaw), a Yiddish newspaper, still appears four times a week, as do a Yiddish monthly and a quarterly periodical. The number of ordained rabbis in the country is not known.



Illustration from an article on Gypsies in Slovakia entitled "About those who now think and live in the new way." The caption says that the Mizigar family (he is a miner) has "exchanged a caravan for a nice family house." The destruction of the Gypsies' traditional nomadic way of life, and their incorporation into the controlled social fabric, has been a consistent part of the regimes' minority policy.

Photo from *Slovenka* (Bratislava), August 11, 1958

## Gypsies

THE GYPSIES are important not for their number, which is small, nor for their influence on others, which is almost non-existent, but as examples of the extent to which the Communist authorities go to "educate" and dominate even those groups least dangerous to them. Historically a race apart, with a largely nomadic way of life and no interest, either pro or con, in any of the national governments, this utterly unmenacing people is now subjected to the strongest pressure to conform to the Communist way of life.

The authorities aim at integrating the Gypsy populations in farming and factory communities, and there are indications that this drive has met with a certain amount of success. How much of this success is due to regime efforts and how much to the natural course of history is, however, problematical, for even before the Communist takeover of the area there was a tendency for some Gypsies to abandon their nomadic existence. This was especially true of Bulgaria, where Gypsies have settled in all parts of the country, not only as farmers and workers, but also as craftsmen. They are particularly noted as blacksmiths, and the iron goods made by settled tribes are peddled over the countryside by their nomadic compatriots. Likewise, it is claimed in Czechoslovakia, that "40 percent of the Gypsy population has settled down to work in industry and agriculture" (*Zemedske Noviny* [Prague], July 11, 1957), and an assimilatory new law, passed by the National Assembly, October 17, 1958, attempts to decree the settlement of "more than 40,000 itinerant" Gypsies. (*Rude Pravo*, October 18, 1958.) The latter measure called on the National Committees to find housing for the former "vagrants" and stated that trade unions should undertake their "sponsorship" and job training.

Radio Prague, January 19, commented on this assimilatory law as follows: "It is the duty of the national committees to break up all major concentrations of Gypsies in

villages, streets, or houses in order to prevent Gypsy families from influencing each other, and to make them live on the same cultural level as their non-Gypsy neighbors. National committees must find permanent housing for all Gypsy families, as well as permanent employment. All Gypsy children must be made to attend schools, kindergartens, and nurseries. We could never claim to have achieved a successful cultural revolution if we allowed thousands of our fellow human beings to live an uncultured, primitive life."

No similar official measures for—or even discussions of—Gypsy integration have been prominently reported in the press of the other countries. Indeed, it is the areawide policy not to include this particular people in published lists of minorities. Population statistics can be gleaned only from infrequent articles, appearing sporadically in the press and containing casually presented and undocumented estimates.\*

### Relations with the Community

It would appear that there is considerable bias against Gypsies on the part of some of the majority peoples of the area. This prejudice has been openly reported in many publications. For example, the June 14, 1958 issue of *Smena* (Bratislava) likened the popular feeling toward Gypsies to the "discrimination against the Negro in the United States." The Budapest Party organ, *Nepszabadsag*, August 27, 1958, stated that "the peasants have an aversion to the Gypsies," and that, because of this bias, "Gypsies are often refused housing sites in the villages." The same newspaper commented unfavorably on the fact that at times "local authorities are responsible for segregation" of the minority. As to the general living conditions of the Gypsies, the paper had this to say: "The majority still live outside the villages in shacks. Often eight to ten people are crammed into a small shed measuring six-by-nine feet. They sleep on straw. . . . Their tiny yards are full of dungheaps, swarming with flies. Most of the children do not go to school."

Perhaps the most stringent action against the nomadic Gypsy way of life was taken by the Bulgarian regime recently. According to the Official Gazette, *Izvestia* (Sofia), December 30, 1958, all Gypsies without regular jobs will be ordered to work in State industrial or agricultural enterprises. The effects of this decree—and the seriousness with which it is enforced—are not yet known. Otherwise there is little documentation available on efforts anywhere in the area to integrate the Gypsies, although occasional newspaper items indicate at least isolated attempts. For

\* The following unsubstantiated figures are the best available on Gypsy population in the Satellite area: Bulgaria, 150,000 (*Geografia* [Sofia], 1951); Czechoslovakia, 150,000 (Radio Bratislava, September 9, 1958); Hungary, 150,000-200,000 (*Nepakarat* [Budapest], October 20, 1957); Poland, 15,000 (*The New York Times*, "best estimate," September 6, 1958); Romania, 262,501 (*Anuarul Statistic* [Bucharest], 1939-40). It is known that a great number of Romanian Gypsies perished under the Nazis during World War II, but no subsequent population figures have been released, and there has been no press coverage on Gypsy schools, organizations or living conditions similar to the articles which have appeared in other Satellite countries. The Gypsy population of Albania is insignificant.



A cellist in the Budapest Gypsy Band. Gypsies and "Gypsy music" are, of course, a traditional feature of Hungarian life.

Photo from *Hungary* (Budapest), No. 3-4, 1956

example, *Lidova Demokracie*, February 6, 1957, hailed the "many Gypsies who have come to work" in the coal mines of the Sokolov district. On October 20, 1957, *Nepakarat* announced the formation of an organization called The National Federation of Hungarian Gypsies, but there was no significant press coverage of the "event," either at the time or in the year following.


The children of Gypsies who have settled down usually attend schools in the neighborhood and are taught in the local language. Similarly, Gypsies often adopt the religion of the country. For example, those in Bulgaria are frequently either Greek Orthodox or Moslem; in Poland and Hungary, they may be Roman Catholic. They may also be rather casual about their religious status, as can be seen from an article in *Eszakmagyarország* (Miskolc), February 1, 1958, which boasts of "150 Gypsy weddings this year" and explains the phenomenon as follows: "Many Gypsies wanted to legalize their status. The 'youngest pair' of those recently married had lived together more than 18 years 'married over a broomstick.'"

Although the Gypsies are neither numerous enough, nor sufficiently engaged politically to make or break the "revolution" anywhere in the area, their treatment is, perhaps, the prime example of the chronic inability of Communist officials to let anyone under their authority alone.

A second article, detailing, country-by-country, further minority problems in the Satellite States, will appear in a forthcoming issue of this magazine.


# The Race to Catch Up

At the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Union's Communist Party held in January, Premier Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed that by 1970 the economy of the Soviet Union will be outproducing that of the United States. By 1965, when the new Seven Year Plan ends, the Communist countries together will, he asserted, account for more than half the world's industrial production. The charts on the following two pages are an attempt to show in a graphic way what has happened in the race for economic supremacy since 1938. The production of four key industrial items—coal, steel, electric power and cement—rose rapidly in Eastern Europe and the USSR between 1938 and 1956. The West, however, did not stand still: in the production of cement and steel it maintained roughly the same pace, and in electric power its advance was only slightly less rapid. In 1956 the Soviet share of world production was less than that of Western Europe for all four items. Eastern Europe, starting from a very low level, had gained on Western Europe in the production of coal, electric power and steel, and formed an important adjunct to the industrial power of the USSR. Current plans in Eastern Europe call for industrial expansion at rates equalling or even exceeding the Soviet rate. However, comparisons restricted to the heavy industries fail to show the true strength of the West in the vast area of useful goods and services—roads, houses, light industry, agriculture, merchandising—where the Communists have made little progress. The charts below, taken from a Czechoslovak publication, show how the Communists employ these vague but striking comparisons to impress public opinion both at home and abroad.



The USSR's new Seven Year Plan (left) calls for an 80 percent increase in industrial production over the next seven years. Chart on right illustrates Khrushchev's boast that by 1965 the economic "balance of power" will have shifted in favor of the Communist bloc. In 1958, according to the chart on the right, the Communist countries had 33 percent of the world's industrial production; in 1965 they will account for "over 50 percent."


Charts from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), January 31, 1959




The chart compares the production of four basic industries in Eastern Europe, the USSR, Western Europe and the USA in the period 1938-1960. It does not measure the economic efficiency of the four areas. Eastern Europe (EE): Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Western Europe (WE): United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Italy, Spain and Portugal. "Hard coal" means bituminous and anthracite. Figures for 1960 are estimates.




# Share of World Production, 1956 (Percent)




**Hard Coal**



**Electric Power**



**Crude Steel**



**Cement**

The chart shows the relative shares of Eastern Europe, the USSR, Western Europe and the USA in the world production of hard coal, crude steel, electric power and cement in the year 1956. For definitions, see previous chart. In the USA, oil and natural gas have displaced coal in many uses.

## Life Among the New Class

IN THE HONEYMOON of Poland's 1956 October "revolution," the notorious "closed shops" or "yellow-curtain shops," which had become a symbol of the existence of a privileged echelon of Communist Party leaders, officially disappeared. In these shops articles unavailable to the general public were cheaply purchased by what Milovan Djilas has called "the new class." Although Gomulka's ascent to power ostensibly eliminated such blatant indications of hierarchy, the concept of a privileged elite has not disappeared. The survival of the "closed shops" is a striking reminder of this fact.

As the housekeeper and governess from 1954 to 1957 of Czeslaw Babinski, Minister of Industrial Construction, Mrs. Irena Swiat-Ihnatowicz was in a unique position to observe the system of privileges of the Party bourgeoisie. Mrs. Swiat-Ihnatowicz originally came from a land-owning family in the Poznan district, and during the war she was imprisoned on the charge of collaborating with illegal underground groups. Unemployed at the end of 1953, she answered an advertisement to the effect that a middle-aged society woman was required in the home of a cultured man in Warsaw as housekeeper and governess of his children. Because of her education and background she was hired. In the following interview, broadcast over Radio Free Europe, Mrs. Swiat-Ihnatowicz, who escaped to Sweden from a tourist ship in 1958, describes the revival of the "closed shops":

"After October (1956) when it was announced that the 'yellow-curtain shops' had been closed down, they continued to exist in a more discreet way. Instructions were issued not to go to the stores on foot, but drive up in a car, and also not to carry packages out of there yourself. Only chauffeurs were permitted to do this . . . so that the public should not see a minister's wife coming out with a load of parcels. . . . The personnel, consisting exclusively of UB [security police] members, knew their clients well and would not sell anything to strangers, saying that they had no goods. The goods were, in fact, concealed. But whenever I went there, I got everything I wanted, since the clerks knew I was the minister's housekeeper. . . .

"The store is divided into three sections. In the first there are meat, sausages, and dairy products, including many imported goods. . . . The second section contains imported fruit, coffee, foreign wines, brandies, etc. Textiles and other goods are in the third section—fine linen and underwear imported from Germany, slippers from Hungary and Yugoslavia . . . perfumes from abroad, Russian furs . . . Czech ice-boxes, washing-machines, TV sets, German radios. . . .

"In these shops foodstuffs are 25% cheaper than in regular stores, and incidentally are the only articles for which the minister has to pay. If the minister or his wife wishes to buy, for example, a TV set, a piano . . . or a bicycle, all they need do is to go to the store and select the merchandise. The bill is paid by the ministry. . . . The ministers also receive annually, and free-of-charge, coupons for three suits; the bills are paid by the ministry.



"Oh, I know, comrade, that there are still some disproportions in everyday life. . . ."  
Szpilki (Warsaw), July 7, 1957

"During the Christmas season . . . the stores are particularly crammed with new merchandise. The children get gifts from the store in the form of enormous packets of imported fruits and Polish export chocolate. . . .

"There are no restrictions [as to the number of purchases which can be made at the stores] with the exception of free-of-charge furs and suits. As the stores sell things which are unavailable on the market, it pays to buy them there and sell them at the so-called bazaars. For example, [at one time] the Rozycki bazaar in Warsaw's Szezbek Square literally flourished under the quantity of modern Russian tapestries at 1,500 *zloty* each. All of them without exception came from the ministerial stores. The wives had bought them at 200 *zloty* each, then re-sold them on the regular market. Members of the Central Committee have separate, still better stores; generals also have their own special shops.

### Other Privileges of the Party Hierarchy

"Each minister has at least six personal servants, paid by his department. These servants officially occupy posts which have nothing in common with their real functions. For example, while I was a housekeeper, my identity card was issued by the Ministry of Industrial Construction and I was paid as a manageress of a machine shop. . . . [In some cases the ministers do not wish to keep so many servants], the minister may want to save, so he draws from his department the wages of more servants than he has. . . .

"An exclusive kindergarten (situated in Lazienki Palace Park in Warsaw) is intended only for children of ministers, vice-ministers and generals. . . . These children are subject to regular medical examinations and health tests performed by Doctor Majewska from the Clinic for Government Members. . . . They were the first ones in Poland to be vaccinated against polio."

# Workers and the State: II

## Destruction of the Hungarian Workers' Councils

*In 1950 the Yugoslav Communists set up workers' councils in an effort to acquire more popular support for their regime after its break with Moscow. The councils spread to Poland and Hungary during the revolutionary summer and fall of 1956. A previous article (January 1959) described the part played by the Polish councils in the rise of Gomulka, and the way in which Gomulka has since managed to reduce their threat to Communist orthodoxy. The councils in Hungary acquired great power during and after the October Revolt, so much so that Yugoslav leaders argued for their recognition as Hungary's true government. This article details the origin and rapid growth of the Hungarian councils, their stout-hearted opposition to the Communists, and their final, inevitable defeat.*



Members of the so-called "workers' militia." These bully-boys were organized by the Kadar regime after the Revolt to counteract the workers' councils.

Photo from "The Counterrevolutionary Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Accomplices," published by the Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic; Budapest

THE AGITATION for workers' councils began in Hungary during the summer of 1956 in the same way it did in Poland, as part of the current of popular discontent which led to the crisis of October. But the violence and tragedy in Hungary gave the councils a quite different role to play. With the outbreak of fighting, the Hungarian Communist Party ceased to exist as an organized body, its active members either throwing in their lot with the various revolutionary groups or else disappearing from the scene. Workers' councils sprang up all over the country in the first days of the Revolt, quickly allying themselves with other popular forces until they bore a strong resemblance to the Soviets of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. They fought not simply for "self-government in the factory" but for national independence and political freedom. After the Soviet Union had crushed the Revolt, the Kadar regime, which sought to combine political repression with a certain amount of concession to popular demands (particularly with respect to wages and living standards), recognized the right of "worker management" in the factory and allowed the councils to remain—at least in name—long after the leaders of the Revolt had been consigned to the dungeons of the security police. The elimination of the councils was done gradually over the course of a year, with a combination of terror and hypocrisy typical of Kadarist politics.

### In Tito's Shadow

THE MORAL AND ECONOMIC bankruptcy of the Hungarian regime had been manifest since the summer of 1953. Not until the summer of 1956, however, was it possible to say in public that the regime was naked. During the debates of those months the idea of workers' councils gained rapid acceptance among the dissidents within the Communist Party. Not only were the councils a popular demand among the workers, and among all those who hated the trade union bureaucracy, but they partook of the new aura of respectability surrounding Marshal Tito in neighboring Yugoslavia. As a partial concession to the demand for reform, the regime began to tout "democracy in the factory"—without, however, consenting to any change in the *status quo*. An editorial in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) on August 7 said that "democracy in the factories must be further developed, and the workers must be encouraged to a far greater extent to participate in the discussion of all problems connected with production." An effort was made to breathe some life into the moribund trade unions by giving them a little more authority within the factories, and in September the National Council of Trade Unions produced a draft resolution calling vaguely for "the independence of lower trade union strata in connection with the strengthening of democracy within the trade unions" and asserting that "the State organs must take trade union advice to a far greater extent than hitherto with respect to manpower and the saving of labor." (*Szabad Nep*, September 15.) Such exhortations meant little or nothing to the workers in the factories and to the rebellious group within the Party, except that the regime was clearly on the defensive and might be induced to retreat still further. The defeats it had

already suffered on the political front—the expulsion of Rakosi, the public admission of past injustices, etc.—suggested that the time was at hand for more thoroughgoing changes.

A model for such changes lay just across the Danube where Tito was offering Yugoslavia as an example for the rest of Eastern Europe. He played host during that summer to a number of visitors from Hungary, including engineers, economists and trade unionists. By the end of summer the subject of workers' councils was increasingly in the air. In September one of the turbulent meetings of the Petofi Circle—the organization of young intellectuals that acted as a forum for dissident ideas—heard Zoltan Vas, who had once been Rakosi's chief economist, describe his favorable impressions of Yugoslavia. His discussion of the workers' councils was not published in the Communist press, but it had a strong effect on those who attended the meeting.

In October the National Council of Trade Unions sent a delegation to Belgrade, where its leader told the Yugoslavs: "We have heard much about the workers' councils and we have now been given the opportunity of getting to know their activities. We are looking forward with great expectation to seeing them." (*Nepszava* [Budapest], October 13, 1956.) And the Party newspaper, *Szabad Nep*, said on October 14 that the delegation's visit "is of particular importance because we expect it to bring back many interesting and useful experiences on the working of democracy in Yugoslav enterprises, the workers' councils, and the problem of independence for enterprises which interests us very much."

Little by little the regime was being pushed toward an acceptance of workers' councils in Hungary. When First Secretary Erno Gero led a top-level delegation to Yugoslavia in mid-October, they were taken to a factory in Zagreb and politely introduced to the workers' council. According to Radio Budapest, October 19, the session lasted nearly three hours. "Recently much has been said about Yugoslav workers' councils, autonomy, the workers' part in directing the factory, factory democracy and the [way in which] Yugoslav workers assert their interests. Everybody who was present at these informal talks could see that the Yugoslav workers regard this factory as their own."

"Vlado Mihailovic, chairman of the factory workers' council, replying to a question by Janos Kadar, spoke on relations between the trade unions and the workers' councils and their scope of authority, and said that trade union activity in the factory is many-sided, important, and lively in the field of culture, politics and expert guidance. He said that the trade union is preparing for the election of the members of the workers' council. He mentioned another example as well: At the request of the workers the trade union has convened a meeting at which it was decided to replace the members of the management board and the workers' council."

Two days before the Revolt, on October 21, an article in the Party newspaper *Szabad Nep* reviewed the alternatives of reforming the trade unions in Hungarian factories or of introducing workers' councils. The writer concluded that "Hungarian traditions speak in favor of workers' councils. I believe it reasonable not to deal hastily, for the





Workers' housing in the Communist-built industrial center of Sztalinvaros (renamed Dunapentele during and for a few months after the 1956 Revolt). The construction of this "workers' city" was one of the great boasts of Hungarian Communism; as the article accompanying this picture said, "Sztalinvaros [has] a special atmosphere, which no one who has been there can ever forget. It rouses people out of old habits, and makes them share the vision of the great future that lies before Sztalinvaros." (*Hungary* [Budapest], June 1954.) The most dramatic moment of this future, of course, was the ardent participation of the Sztalinvaros workers in the Revolt, and their bitter, last-ditch struggle against Soviet troops. On November 7, 1956, three days after the second Soviet onslaught, Radio Rakoczi of Dunapentele, still unconquered, broadcast the reply of Dunapentele to the Soviet Command's call for surrender: "Dunapentele is the foremost Socialist town in Hungary. The majority of residents are workers and power is in their hands. After the victorious revolution of October 23 [1956], the workers elected the National Committee. . . . The population of the town is armed. The houses were all built by the workers themselves. The workers will defend the town from Fascist excesses—but also from Soviet troops. We are prepared to live in peace with the Soviets as long as they don't interfere in our internal affairs. The majority of factories and plants are working. There are no counter-revolutionaries in the town." A few days later, the workers succumbed to the Soviet tank armies.

time being, with such a complex problem. We should avail ourselves of the present set-up in developing plant democracy, but also keep other solutions in mind. We must take advantage of every available possibility."

One day before the Revolt, on October 22, the directors of the Petofi Circle issued a manifesto making ten demands of the Party Central Committee. The third one was: "The Central Committee and the Government should adopt every means possible to insure the development of Socialist democracy in Hungary . . . by asserting the legitimate political aspirations of the working class, and by introducing self-management in the factories and a workers' democracy." On the day of the Revolt itself another manifesto was read to the crowd which gathered at the statue of General Bem, this one issued by the presidium of the Hungarian Writers' Union. One of its seven demands was: "Factories should be directed by workers and specialists. The present wage system should be reformed, as should work norms and the disgraceful condition of social security, and so forth. Trade unions should truly represent the interests of the Hungarian working class."

The political tide was obviously pressing toward a wholesale reform of Hungarian Communism similar to that which

had occurred in Poland several days earlier. But for the fateful shots in front of the radio building the reform would have occurred, and the new leadership of the Party would have been committed to the establishment of workers' councils just as Gomulka was.

### The Soviets of 1956

AFTER THE INITIAL stage of the Revolt, when the impotence of the government had become manifest, the workers' councils began to appear throughout Hungary. They were part of that flowering of people's organizations—revolutionary committees, associations and councils of all sorts—that testified to the democratic nature of the Revolt. Though more than half of Hungary's industry is centered in the Budapest area, the greatest initiative came from workers in the provincial cities of Miskolc and Gyor where the political vacuum was also greatest. On October 26—the fourth day of the Revolt—Radio Budapest announced that the workers of Borsod County (the Miskolc area) had sent a delegation to Imre Nagy with 21 demands. These amounted to a summary of all the grievances that had been registered in the months preceding the Revolt, ranging from abuses of the security police to questions of foreign

trade, economic planning and farm collectivization. "To the workers of Borsod and Miskolc," said the broadcast, "Imre Nagy replied that he agreed with every point. . . . Tonight, or tomorrow morning, a new government will be formed, a Patriotic People's Front government. . . ."

This was followed in a few hours by the announcement of a new Party program, endorsing in substance most of the popular demands. One of its major points was the acceptance of workers' councils.

"The Central Committee deems correct the election of workers' councils in the factories through the intermediary of the trade union organs. To satisfy the legitimate material demands of the working class, wage increases must be implemented within the limits of our material possibilities; maximum efforts must be made in the first place for those in the lower-paid brackets."

That evening the Central Committee broadcast a formal statement on the subject of workers' councils, maintaining that its decision to speed their formation "was not the result of a few hours' deliberation."

"This resolution has been ripening for months. . . . There were discussions on workers' management of factories in the trade unions, in the Party organizations and at the meetings of intellectuals. Now life itself has decided the matter. We cannot say yet that the details of the new workers' management system are clear. We must experiment; practice itself will forge in our country the best methods of workers' management. However there is no doubt that the activity of our working classes, their sense of responsibility to their own cause—Socialism—, the skill and experience of our technical intelligentsia, will show us the best methods, methods which will lead to increased production, a greater personal participation by the workers and—through these—to a higher living standard for the working people. In recent days some factories such as the United Lamp Factory, the ironworks at Ozd and the Lenin Works, as well as others, have already formed workers' councils and elected to them the best of the workers and technicians. Now it is imperative that these workers organize the defense of their plants and prevent armed hooligans from ransacking the premises or damaging the machinery.

"They must not permit irresponsible elements to harm the cause of the workers, the cause of Socialism. We need order and peace in our country. The Central Committee of our Party and the newly elected Politburo have profound faith in our working classes, which they consider the leading force of Socialism and on which they will rely for support in every instance. In these tragic days it is particularly important that the working classes, worthy of their militant past, should take a stand for order and peace, just as many times before in our history. Through the establishment of workers' councils and through the organization of factory defense our working classes will assist the new Politburo of our Party and the new government in their efforts to bring about order as soon as possible and to commence with constructive work under the new conditions."

The Nagy wing of the Party was now in full control of the government, and sought to gain popular acceptance for its program of liberalized Communism. It evidently banked heavily on the workers' councils as an organized

nucleus for the re-establishment of public order—a hope which ultimately failed when the councils refused to support the Communists. The broadcasts of the provincial radio stations in the following days show in dramatic outline the rise of the workers' councils and their attitude toward the Nagy Communist government as it was constituted on October 27. The councils were clearly of a popular nature and some of their pronouncements showed that they did not trust the government. A general strike spread over the country. The workers, in unison with other groups, were demanding that the Soviet army cease fighting and withdraw from Hungary as a condition of their support for the Nagy government. Some councils also expressed their distrust of certain members of the government who had been associated with Rakosi and the Stalinists.

## Councils Adamant

On October 27 the Borsod County workers' council announced that it had called a general strike.

"For two days the city of Miskolc has been under the leadership of the workers' council and the students' parliament. The workers' council has taken over control of the garrison and the police. The demands of the workers' council and of the students have been made publicly known by radio and press—the 21 points of the workers' councils as well as the universities' 11 points. As you know, the county strike committee has also called on all plants in the county to strike, with the exception of mail, transport, communications, food supplies, health services and power plants. . . .

"The government still does not comply with our demands, and especially with our most important demand that Soviet troops be withdrawn at once. In yesterday's message the government said, 'Let order be restored and Soviet troops will withdraw to their bases.' The workers of Borsod County adhere to the stand they have taken and demand immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. Soviet troops shall stop military operations at once and shall immediately begin withdrawing from our country. Only then will there be order in the country. Only then will Borsod County stop the strike. The entire working class of Borsod County sticks as faithfully to this primary demand as it did two days ago." (Radio Miskolc, October 27.)

Across the country from Borsod, Radio Gyor was also calling for Soviet withdrawal, speaking in the name of "the workers' power of Gyor-Sopron County and its leading organization, the Provisional National Council of Gyor-Sopron County, which is comprised of the workers' council, the soldiers' council, the peasants' council, the intellectuals' council and the youth council."

On October 28, in the afternoon, Radio Miskolc broadcast an appeal from "the workers' councils and student parliament of Borsod County" calling for a new government that would carry out the demands of the people.

"An appeal to Hungarian workers' councils and freedom fighters! Debrecen, Szeged, Hatvan, Szekesfeharvar, Pecs, Szombathely, Gyor, Moson-Magyarovar, Szolnok, Nyiregyhaza and all workers' councils, freedom fighters and youth



Typical Hungarian propaganda picture of happy, healthy, clean-cut workers grinning broadly over their spotless machines. (Photo from *Hungary* [Budapest], April 1955.) A year and a half after this picture was published, just such workers as these were battling Hungarian regime forces and Soviet troops.

of the country!

"In the course of our several days' fight for freedom, the joint demands of the entire country are slowly beginning to take shape. Therefore, we workers, students and armed forces under the leadership of the workers' council and student parliament of Miskolc submit the following proposal:

"1. We demand a new provisional government, one truly democratic, sovereign and independent, fighting for a free and Socialist Hungary, excluding all ministers who served in the Rakosi regime. . . .

"3. The first act of this new independent provisional government . . . shall be the immediate recall of Soviet troops from our country. . . .

"4. The new government shall include in its program, and carry out, the demands of all workers' councils and student parliaments of the country. . . .

"Let us adopt a common position based on the above. This position appears so far to be shared by all and is by no means the same as that of the present government, which is relying on a foreign power. . . ."

On October 29 Radio Gyor called for a general strike:

"At a meeting attended by representatives of the workers' councils of Pecs, Dorog, Tokod, Tatabanya, Tata and Miskolc, we passed a resolution: we shall carry out our desire for immediate withdrawal of the Russians from the country with the help of our only weapon—that is, with a strike! The council vowed that they would not produce coal until the last Soviet division has left Hungary. The youth of Gyor will not work. . . . Support our strike until we have won. . . . Strike for a free and independent Hungary!"

On October 30 Radio Szombathely (in Vas County) broadcast a similar message:

"How long does the government intend to wait before issuing a cease-fire and ordering the recall of foreign troops

from the capital? . . . So long as these demands are not fulfilled, the working people of County Vas will maintain the strike. . . ."

In Szabolcs-Szatmar County, on the border of the Soviet Union, the workers were also on strike.

"We have visited one of the largest plants in Szabolcs-Szatmar County, the tobacco factory, to inquire about the program of the recently formed workers' council. The workers are fully satisfied with the plant council—after all, they elected its members freely, without any outside pressure. However, they are less satisfied with the town workers' council. Without mentioning names, they implied that there were people in leading positions who had been faithful minions of the Hungarian dictator Rakosi even during the Stalin era. As to production, the workers insist that they will not go back to their jobs as long as there are Russian troops in Hungary." (Radio Miskolc, October 30.)

In subsequent days the workers' councils figured less prominently in public announcements. The Revolt was sweeping everything before it, and the country burgeoned with Revolutionary Councils and revivals of the old political parties. The popular demands were met in principle when, on October 30, Nagy reshuffled his cabinet to include representatives of the Smallholders and Peasant parties and called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

With the Soviet military onslaught of November 4, the history of the workers' councils entered a new phase. Although the regime of Janos Kadar immediately recognized the councils along with many other revolutionary demands, the councils refused to accept Kadar. Long after active fighting had ceased the councils continued to be militant centers of resistance, demonstrating once again that Hungarian Communism lacked support, particularly among the workers.

## Kadar Woos the Councils

IN HIS FIRST public announcement Kadar issued a 15-point program that was similar in substance to that put forward by the Nagy regime in the early days of the Revolt. As broadcast on the morning of November 4, it stated (point 9): "On the basis of the broadest democracy, worker management must be inaugurated in factories and enterprises." With this much recognition the councils were soon able to expand their power and organization until their representatives were dealing with those of Kadar practically on an equal basis. Kadar had the Soviet troops, while the councils had the factories. On November 13 and 14 the councils in the Budapest area elected a "Workers' Council of Greater Budapest," with 21 members representing the various districts of the city and other representatives in attendance from the surrounding province. The Council immediately demanded the reinstatement of Imre Nagy, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, free elections and the recognition of workers' councils as political organizations on a nationwide level. The provincial councils were equally steadfast in their opposition to Kadar, and the council at Ozd (in Borsod County) published a pronouncement on November 14 calling Kadar a traitor and stating

that the workers would continue to strike:

"No. The working class informs Kadar and his associates that it will not cooperate in any way whatsoever with traitors.

"The workers of Ozd, Diosgyor, Kazincbarcika, Borsodnadasd and Salgotarjan, the miners of the Borsod and Ozd Coal Trust, stand in solid ranks against Kadar and Company. Everywhere the democratically elected workers' councils, enjoying the full confidence of the workers, are heading the strikes. Many council members have seen 30 or 40 years of active service in the workers' movement. Many of them are Communists. Take the Ozd Revolutionary Workers' Council for instance: that's us!

"Kadar and his associates must realize by now that their plans have fizzled out. They meet everywhere with the strongest resistance. Our people will never again be governed against its will. The sweeping force of the revolution and its ideals have awakened the working millions. These millions expect that their justified demands will be complied with.

"Kadar must sincerely and openly express what he has to say to the people and give an acceptable excuse for his deeds. He must make an effort to tell them what he is able to do and what he is not able to do. Above all he should never attempt—since it is useless to attempt the impossible—to restore the honor of himself and his group in the eyes of the population of this country." (*Szabad Ozd*, organ of the Revolutionary Workers' Council of Ozd, November 14, 1956.)


The attitude of the workers brought from the regime a desperate melange of promises and pleas. The Party news-

paper *Nepszabadsag* said on November 14 that all cause for resistance was ended and that only irresponsible elements were refusing to go back to work.

"Why is there still a strike? What political end does it serve? Who is responsible for the fact that in many Budapest factories work has not been resumed? Let us answer the second question first. The pompously-worded leaflets plastered on the walls of Budapest streets assert that the continuation of the strike is an expression of the united determination of the Hungarian working class. . . . This is not so; this is a barefaced lie.

"Honest workers . . . want to work. They want to work not only because their pride commands them to live on their own labor and not on charity, but also because they know that the inflation, into which irresponsible elements are ready to drive the country, would affect their own wives and children. . . . The strike merely delays still longer the withdrawal of Soviet troops and postpones the democratic political development that must take place in our fatherland."

On the same day Premier Kadar, conferring with a workers' delegation, gave the appearance of acceding to popular demands for elections, inclusion of non-Communist parties in the government and abolition of the secret police. Speaking of the elections Kadar said: "Let us consider the position of the Party. We want a multiparty system and free, honest elections. We know that this will be no easy matter, because the workers' power can be destroyed not only by bullets but also by ballots. We have to take into account the fact that we may be thoroughly



Csepel Island, near Budapest, is the center of one of the largest Hungarian industrial complexes. Above, Communist-built housing for Csepel workers, as shown in the English-language propaganda magazine *Hungary* (Budapest), July-August, 1954. Two years later, during the Revolt, the workers of Csepel were in the forefront of the uprising against the Communist regime. In this struggle they were led by their Revolutionary Workers' Council. On November 3, 1956, the day before the final Soviet onslaught, Csepel workers supported Imre Nagy's plea to resume production. (Radio Free Kossuth, Budapest, November 3, 1956.) On the morning of November 4, the Trans-Danubian Free Military Radio broadcast that "All Budapest bridges have been occupied by Soviet troops. . . . The Army units and freedom fighters at Csepel continue to hold out." And as late as November 9, radio reports stated that the Csepel workers were still battling the Soviets and were being reinforced from rural areas "on authorization of rural workers' and peasants' councils."



beaten at the elections, but we do take on the election fight, since the Communist Party has sufficient strength to obtain once more the confidence of the working masses." (*Nepszabadsag*, November 14.)

Thus the workers' councils were not only accepted as a legitimate institution in the factory, but were strong enough to bargain with the regime on political questions. In this they differed from the Revolutionary Committees which had taken over most governmental functions in the latter days of the Revolt: these political organizations were quickly pushed aside, and in a decree of November 12 were given only "advisory" functions to perform. The distinction evidently resulted from the new regime's desire to pose as a popular, "worker-peasant" government within the limits of the "liberal Communist" program evolved before the Revolt. That program had accepted workers' councils, but it had not allowed for the sort of political activity typified by the Revolutionary Committees.


The constitution and powers of the workers' councils had never been precisely defined. The National Council of Trade Unions had declared on October 27 that a council was to be composed of from 21 to 71 members, depending on the size of the enterprise, and that the council would appoint a board of from 5 to 15 members which would be responsible for the continuing management. The councils were to work out the enterprises' production plans, reform the wage system, decide questions relating to investment and the distribution of profits, and be responsible for the proper management of the enterprises and for the "satisfaction of the workers' social and cultural requirements." This outline, though inevitably vague, was very similar to the charter of the Yugoslav workers' councils.

On November 21, Radio Budapest broadcast the draft of a law on workers' councils which filled in some of the details left out before.

"... In arriving at its decisions... [the presidium of the workers' council] must pay attention to the trade union committee within the enterprise... Decisions of the workers' council and its presidium are to be carried out by the director. In case a decision... runs counter to law... the director is duty-bound to refuse to implement it and to report the decision to the higher authority. The director of the enterprise alone organizes the production process... Workers who fail to carry out work assigned them or who do so in a negligent manner are to be called to account by the director. Should the presidium fail to take steps in connection with maintaining continuous production and toward assuring plan fulfillment, the director must make good the omission within his own field of authority... The director of the enterprise is appointed to and relieved from his post by the superior State organ designated by law. The previous consent of the workers' council is needed for the appointment or removal of the director."

## The Councils Hold Fast

**B**UT THE COUNCILS had already transcended this official blueprint and had declared war on the whole Kadar regime. The Greater Budapest Workers' Council had called a conference of representatives from plants in Buda-



An attack on workers' councils for inefficiency. Title: "Where debate is the most important activity." Caption: "'Comrades, help, the house is on fire!' 'Take it easy, first we must finish the discussion.'"  
Ludas Matyi (Budapest), August 22, 1957

pest and the surrounding area to be held in Budapest on November 21. The regime forbade this assembly and dispersed it with troops. In retaliation the Council called a general strike, and the country's factories—just beginning to resume production—were emptied again for 48 hours. The regime issued warnings that it was not prepared to countenance political activity by the workers' councils. The trade union newspaper *Nepakarat* declared on November 24 that the chief function of the councils was economic, and that the strike then in progress was illegal because the councils had no right to call a strike.

"The principal task of the workers' councils... is to insure the most economical operation of the enterprise... The workers' councils are efficient if, as a result of their work, their enterprise improves its performances and thus increases the workers' income... One cannot emphasize strongly enough that the local workers' councils are organs of local business management, not political organs or bodies protecting the workers' interests. The trade unions are the chief organs for the protection of workers' interests... Workers councils should not act in place of trade unions but rather in cooperation with them..."

"Not even the most perfect and democratic decree concerning the workers' councils will assure the right to strike, for the simple reason that the right in question is not connected with the workers' councils. The workers' councils fill the role of the enterprises' business management; the right to strike, on the other hand, is a form of protecting interests—a trade union activity."

By early December the regime concluded that its policy of accommodation would not work. Neither the workers nor the population in general evinced any loyalty to Kadar despite his attempts to dress his regime in popular colors. Budapest was seething with suppressed violence, posters and leaflets appeared inciting the people against Kadar, and various incidents and demonstrations occurred. On December 6 wholesale arrests were made. They included an undetermined—but apparently large—number of men active in the workers' councils. In reaction, the workers held "silent demonstrations," and there were spontaneous

calls for a new general strike. The Budapest Workers' Council reportedly advised against a strike, but sent the government a telegram protesting the arrests. On the following day there were strikes and further incidents in Budapest. Western correspondents reported that the Budapest Workers' Council had issued a proclamation charging that the continued arrests of council members would end in "a general strike, bloodshed and a new national tragedy" and had demanded an answer from the government by 8 p.m. *Nepakarat* bemoaned the shortage of coal:

"Why is this . . . worry inflicted upon the people? . . . Let us give a straightforward reply. It is because miners are unaware of their responsibility. In the Tata, Borsod, Nograd and Pecs coal basins, almost day after day, almost shift by shift, there are strikes which are no longer justified in any respect. As soon as coal production is about to get underway, one or two stray rumors, new or revived demands, imaginary or real grievances, promptly begin to emerge. . . . Workers' councils and miners who are aware of realities . . . must oppose any work stoppage."

On December 9 the Budapest Workers' Council called a general strike for December 11 and 12. A few hours after the strike call, the regime ordered the dissolution of the Council and all other workers' councils organized outside factory gates on a regional basis. It also declared martial law starting December 11. In its statement on the dissolution of the regional councils it charged that they had become tools of the "counterrevolution":

"The counterrevolution also endeavors to make use of the workers' organizations. . . . Weeks ago, in Budapest and other parts of the country, district organizations of the workers' councils were . . . formed without any legal basis and despite warnings by government authorities.

"The Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government disagreed with the establishment of district workers' councils and did not recognize them. On several occasions, it has had talks with members of the Budapest Workers' Council . . . hoping that this Council would be able to assist factory workers' councils in carrying out their tasks. Practice, however, proved something quite different. The district workers' councils did not help the factory workers' councils. . . . In its four circular letters issued so far, the Budapest Workers' Council has not made a single reference to the effective tasks of the factory workers' councils. . . . Members of the Budapest Workers' Council aimed at dealing exclusively with political matters and at developing district organizations of the workers' councils into a new organ of State power against legal State executive bodies. . . .

"Certain counterrevolutionary elements who edged their way into the Budapest Central Workers' Council—for instance, Imre Nemeskeri Kiss . . . and Endre Mester . . . and other people like them, set for themselves the aim of disarming the police and taking over its control. At an illegal national conference held a few days ago, the majority of members of the Budapest Workers' Council agitated for renewed bloodshed, provocations and strikes. . . . It has been proved that sober-minded workers cannot assert their will in the Budapest Workers' Council against the . . . majority who more and more openly want revolution. . . . For this reason, the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government outlaws the Budapest Central

Workers' Council, the Budapest district council and provincial county and town workers' councils and ends their existence immediately.

"At the same time . . . all industrial ministries, industrial directorates and council authorities are instructed to give far-reaching support to factory workers' councils in discharging their economic tasks. . . . It is known that there are also undesirable elements in the factory workers' councils which hamper the activities of these bodies. . . . The Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government is of the opinion that the purging of undesirable elements in workers' councils in every factory is the primary concern of the workers. . . ."

## Arrest and Torture

**M**ORE ARRESTS followed. On December 11 the President and Secretary of the Budapest Council, Sandor Racz and Sandor Bali, were arrested. Telephone communications between Budapest and the provinces were cut. Nevertheless, despite all the regime's security measures, the strike order went out through the railroad workers and was widely observed.

These acts of suppression brought strong comments from Yugoslavia, where only several days earlier Vice President Kardelj had told the National Assembly that the Soviet intervention in Hungary would prove justified only if the new regime would "enable the working class to achieve influence upon State policy through the workers' councils and other similar bodies, which it was unable to do in the past. . . . If such results fail to appear, the very fact of intervention will be condemned by history. . . ." Radio Belgrade declared on December 11: "There is no doubt that in Hungary a heavy blow has been dealt to Socialist democratism in its first stage." And on the same day the newspaper *Borba* (Belgrade) said that Kadar was returning to methods of "Stalinist despotism":

"Sad and tragic reports are again reaching us from Hungary. As telephone communication has been cut off, we do not have a complete picture of the situation, but judging from the brief reports emanating from Radio Budapest one imagines that the worst is again happening—action which cannot lead to a solution. Not because naked force has again been given the tragic privilege of proving its own absurdity, but rather because it is now more evident than ever before that it has not been learned, because there is no will to learn, that Hungary's cardinal need lies in a fundamental change of the political system. . . .

"[The workers' councils] enjoyed the full confidence of 4,500,000 Hungarian toilers. . . . By their very existence the workers' councils acted in the direction of a much needed improvement of the situation. But it was not possible to stop there. Their role could not be reduced to that of a kind of economic adviser. . . . To isolate the workers' councils, to conduct a campaign against them, and to see a class enemy in them—means inevitably to strengthen the old and discredited transmissions of authority, the discredited mechanism and system of Stalinist despotism."

Henceforth the councils were given little quarter. They were purged of their more intransigent members, deprived



A complaint that functionaries impose their will on workers' councils. Title: "How some people see unity." Caption: "You see, comrade, we are all agreed."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 18, 1957

of all important powers and steadily infiltrated by agents of the regime. A decree issued on January 5, 1957, reduced the scope of the councils' activity to little more than the setting of wage and premium scales in collaboration with management. In protest against these developments many workers' councils resigned. The council in Csepel—heart of Hungary's heavy industry—declared on January 10 that it could not play the role envisioned for it by the regime. Nor could it remain passive "when members of our council are arrested and tortured without justification, and when the whole work of the workers' council is declared to be 'counterrevolutionary.'" The action of the Csepel council was denounced by *Nepszabadsag*, January 12, as "provocative":

"There are, however, some workers' councils that flee from their duties, and provocatively dissolve themselves, and what is more, incite for further bloodshed and strikes. Fundamentally this was the road chosen by the Csepel Ironworkers' Council when it announced its resignation day before yesterday. Following their example workers' councils in other enterprises have also resigned, or rather, suspended their activities. The originators of this provocative act, however, were not satisfied and went on to prod the workers' council of other plants to follow their example, and what is more, organized further disturbances in Csepel, resulting most regrettably in the death of one worker."

As the Communist functionaries returned to the factories from which they had been ousted by the Revolt, they faced bitter hostility from the workers' councils. On January 23 *Nepszabadsag* described the situation in one plant as follows:

"The workers' council is wary of Party organization work, objects to giving premises to the Party organization group within the plant, does not invite them to the council meetings, and does not take any notice of their existence. The organization committee in fact is quite worried that in the event of lay-offs the antipathy against the Communists will be manifested in a more tangible way."

And on the next day:

"The president of a local Party organization committee visited our offices and complained bitterly about his constant debates and fights with the workers' councils. He said that despite many Party members, no contact can be established with the workers. 'We cannot make ourselves understood,' he said, and asked us to make him heard through our newspaper since—as he said—'What does it avail us if we have good Party premises, plenty of members, and yet cannot get across to the workers?'"

## Infiltration

The regime now adopted the thesis that the workers' councils had been infiltrated by "alien and counterrevolutionary elements," and that it was up to the workers themselves to purge their leaders and to elect reliable members to the councils. This process went on for several months. On March 14, 1957, *Nepszabadsag* said:

"There are plants where Communists participate in the management of the workers' councils, and demand the assistance of Party organs. However, we still find plants where a few doubtful characters are still members of the councils and even call the tune. We do not make a secret of our wish that the workers should withdraw their confidence from these people and support the decent and honest council members. The leadership of the workers' councils must be entrusted from now on to wise and reliable men."

At a Party conference held at the end of June, 1957, Kadar seemed ready to write off the workers' councils as a hopeless institution:

"The road followed by the workers' councils so far has not been promising on the whole. They were set up under conditions and operated by elements which made them servants of counterrevolutionary interests. What should be done? The Party can bring about a solution only if it is endorsed by the absolute majority of the workers. Therefore the Party must soon work out a policy on this issue, which first must be thoroughly debated with trade union representatives, workers' councils and the workers themselves." (*Nepszabadsag*, June 28.)

The conference passed a resolution which hinted that a wholesale reorganization of the councils was under consideration, one that would place them under the dominance of the trade unions (*Nepszabadsag*, June 30):

"In the opinion of the Party conference the workers' councils in our country are still in an experimental stage. The negative features of their early activities have disappeared in just the degree that they have been able to get rid of the class-alien and counterrevolutionary elements that assumed the leadership in the beginning. The activity and authority of the workers' councils must be guided in the future by careful research, conferences with the workers and discussions. . . . With regard to the further widening of plant democracy and the future of the workers' councils, we must think in terms of giving an increasingly important role to the trade unions, which have a well-established tradition of eight decades and which must be invested with more authority than hitherto."

The regime was evidently preparing the ground for

eliminating the workers' councils, without formally abandoning the principle of giving the workers some voice in the running of their factories. It is not clear whether this was a long-calculated policy or whether it arose from a realization that the workers' councils were bound to remain a source of trouble so long as they had any independence at all. At any rate, after midsummer of 1957 all discussion of workers' councils ceased. No mention of them was made in the press or in official speeches until October when *Társadalmi Szemle*, the Party's theoretical organ, indicated that a new policy had been decided on.

"Democratization is in order for the factories, but the workers' councils are unsuitable for this purpose. The widening of factory democracy can best be served by . . . a system of factory councils, directed by the trade unions, thus assuring extensive influence of the workers' Party on factory management."

### End of the Councils

The new policy was announced at a meeting of the National Council of Trade Unions in November of that year. The Council's resolution stated that "since the workers' councils have practically all been dissolved, it has been found important that more authority over production, management and control be given to the workers themselves." The decree, which had been already adopted by the government and the presidium of the Trade Union Council, provided that the workers' councils were to be formally dissolved and replaced by "factory councils." The factory councils were to consist of from 15 to 125 members, under the leadership of the chairman of the factory trade union committee. Two-thirds of the members were to be trade union officials elected by the trade union committee, while the remaining one-third were to be elected by the workers. The factory director, the chief engineer, the controller, the Secretary of the Party committee and the Secretary of the Communist Youth Union were automatically members of the council.

The anticipated role of the factory councils was well described—if any description were needed—by Gyorgy Varga, secretary of the Trade Union Council (*Nepakarat*, November 17):

"Why are the factory councils needed? First of all,

because this is a suitable means of drawing all the workers of an enterprise into management and control. If the factory councils function well, they may become important factors in strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and in improving the economy. They may also play a serious role in the battle for protecting social property."

### Conclusion

THE FUNCTIONS of the Hungarian factory councils and the Polish workers' councils now seem to be practically identical to the "production conferences" which have operated in the Soviet Union since the 1920's and are accepted practice in the other Satellites. These are meetings of the workers conducted under the auspices of the trade unions, in which various problems of production are discussed—or explained—and the workers are exhorted to apply themselves with vigor and intelligence to the tasks set forth for them. Both the Polish and Hungarian regimes still give lip service to the notion of "worker management," but they interpret it in a way that differs little if at all from the traditional Communist conception of trade union activity. In that conception, the function of the trade union is to guide the workers toward better production rather than to defend their interests against a hostile employer. There can be no fundamental conflict between the proletariat and its own State, and therefore no necessity exists for special working class organizations in opposition to the State. Tito's philosophers have challenged this thesis by asserting that the State may acquire a momentum of its own, even under "Socialism," and that measures need to be taken to reduce central power and transfer as much of it as possible to the local organs of the people. This has been the basic rationale of the Yugoslav workers' councils, no matter how much they may have departed from the ideal conception of "workers' self-management." But the relative weakness of the Communist Parties in Poland and Hungary made it impossible to carry through the sort of reforms made in Yugoslavia. Such a dispersion of power would have meant either the end of the Communists—as in Hungary—or a loss of their economic control. Since they could not simply dispense with the popular notion of workers' councils, their only alternative was to find a way of neutralizing them.

### Heads per Pillow, Feet per Shoe

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S HOUSING problem is no better and no worse than it was nine years ago, according to the State Statistical Office in Prague. The Party newspaper *Rude Pravo* (Prague) said on December 28, 1958, that the average number of people per apartment was 3.40 at the end of 1957 as compared to 3.42 in March 1950. By 1970, the paper promised, the ratio will fall to "only 2.92." It supplied the following figures:

	March 1, 1950	December 31, 1957
Number of inhabitants (thousand) . .	12,338	13,494
Number of apartments (thousand) . .	3,613	3,950
Number of rooms (thousand) . . . . .	8,013	8,729
Living space (thousand sq. meters) . .	139,685	153,000
Number of inhabitants per apt. . . . .	3.42	3.40
Square meters per inhabitant . . . . .	11.32	11.40
Number of inhabitants per room . . . .	1.54	1.54



## "Mr. Puritanical Desperado in a Socialist Country"

by

Zygmunt Kaluzynski

*This interesting analysis of American literature and its impact on Polish writers and readers appeared in the Warsaw weekly Polityka, October 25, 1958. Its author, Zygmunt Kaluzynski, is a well-known literary critic and essayist (and a member of the Party). He is in his late thirties, and is currently attached to Polityka, the organ of Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka. Kaluzynski's essay displays a considerable knowledge of American literature and of its social and historical background.*

AN IMPORTANT CULTURAL event of the last two years, perhaps the most important, was the appearance on our literary market of contemporary American literature. We may consider this as now having been accomplished: we are already familiar with the leading works of Steinbeck, Hemingway, Faulkner, Caldwell and Mailer, or, in other words, authors acknowledged as the most representative writers of contemporary American literature (I do have some reservations as far as Faulkner is concerned, since several of his best known books, such as "The Sound and the Fury" and "Light in August," have not yet appeared in Polish translation; however, "The Wild Palms," "Sanctuary" and the recently published two volumes of his novels do provide us with a certain knowledge of his talents). We have been introduced to the "thirty-year-old" generation—Truman Capote, for example; we are acquainted with Algren and McCullers, that 'second generation,' the exponents of a perhaps more subtle version of the masters of the twenties. No doubt these young authors will yet provide us with many more interesting emotions; nevertheless, it may be said that the first and major shock of acquaintance has already occurred.

Similar "impact-full" encounters are a rarity in the annals of culture and are usually associated with a thoroughgoing transformation of existing tastes. Such was the case, for example, of Greek literature during the Renaissance, German literature during the Romantic epoch and Scandinavian literature during the modern period. Our sudden contact with American literature, though of lesser importance, is nevertheless an experiment that provides much food for thought. It is the first time that the most dynamic literature of the Western world has entered upon grounds heretofore under the sole influence of Socialist teaching.

This collision occurring in our land is being closely observed by both sides, as is shown by the equally animated reactions of the Soviet and Western worlds. Although these

opinions are characterized by schematism, political "wishful thinking" and provocative swiftness of judgment, one cannot resist the impression that concealed behind them lies expectant hope. Is it absolutely necessary that the two basic cultures be mutually destructive? One cannot wonder at the overly hasty evaluations presented by the foreign commentators from both sides, if even the "on-the-spot" witnesses to this fascinating experiment, i.e. our own critics, have displayed more than a little intellectual indolence as far as this subject is concerned. It is true that the American arrivals are being discussed here, but such discussions either have the overtones of an impish giggle, a la *Przekroj*,\* or are conducted along specialized rarified lines that seem to me blindly unaware of the issues involved. Thus, as we read the latest news from Tutankhamen's tomb, supplied us by our archeological press, we get the distinct impression that this famous collision which was to have produced a multitude of sparks, actually took place under an old eiderdown, while the waiting world heard nothing but a barely audible plink.

### "Two 'American Literatures', or One?"

OUR SELECTION of American authors followed rather closely the pattern established throughout the rest of Europe—especially in France after 1945, the year that American literature made its mass debut on the markets of the Old World. American realists of the Dreiser, Dos Passos and Sinclair Lewis type, awakened little or no interest, although their works were also translated. Greatest stress was placed on the writers of the Great Crisis of the Thirties, Hemingway and Faulkner, representatives of the highest achievement—in the opinion of the critics—as well as on their acolytes, such as Caldwell, Steinbeck, the younger-than-they Mailer, etc.

These writers were best suited to the then reigning post-

\* A rather light-hearted Cracow weekly.



Tennessee Williams' play "A Streetcar Named Desire" was recently produced in Warsaw. Above, Blanche Dubois primps, while the loutish Stanley Kowalski and his friends play cards.

Photo from *Swiat* (Warsaw), September 21, 1958

war fashion of existentialism: their refined austerity, obsession with brutality, delight in the psychological nightmare, derision of the moral, social and civilized values of their period, projection of chaos and willingness to deal with the deterioration of man's will power, conscience and ethics—all these negative factors, which, by the way, succeeded in providing their authors with the title "black literature," were perfectly in unison with the climate of stolid desperation underlining the ideological crisis prevalent in postwar Europe.

American observers have frequently pointed out that in their own country the popularity of these *avant garde* writers is confined mainly to circles of intellectually ambitious and highly selective readers, who by no means constitute the reading majority. Therefore, acquaintance with these authors is definitely not an introduction to typical American culture. The internal US literary market is dominated by writers unknown to Europe, such as [James Gould] Cozzens, [John] Marquand or [Edna] Ferber. They are authors of voluminous tomes that represent the conformist type of prevalent literature with roots reaching as far back as the Victorian era. French critics, attempting to plow through these thick volumes, would abandon their

efforts after the first 100 pages, and European publishers have yet to make up their minds whether to have them translated or not. This does not mean that we are concerned here with the cheap output that merely borders on literature (such as Pearl Buck, "Gone With the Wind," "Forever Amber," etc.—ineptitude with honorable intentions). On the contrary, these are ambitious and diligently written books, often awarded the Pulitzer Prize, the American version of the Nobel Prize, which often arouses surprise in Europe.

This separation into two types of literary culture, one "black" and the other conformist—this two-layered American literary life, can lead to a clash of peculiarities, such as was the case, for example, three years ago, following the appearance of "The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit," by the young author Sloan Wilson, who, as an optimistic apostate, encountered the disapproval of the "black" literary circles. The indignant author, whose book had reached the bestseller list, defended himself: "The world's treated me awfully well, and I guess it's crept into my work. . . . These are, we forget, pretty good times. Yet too many novelists are still writing as if we were back in Depression years." The weekly *Life* commented on this occa-

sion: "Ours is the most powerful nation in the world. It has had a decade of unparalleled prosperity. . . . Yet it is still producing a literature which sounds sometimes as if it were written by an unemployed homosexual living in a packing-box shanty on the city dump while awaiting admission to the county poorhouse. Wilson's book is refreshing; it is perhaps the first novel about businessmen that does not depict them as just so many cattle and maintains that honesty is more profitable than cynicism."\*

The opinion of *Life*, a nationalism-conscious weekly, was prompted by valueless propaganda aims; nevertheless, it does give evidence of a conflict in American literature, a conflict between the "black" tendency and the tendency of stabilization. Following in the footsteps of European taste, our choice of the Hemingway-Faulkner line predisposes us more or less to ignore that "other literature," so much more so because the "second literature" has failed to display any ambition towards stylistic versatility, and perseveres in its adherence to nineteenth century tastes. In view of the above, a careful study of the American press can prove to be a most instructive pastime. I do not have in mind, of course, such publications as are destined for the international market, but those that are intended for internal consumption, such as, for example, *The Saturday Evening Post*, which is reminiscent of family publications in the period of yea-saying.\*

The eminent essayist Jerzy Stempowski believes that the widespread feeling of insecurity following a period of turbulence has created the need for at least a symbolic accentuation of the continuity of life. Conservative preferences, as well as a return to former art patterns, usually make their appearance during post-revolutionary periods (and America did experience a revolution of sorts). It is Stempowski's opinion that Socialist realism has also been influenced by this same need. Such a hypothesis throws a new light on the stabilizing trends in both our culture and the American, trends that are contemptuously regarded as being merely the result of the lack of good taste on the part of officials dictating *ex cathedra* obligatory formulas. Thus, the discussion about the "second culture" is not yet closed; and that is why it would be incorrect to identify American culture solely with the "black" trend.

### "'Black' Tradition?"

THE CRUX of the matter is that we, like the Americans, can boast of a conflict between two profiles, but ours is being conducted along horizontal, rather than vertical lines. The American experience is depicted here in the form of criss-crossing lines; the fascinating subject of decoding these lines has been overlooked by our critics. The tabulation was rendered more difficult—as we have seen—by the fact that the "black" literature was separated from its background and treated as a universal model. It seems to me that it is yet another mistake to isolate this style of writing from its historical tradition.

\* Wilson's statement and the following remarks appeared in an editorial in *Life*, September 11, 1955. The last-quoted sentence, however, did not appear in the editorial.

\* An ironic reference to the Stalinist period.

Both Hemingway and Faulkner are considered spontaneous phenomena, pioneers, emerging unexpectedly from the experience of the Great Depression. And yet, American critics (Alfred Kazin, for example) stubbornly persist in describing them as continuators. Continuators of what? Recently a US magazine asked 30 young writers, supporters of "black" literature of course, whom they consider to be the greatest American author. According to the ranking as seen from our back yard they should have selected Faulkner—but, the majority chose Herman Melville. The result of this poll will no doubt evoke surprise in this country. Although "Moby Dick" did appear here two years ago, in excellent Polish translation by Zielinski, the book received no reception at all. The critics panned it and it seems that for the most part it circulated among school-age youngsters with a yen for adventure stories. No one, however, took the book seriously and it was regarded as a contribution to the annals of romanticism on far-away continents.

And yet, his compatriots regard Melville as the writer who best expressed the duality of American culture, a duality that, as we can see, is already one hundred years old. "At the same time that Emerson formulated his 'metaphysics of success' to serve as a slogan for the American people, Melville, in direct defiance of his society, glorified

(Continued on page 35)



Ernest Hemingway is probably the most popular American author in Poland. The Warsaw weekly *Swiat* recently featured a story of a visit to Hemingway in Iowa by its correspondent. Above, Hemingway and the Polish journalist, on the cover of *Swiat*, January 11, 1959. The caption begins: "Attention, Lovers of Hemingway!"

A Young Pole Looks Wistfully  
at Night Life in Prague:

*"There's Only One  
Barbara  
in the World"*

by Wieslaw Gelbard

from *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw),

September 13-14, 1958



A section of the Václavak, Prague's main thoroughfare and the center of its night life.

Photo from *Tschechoslowakei* (Prague), No. 1, 1958

*Contrasts between life in the cities of Prague and Warsaw are sharp and numerous. The relative degree of intellectual and personal freedom in Poland is opposed by the regimentation and conformity enforced by the regime in Czechoslovakia; but by the same token the relative prosperity of Czechoslovakia contrasts with the material poverty and scarcities in Poland. This dazzled account of an evening out on the town in Prague by a visiting young Pole reveals the intensity of the Polish yearning for a little pleasure and comfort in life; it also points up one of the main factors—the relatively high standard of living—serving to bolster the stability of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. The latter country, of course, has long been more economically advanced than Poland, and it suffered far less from the ravages of World War II, which so shattered the Polish economy.*

THE PHONE RANG at exactly 10 p.m. It was Vera, my charming cicerone-in-skirts.

"I was just going to sleep," I replied to the standard question of "what are you doing?"

"You're incorrigible; get dressed immediately; you forget that you are in Prague. We don't go to sleep at this hour."

"My dear, I am only a tourist, and besides, my *koruny* are almost gone," I said simply.

"Don't be a bore. I'll be waiting in front of the Alfa in

fifteen minutes. I'll show you a few night clubs and we'll go dancing."

"You're cra . . ." I stopped, as she had already hung up. I was terrified. I had only 200 *koruny* in my pocket and I was due to stay in Prague for another two days. A night club! The girl was out of her mind. I could imagine anyone trying to go to the Bristol, Kameralna or Kongresowa [night spots in Warsaw] with no more than 300 *zloty* to his name.





"Where can one go on such a rainy evening? The movies? No! The best one can do is aimlessly walk the wet streets of Warsaw."  
*Sztandar Młodych* (Warsaw), November 12, 1958

### In Search of Boredom

What does a young gentleman of Prague do when, for instance, he has only about 100 *koruny*, night is approaching, and he intends to take his favorite girl to a dance or a cabaret; or in other words, if he wants to spend the hours between ten and four in the morning out of his house or apartment?

He gets on a trolley and rides to Vaclavske Namesti, popularly called Vaclavak. Here, on the main artery of Prague, ablaze with multicolored neon lights, are the biggest night clubs and cabarets. The Tatra Bar is presenting an interesting variety program several hours long, called "Nonsensical Dreams," full of girls, dancing, songs, jokes and skits. At the Alhambra Bar a variety show; in the Romania Bar an excellent gypsy orchestra; at the Alfa, Milko Foret, one of the best dance bands in Prague, etc., etc.

Most night spots on the Vaclavak and in its vicinity are located in basements. The alleys leading to them are lined with neon arrows, colored advertisements and bowing door-men.

The young gentleman of Prague is, therefore, faced with a decision: which one to go to? And, following a short period of deliberation, he disappears behind the red curtain

at the entrance of a club where one may see a good show and dance to the music of a good orchestra.

It would be fruitless, my dear visitor from the land of the Vistula, to spend an evening in Prague looking for something corresponding to the Polish conception of boredom, which is such an integral part of our way of life. Perhaps that is why in the evening on the Vaclavak you will not see any sullen faces expressing unfathomable boredom and discouragement, those faces so numerous in the stifling and smoke-filled cafes of Warsaw.

### You'll Still Have Enough for a Taxi

But let us return to the hypothetical young Prague gentleman and his companion. He has 100 *koruny* in his wallet, which corresponds approximately to 200 *zloty*, according to prices of basic commodities.\*

But for 100 *koruny* you can spend the evening in the best cabaret in Prague and still have enough left to take a taxi home.

The young man and the girl are being seated at a table at the Alhambra, assisted by the headwaiter dressed in coat and tails. A waiter, also in coat and tails, appears within the minute. Soon a bottle of French or Italian wine is placed on the table, accompanied by a bowl of peanuts (a true delicacy!), and coffee is served a little later. And the service, the tablecloths, the reverence of the waiter and bus-boy . . . a Pole sees such things only in the movies. The manner in which you are served here is characteristic of all the other places—restaurants and cafes—regardless of their location: city or suburbs.

It is three o'clock in the morning. Our friend asks for the check. He pays—85 *koruny*. (A bottle of champagne costs 60 *koruny* at the most expensive night spot in town!)

It is useless to seek in any night club, even in the highly exclusive Etabar, for steaming platters of food or for vodka. The waiter would know immediately that you are from the provinces or from Poland. In Prague night spots you order only hors d'oeuvres [to eat], if anything, and most often you just drink coffee and the excellent wines, dance and watch the show.

We are in the Old City now. Narrow, empty streets, lit only by a few lamps. We stop in front of a small house. In the dim light I can barely see the sign over the entrance: Didek Grill. We go down the stairs, making no sound on the carpet. I part one and then another curtain; the strains of a piano become audible. We find ourselves in a small parlor. Pictures by old masters are hung on carpet tapestries covering the walls. There are six or eight tables. On each table there is a silver candlestick with a slim, red candle burning. Soft club chairs, a small cocktail bar and a small piano in the corner. A violinist, playing a Spanish song, is standing by one of the tables. We sit down. The piano player asks me in German what is my favorite song. In a moment he is playing the Czardas.

\* Average monthly wage of an industrial worker is 1,300 *koruny* in Czechoslovakia, 1,600 *zloty* in Poland. If, as it seemed to this writer, the purchasing power of the *koruna* is double that of the *zloty*, the standard of living in Czechoslovakia would be nearly two-thirds higher than that of Poland. Official dollar exchange rates are 4 *zloty* to \$1, 7.20 *koruny* to \$1.

"If you ever come again"—Vera tells me—"he will always play the Czardas for you."

My watch measures the time, and I sit as if at a film that will soon come to an end but is worth the price of 68 *koruny*, which is the exact amount of my check.

Prague is full of these small exclusive night clubs, hidden in dark narrow streets, far from the noisy Vaclavak, the neon and the blare of dance orchestras. All is quiet and peaceful here. There are no advertisements, all the customers "know" each other, there are few foreigners. They will find here excellent cuisine and first class service—something a Pole is unable even to imagine—and also something that cannot be found anywhere else: a special atmosphere. The Barbara, a charming spot not far from the center of the city, is famous for just such atmosphere. As I was assured by the violinist, Mr. Satler (in this type of place music is provided only by a piano player, and a violinist who circulates among the tables and the couples on the dance floor), there is only one Barbara in the world. "Believe me," he said, "I have played in Vienna and Budapest, but there is only one Barbara and only in Prague." Yes, there are places in Prague which the tourist will not find in any other city in Central Europe; not the big places, full of dancing and noise, but the ones concealed in the cellars of small buildings, known only to their own clientele, furnished in such a manner that to a Pole they seem like scenes out of a fairy tale.

### *Prague Evenings are Colorful*

Prague evenings are colorful and fascinating. Of course, what we call night life does not constitute a basic feature of

the life of the average inhabitant of Prague. This writer is far from maintaining that Czechoslovak youth does not suffer from boredom, or that the only explanation for why they do not drink to excess is the existence of an interesting, inexpensive and wholesome night life. I do believe, however, that the opportunity a young man has for spending a decent and financially feasible evening out is an important link in the chain of measures which make the life of a Czechoslovak citizen easier and more pleasant and explain why in the streets of Prague one encounters more smiling and satisfied boys and girls than in Warsaw.

I am convinced that, among other things, a good inexpensive cabaret could, to some extent, lure young people in Poland away from the sidewalks, where they pace aimlessly back and forth for hours, away from the dark squares and stairwells where bottles of vodka are opened, as well as from the notorious 'private apartments.' We are building so much—and yet in the capital of a civilized country it is still a problem to get a midnight snack in any night spot and it is still a problem to go dancing if one has, let's say, only 200 *zloty* in one's pocket.

Try going into the Warsaw Bristol at night to order a bottle of wine and coffee! Hah! Try even to get into one of the Warsaw night clubs at midnight. You're thirsty? Go to the railroad station, perhaps there you'll be able to get a cup of coffee or tea. You have come out of the theater and would like something light to eat, some ice cream, or an orangeade? Shake your head and go to bed. In the Warsaw night clubs the only thing you can get is vodka and heavy food, nothing else.

And let no one say that countries do not have their own particular customs.

### **Dig They Must**

IN BULGARIA'S current attempt to speed fulfillment of its economic plans, manual labor "contributed" by factory and office workers plays an important part. The following report by a Bulgarian traveller in his forties, employed in Sofia, describes the details of the system:

AS SOON AS the idea of instituting such labor had been launched by the Party First Secretary, Todor Zhivkov, the practical application of it was put into effect. Clerks, other employees, and certain categories of workers were rapidly formed into "brigades." The work is organized in this manner: all the offices, organizations, and State institutions, cooperatives, etc. prepared their own projects. The technical organization is confined to the trade unions of each establishment; these hold the records of attendance. Everything is under the control of the Communist cells in the various organizations. Everybody is split into groups of six. Neither women nor important technicians are excused: these include architects, engineers, chief accountants, office managers. These groups of six do "volunteer" work regularly once a week. The work is quite varied: road repairs, work in the forests, repairs on irrigation canals, in fact, all kinds of manual labor. Such work is very tiring;

for example, many women cannot dig even two ditches a day for planting trees. Others faint from weariness or see their hands lacerated by the shovel. Wounds and sores appear, but work continues under the vigilant eyes of the foremen of the group. Also, forced labor necessitates the purchase of appropriate clothes, and thus destroys the precarious equilibrium in the budget of each employee.

This work is even more difficult because the workers and employees also have to fulfill their norms in their regular jobs. Their daily and weekly norms are quite difficult enough to complete in only six days; now with only five days left to them, they are in a dilemma. Moreover, the regime insists that the work be done during the week, not on days of rest—Sundays and holidays—claiming to respect social customs. These workers, however, are caught in the middle: to fill their norms and to work one day gratuitously for the "glory of Socialism." This forces them to deprive themselves of their weekly day off.

If someone is absent for any reason at all, he must still fulfill his obligation on his return. The morale of all those who are compelled to work is very low. On the job they joke maliciously, almost openly: "We've finally begun to lay the foundations of Socialism, but when will come the day when we put on the roof?"

(Continued from page 31)

defeat," writes Kazin. "Greatness can be achieved only by those who have known defeat," maintains Melville and demonstrates his theory in the history of Captain Ahab, who sacrifices not only his life and ship, but also the lives of his crew, in order to satisfy his obsessed desire to find and capture the White Whale.

Melville as the "black precursor" may be seen even more clearly in his novel "Pierre," which will soon also appear in Polish. The hero discovers that his father had an illegitimate daughter; motivated by an obscure moral compulsion, the son marries his own step-sister, as a result becomes involved in dreadful family intrigue and is forced to kill his own cousin; imprisoned together with Isabella, they both commit suicide. The fact is that this book has an amazing counterpart in the Faulkner novel recently published in Poland, "The Wild Palms." Faulkner's hero seduces another man's wife and flees from civilization with her in the belief that everyday life with her under conditions of "respectability and prosperity" would be slow moral agony destroying the only value in life: love. Persisting in his stubborn desertion, the hero—a doctor—is forced to perform an abortion on his mistress under primitive conditions and the operation results in her death. Harry is sentenced to life imprisonment; Carlotta's first husband, who sympathizes with him, gives him cyanide which he, however, tosses out the window. If there can be no love, then only suffering constitutes a certain value to him. "The Wild Palms," like Melville, expresses a tenacious rejection of the life offered the hero by conventional society.

Faulkner, as well as Melville, and even Hemingway, thus offers two alternatives: attainable but valueless prosperity, or moral ambition impossible to realize because of man's spiritual infirmity and the absurdity of life which forces the hero to violate social norms. Therefore, the point of departure in this case is the frustrated desire to achieve spiritual perfection, and hence the despair, brutality of protest, nihilism; there is also Hemingway's suggestion of a "manly acceptance of the world" or Faulkner's "endurance of suffering." Consequently, "black" literature does not derive its famous nihilism from the head of Jove, whence allegedly it has just emerged—but from deceived idealism with its own premises in literary tradition.

This is a legacy of puritanism. American critics plainly mention the sermon-like style of "black" literature. Melville even uses biblical language; Faulkner, [Robert Penn] Warren, Mailer overwhelm the reader with a deluge of rhetoric the force of which is not blunted by the filthiest profanity. Such a genesis explains the glaring tenacity of this literature, its separateness, refusal to collaborate; the admonishing preacher is possessed of singular credentials and is entitled to considerable exaggeration, without danger of being thrown out the door. . . .

There is no doubt that America's "black" literature will have a completely different meaning for us if we approach it not as an abstract and nihilist cosmogony—the singular, the unique, destroying all in its path—but as a system of moral polemics, born of a traditional civilization. It will then be possible to incorporate its human values within

the framework of rationalistic pedagogy, the new premises of which we are attempting, with beaded brows, somehow to establish.

### "According to the Polish Perspective"

However, the creative reception of American literature does not hinge on one interpretation only. Although among our critics there is nary a sight of the intellectual brawn necessary to undertake this task, we may continue to hope that in time someone will finally think of something.

Let us try to clarify this by citing [Ilya] Ehrenburg who writes about the appearance in a kolkhoz of a traveling theater troupe. The play was "Othello." The actress who was to play Desdemona, the only reasonably intelligent person in the entire company, was greatly disturbed by the absurdity of the decision to stage "Othello." The kolkhoz had its usual crop of problems—cows yielding only half the milk obtained from the "private" ones, fields covered with weeds. The theater had other, Soviet plays in its repertoire, but the provincial thespian, a petty tyrant, simply wanted to blow off his artistic steam in the emotion-laden role of the jealous Moor. That was his only concern. The show, begun in an atmosphere of misunderstanding, ended amidst emotional outbursts, tears and applause. After the curtain came down the peasants flocked backstage to express their gratitude to the actors, and poor Desdemona, seeing this, burst into a torrent of tears, for, in addition to everything, there were those promises, the least expected ones: to increase the milking quota, improve weeding, etc.

This anecdote touches upon the problem of the duality of culture: the one for the masses and the "first degree" one. Here, Ehrenburg expresses the opinion that difficult works, belonging to the "first degree" culture, may surprisingly become absorbed by popular culture. He uses a practical argument (result: economic successes!), therefore a narrow one, but this only in order to convince the sectarians who would restrict culture within the cheap, "mass" limits.

Here, perhaps, is where lies the cause of the defeat in Poland of the slogan: "culture (the first degree one!) for the masses." The past period marked the waging of a mute battle to admit into circulation values that had been too hastily branded as bourgeois, hostile, cosmopolitan, etc.—their hallmark could very well be the "Othello" of Ehrenburg's anecdote. Except that Ehrenburg calls for the inclusion of heretofore banned works of art in the name of enriching the common culture. In Poland, this aspiration did not become manifest under the slogan of the advantages to be derived from these works of art by the new type of popular culture. Rather, the battle was waged with the aim of obtaining permission for the present limited group to continue to partake of this culture. Today, when such as Klee, Kafka and Honegger have finally reached our shores, when everyone has read and enjoyed to his heart's content, once again no one can tell what will happen next. If, like these, American literature—one of the most notable cultural phenomena of our century—remains available only to an exclusive audience, then it will undoubtedly become an asset of little or no value [in Poland].



The Polish press continues to feature extensive reports on Communist China and its total mobilization of the population for the "great leap forward." Between the lines of the Polish descriptions of these developments, it is possible to read a rather awe-struck contempt for the new Chinese Stalinism; illustrations are chosen with a nice eye for the ironies. Above, for example, is a picture that illustrated an article on China in *Swiat* (Warsaw), January 4, 1959; the caption commented on the huge drawings of a brawny worker transforming the landscape and a brawny soldier smashing figures representing the US and Chiang Kai-shek: "Every centimeter of the countryside is covered with posters calling for complete mobilization." The article added that graphic propaganda is necessitated by widespread illiteracy.

## Current Developments

### AREA

#### Soviet Party Congress

When the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Communist Party came to a close on February 5, Party First Secretary and Premier Nikita Khrushchev was clearly recognized as the leading theoretician in the Communist world, having repulsed all threats from China in regard to such leadership. Khrushchev presented the Soviet bloc with a blueprint for the transition from present "Socialism" to future total Communism; by implication he condemned the theory advanced by the Chinese in the fall of 1958 (and subsequently repudiated) that their commune system was a short-cut to the Communist ideal "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." According to the Khrushchev thesis, the USSR is still a "Socialist" State since production is insufficient to meet all the needs of the country; therefore, the people must be given incentives in order to facilitate the growth of production leading to the final stage of pure Communism.

Khrushchev also declared that the transition from "So-

cialism" to Communism would be gradual, and "there will be no particular moment" when one ends and the other begins. Of special significance for the Satellite area was his statement that all "Socialist countries, correctly using the opportunities inherent in the Socialist order, will more or less simultaneously reach the highest phase of Communist society."

Even before Khrushchev's speeches, the bloc had begun to put his theories into practice. In Bulgaria, which seemed toward the end of 1958 to be falling under the influence of the Communist Chinese theorists, the Party Central Committee recently adopted industrial and agricultural policies which closely reflected Khrushchev's point of view (see Bulgaria, below). The merging of collective farms in Albania and the decision of Czechoslovakia to break up the Machine Tractor Stations were further indications of Satellite conformity (see Albania and Czechoslovakia, below).

#### Yugoslavs Attacked

Pilloried in a particularly harsh speech by Nikita Khrushchev, Yugoslav "revisionism" was widely condemned at the Congress, although such Party leaders as Janos Kadar of Hungary and Wladyslaw Gomulka of Poland pointed



out that this did not imply a return to Stalinism. Without mentioning Yugoslavia by name, Gomulka stated that Khrushchev's speeches had delivered "a blow against the enemies of Socialism" and "renegades from Marxism-Leninism," who accused the Soviet Union of imposing its will on other countries. Kadar, after praising the USSR for its role in suppressing the Hungarian "counterrevolution," went on to say that he was guided "by Leninist principles postulated by the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress [of February 1956, which] enabled our Party to break with the dogmatic, sectarian errors [of the past] as well as to take a proper stand against revisionist misconceptions and treachery."

Other delegates from the Satellite bloc filled the air with fulsome praise for the Soviet Union. Typical of the speeches was Czechoslovak Party boss Novotný's statement that mutual relations between his country and the Soviet Union were based "on equality, trust and voluntary cooperation."

### New Aspects of Anti-Yugoslav Campaign

While Marshal Tito was visiting many of the "uncommitted countries" of Asia and Africa, the Soviet and Satellite attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism" increased in virulence. Criticism now centered on Yugoslavia's internal organization, particularly the economy, rather than, as hitherto, on matters of ideology and foreign policy.

The signal for this switch in bellicose tactics came from Soviet propagandists, who set out to prove that Yugoslavia, having abandoned true "Socialism," is going through a "prolonged crisis." According to Radio Moscow, January

26, at the present time "more than 90 per cent of the agricultural area of Yugoslavia belongs to private farms . . . [therefore] the position of the kulak is being consolidated [while] an active process of pauperization of the overwhelming majority of the rural population is going on." Moscow also blamed Yugoslavia's "economic troubles" on the acceptance of foreign aid from Western countries, claiming that the Yugoslavs "have to pay a high price for the credit they have received. One-quarter of all the earnings from Yugoslav exports is used to pay off foreign debts." Both kinds of criticism, of course, could be made to apply to Poland as well.

The real cause of Yugoslavia's problems, according to Moscow, stems from that fact that "any attempt to build Socialism singly, separately from other Socialist States . . . is a useless, harebrained scheme [which] . . . contradicts the fundamental interests of the Yugoslav workers. It is not the isolated, crooked, and twisted lanes that lead to the great goal, Socialism and Communism, but a common highway for all the countries."

### Soviet Line Echoed

Among the Satellites Czechoslovakia and Albania were the most vocal in their denunciations of Yugoslavia. On the occasion of the State visit to Prague, lasting from January 12 to 17, Albanian Party boss, Enver Hoxha, liberally sprinkled his speeches with references to the "Yugoslav Trotskyite leadership" which had "sabotaged" Albanian recovery from 1944-1948. (Radio Bratislava, January 14.) *Rude Pravo*, interestingly enough, omitted this remark in its summary of the speech.

Although high Czechoslovak officials did not generally echo Hoxha's attacks in public, the joint communique issued at the end of the visit contained the following statement: "Both delegations declare that in the future, too, their Parties will firmly preserve the purity of Marxism-Leninism and vigorously fight contemporary revisionism, the sworn enemy of the international Communist movement, as expressed in the program of the League of Yugoslav Communists and the policy of its leadership." (Radio Tirana, January 17.) In response to this declaration, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Prague lodged an official protest. (Radio Belgrade, January 27.)

Unofficially, the Czechoslovak press and radio aped the Soviet Union in its criticism of the Yugoslav economy. In an accusation remarkably similar to the one quoted above from Moscow radio, Radio Prague, February 5, in referring to the low standard of living in Yugoslavia, stated: "It is clear that the kulak has a steadily growing power in the fixing of prices, and thus in determining the living standard." In another statement apparently inspired by the Soviet Union, Radio Prague, January 29, made the following comparison: "In Yugoslavia industrial production has risen 3.4 times compared with the prewar level, yet in Bulgaria it has risen about 9 times, and Albania produces in 19 days the volume of her total annual industrial production in 1938."

Hungary, too, criticized Yugoslavia's economy, and also mentioned the latter's dependence on Western foreign aid. In Bulgaria and Romania the attacks on Yugoslavia were



From a Polish article on Chinese communes in Hopei Province. The caption states that this father and son, commune members, are going out to work on irrigation canals. The Chinese "great leap forward" demands manual labor even from toddlers; similar, if less intense campaigns are currently being pushed in several East European countries.

Photo from *Swiat* (Warsaw), January 11, 1959

### The Bovine Afflatus

IT IS REASSURING to note that despite certain changes in Communist methods, despite a grinning, affable Mikoyan lunching in Wall Street and despite ex-Politburo members confessing "anti-Party" plots and getting kicked downstairs instead of shot in the head, there are still some familiar tones in Soviet life. The following, for example, from Radio Kishinev, January 13, must have been some reassurance to Stalin that not all is changed:

"There is unprecedented political and work enthusiasm among the urban and rural laboring population. . . . Thousands of industrial and agricultural workers compete to acquire high distinction in a Communist labor brigade, to achieve labor indexes, and they are followed by thousands more. Anna Semenovna Lazareva, dairy maid at the Kirov kolkhoz in the Chadyr-Lungskiy district, and a Party member, has declared: 'When I became acquainted with the Khrushchev report at the December Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, I understood that as a Communist I cannot rest satisfied with average results, and that my place is always in the vanguard. This year I produced 4,783 liters of milk per cow, or 1.5 times as much as in the past year. To fulfill the new Party plans more rapidly, I decided to increase milk production in 1959 by 1,000 liters.'"

From the cows, no comment.

seemingly less frequent and less violent. A cultural agreement, in fact, was signed between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in Belgrade, January 27. On the other hand, Romanian Party chief Gheorghiu-Dej delivered a rare personal public criticism of Yugoslav "revisionism" before the Twenty-First Party Congress in Moscow.

### Yugoslavia Replies

To all these attacks the Yugoslavs replied in kind while continually stressing their "neutralism." Radio Belgrade, January 23, in a reply to Soviet accusations, said: "Recently we were accused in the West of selling our souls to Khrushchev, and now Khrushchev accuses us of selling our souls to revisionism. . . . Windswept on all sides, we are determined to build Socialism in accordance with the wishes and interests of our people." In a refutation of the current Soviet contention on relative productive efficacy Radio Belgrade, January 22, broadcast the following set of statistics: "According to an announcement given by the Soviet Central Statistical Office, industrial production in the Soviet Union increased in 1958 by 10 percent compared with the previous year, while the increase in Yugoslavia . . . has been about 11 percent. To be sure, Yugoslavia is not yet content with the level of its production, but it would be hard to claim that it is increasing slowly."

More direct action was taken against Czechoslovakia and Albania. A member of the Czechoslovak diplomatic staff, stationed in Belgrade, was expelled from the country in retaliation for the expulsion of a Yugoslav diplomat from Czechoslovakia. According to Radio Prague, February 7, however, the Yugoslav diplomat had had immoral relations with a 14-year-old schoolgirl, and therefore his con-

duct was "incompatible with the behavior of a diplomat in any country."

At the same time the trial of an alleged Albanian spy concluded in Prizren; he was accused of having given the Albanian information service details on the locations of Yugoslav economic projects, as well as on the places where garrisons of the Yugoslav army were stationed, and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment. (Radio Belgrade, February 10.)

### German Peace Treaty

In order to dramatize the significance of their new proposals on Germany, the Soviet Union sent a draft text of the German Peace Treaty throughout the Satellite bloc, and suggested that a conference on Germany be held in either Warsaw or Prague. In its note to Poland the USSR particularly stressed the threat of a revival of "German militarism." The Polish Party journal *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), January 12, urged acceptance of the Soviet proposals and insisted that the Polish-German frontier remain as it now stands, with West German renunciation of "all rights and claims to former German territory beyond the Oder-Neisse line." The other East European countries naturally concurred in their approval of the treaty, with the Hungarian press forging a link between the achievement of the Soviet moon-rocket and the Berlin issue. *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), January 8, commented as follows: "Who could deny that the new, brilliant Soviet achievement will also affect the Berlin issue? For the intensified tension over Berlin is closely connected with the American rocket results. Certain leaders in the United States are incapable of thinking in any other but military terms . . . [which] is understandable, because in order to be able to follow their policy of force they must demonstrate a strength which instills fear. And who will fear someone who is left behind in such an important field as rocket technology?"

Yugoslavia was more cautious in its appraisal of the Soviet proposals, terming them "a constructive initiative . . . which may serve as a generally acceptable basis or as a motive for advancing other stands for negotiation with the aim of finding a common . . . solution." (Radio Belgrade, February 3.)

## POLAND

### Before Party Congress

Taking advantage of the current campaign among activists in preparation for the Third Party Congress, March 10, Stalinist elements within the Party have apparently redoubled efforts to recapture control over the machinery. According to the Warsaw correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 26, already-elected delegates include Kazimierz Mijal, former Minister of Communal Economy and Stanislaw Pawlak, ousted as Warsaw Province Party Secretary last summer—both notorious and unrepentant members of the anti-Gomulka "Natolin" group.

On the other side of the coin, there were rumors that Gomulka would make an attempt during the Congress to include in the Politburo two of his close friends and collaborators, Zenon Kliszko and Marian Spychalski. In any case, the election during the Congress of approximately 70 members to the Central Committee will provide the occasion for a new review of Party policies and an evaluation of Gomulka's position *vis-a-vis* the Stalinists.

Preparations for the Third Congress included a meeting of the Seventh Plenum of the Polish Socialist Youth Union [ZMS], on January 19, which stressed the implementation of ideological training for its members.



The "hula hoop," having raged across Western Europe, has now conquered Poland. This young lady on the front page of the Cracow weekly *Przekroj*, January 11, 1959, is demonstrating her expertise by manipulating two at once. Radio Warsaw, January 19, announced that it was "a historic day for the coastal area," as the "Provincial price committee has finally fixed hula-hoop prices. . . . There has been a tremendous demand for hula-hoops." All, however, is not well; dark ideological clouds of conflict loom; international Communism's position on, or in, the hula-hoop is uncertain. For on November 2, 1958, *Scinteia Tineretului* (Bucharest), official organ of the Romanian Union of Working Youth, in an article headlined, "Hula Hoop, a New Wind of Madness in the West," stated that the hula hoop "is a new diversion intended to stir hysteria in the ranks of youth, to promote debauchery and moral decomposition. . . . The hula hoop has spread because the leading American circles periodically need a diversion in order to pervert youth and to estrange it from Culture. . . . So grows up a generation of assassins, of depraved professional gangsters; thus flesh is prepared for the cannons, for future war."

## Freedom of Opinion

THE QUESTION of the obligation of the press media to adhere strictly to the Party line was raised by a listener in a letter to Radio Warsaw which said: "I do not question the role of radio or television as the mouthpiece of the government and as a form of official propaganda. This is the task of every State radio and clearly the Polish radio cannot be an exception. . . . I am a teacher, I believe that Socialism is superior to capitalism. I also believe, however, that the Achilles heel of Socialism is its refusal to permit the exchange of various opinions within the framework of the system and that it considers positively hostile every outlook which is at variance with its own. . . ."

Reading and replying to this letter on a November 16 broadcast, the director of Polish radio, Włodzimierz Sokorski, repeated the doctrinal line that during the decisive struggle between Socialism and capitalism, freedom of opinion must be curtailed by "a feeling of responsibility toward the nation and the State." Only the Party should have the right to decide when and what problems should be discussed; the time and place to discuss everything freely will be "when Socialism reigns in all parts of the globe."

## Church-State Relations

Rumors of a new orientation in Vatican policies toward Poland gained ground when the diplomatic representatives of the Polish and Lithuanian "Governments-in-exile" were not accredited to the Vatican on December 26. Although the official Vatican organ, *L'Osservatore Romano*, January 5, stated that this decision was not of a political but of a juridical nature, as both offices will remain open under a chargé d'affaires, the Polish Communist press greeted this news with delight. *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), January 10, commented as follows: "One could observe in this connection that the non-recognition of Kazimierz Papée ["Polish Ambassador of the Government-in-exile"] took place five years too late, but it is difficult to accuse the new Pope of the procrastination so consistently practiced by his predecessor."

The press, however, complained that Pope John XXIII has still not officially changed the status of the Polish church in the Western Territories, where the present administration is termed by the Vatican as "provisional." In this respect, *Zycie Warszawy* stated: "Perhaps it is necessary to be patient. Perhaps the Holy Father, having shown understanding . . . in the problem of the emigre Polish government, will show no less historic realism in relation to the Polish Western Territories."

The Vatican also announced on January 28 the appointment of four new Polish bishops. These nominations were apparently without political significance, but were aimed at strengthening Cardinal Wyszyński's administration of the archbishoprics of Warsaw and Gniezno, and of the Western Territories.



### Priest Sentenced

The trial of Father Marian Pirozynski and others accused of economic abuses and bribery concluded in Warsaw, February 9. (See *East Europe*, February, p. 48.) Although the prosecutor had asked for 20 years imprisonment, the priest was sentenced to only 2 years and a fine of 4,000 *zloty*; of the fourteen other defendants, three were found not guilty; the case against one was dropped; one was fined; and the others received suspended sentences ranging from three months to two and a half years, plus fines. (Radio Warsaw, February 9.) The relative leniency of the court was probably due to the fact that, according to Western sources, most of the evidence presented proved more embarrassing to the regime than to the defendants, and proceedings in the courtroom soon vanished from the bulletins of Radio Warsaw and the Polish press.

A master printer testified, for example, that he had received 1,400 *zloty* from the plant manager with a request to speed up publication of a brochure honoring the Virgin Mary, and claimed that the custom of giving "bonuses" to printers to ensure good work had existed since long before the war. Another printer, Jozef Osiadacz, was released after testifying that he had printed 6,000 copies of a religious picture and some 36,000 invitations to a religious ceremony, "because they were for orphans in a convent nursery, and I am an orphan myself."

### Controversy on Cemeteries

According to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), January 9, the Sejm [Parliament] was presented with a new bill calling for "compulsory interment of non-believers in religious burial grounds, if there is no communal cemetery in the vicinity." Until now, Catholic cemetery administration remained solely in the hands of church authorities. The Party journal explained the reasons for the new law as follows:

### Don't Call Us

APPARENTLY THE POLISH postal system is choked with letters of complaint against the inefficiencies and injustices of local bureaucrats, letters which wander futilely from bureau to bureau, without attaining answer or redress. The Warsaw weekly *Polityka*, November 1, complained that a great many letters received by the State Council and other State institutions have gone unanswered, since "cruel and illegal decisions handed down by local administration officials" cannot under the Penal Code be revoked by State courts. "Up to October 1958 no less than 36,000 letters of complaint were delivered to the State Council, almost 21,000 to the Council of Ministers, and 20,000 to the Ministry of Communal Economy. Several score are received daily by almost every newspaper. . . . Letters to these institutions wander back and forth like boomerangs, returning at times to the senders. . . . Public opinion remains powerless to deprive him [the official under attack] of either his freedom or his job."



At the recent Moscow exhibit of art from "the Socialist camp," the abstract Polish entries caused official criticism and wide interest. Above, crowds before the Polish paintings. Photo from *Svet i Obrazek* (Prague), January 31, 1959.

"In recent years we have witnessed excesses . . . by irresponsible clergymen with regard to the interment of non-believers, or even believers, who . . . in the opinion of the priests were unworthy of burial in a Catholic cemetery."

### Writers Attacked

The current drive to curtail the independence of writers continued. With the approach of its Third Congress in March, the Party increased its attacks on the Union of Polish Writers; a letter from the Secretariat of the Party's Central Committee to the Union's Communist unit sharply criticized the resolution adopted by the Union at its December 1958 Congress, defending freedom of expression (see *East Europe*, February, pp. 12-19). According to *The New York Times*, February 6, the Central Committee "removed from the Polish Writers' Union the privilege of selecting writers to go abroad," as well as prevented the Union from negotiating a new scale of royalty payments. Among the writers specifically attacked were Adam Wazyk, who has written poetry harshly critical of conditions in Poland, Jan Kott, who has been removed from the editorial staff of the Warsaw cultural weekly *Przegląd Kulturalny*, and the poets Pawel Hertz and Mieczyslaw Jastrun.\* These writers will apparently be banned from holding "responsible positions in publishing or editorial fields." The poet Antoni Slonimski was also criticized, but retained his post as Chairman of the Writers' Union.

The internationally-known Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski also came under fire in the Soviet Union for his articles on the historical conceptions of Marxism, published in the Warsaw weekly *Nowa Kultura*, January 1958. Radio Moscow, January 10, broadcast excerpts from the Soviet periodical *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1958, accusing Kolakowski of spreading "anti-Marxist" views: "Kolakowski thought that he understood the errors of the past concerning the 'cult of the individual' and would like to

\* These four, it is believed, all quit the Party in 1957, in protest over the banning of *Europa*, a projected review dealing with Western literature.



## Current Developments—Poland

avoid their recurrence. What he does not understand is that the Communist Parties have rejected the mistakes of the past era in the name of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Kolakowski, on the other hand, has come out against these mistakes in order to reject the principles themselves."

### Wawel Treasure Returned

A source of Polish satisfaction was the return of a great part of Poland's national museum treasure from Canada, where it had been stored at the outbreak of World War II. Before the war the treasure had been kept in the Wawel Castle in Cracow; the unreturned portion is still in Canada under the protection of the Provincial Government in Quebec.

### Polish Art in the USSR

Soviet newspapers also dealt harshly with Polish painters. An exhibition entitled "Painting from People's Democracies" had been on display in Moscow since before Christmas, and the Polish contributions, many of them influenced by Western abstraction, were in startling contrast to the "Socialist realism" of the other paintings from the bloc. (See *East Europe*, February, p. 15.) Typical of Soviet reaction was the comment of a member of the Soviet Acad-

emy of Art who stated that "it is . . . especially pitiful that many of the Polish Artists are under the influence of formalistic abstract art." Polish journals have reacted mutely to Soviet criticism, reprinting it without further comment.

### Plans for Culture and Art

The budget for the Ministry of Culture and Art was announced in *Zycie Warszawy*, January 6, as 1 billion, 478 million *zloty*. The Ministry's plans for 1959 include the construction of a ballet and opera house in Warsaw, a National Theater in Lodz, a Music Academy and 17 motion picture theaters. The number of libraries is supposed to total 6,942, an increase of 260; publishing houses expect to print 4,460 new book titles, approximately 200 more than in 1958.

### American Photography, Literature, "Dr. Zhivago"

Recent signs that the "thaw" period has not completely ended were the exhibition, "America in Photography," in Warsaw in January, which apparently included several hundred pictures by leading American photographers, and the publication in the Gomulka weekly *Polityka*, January 10, of a poll among Polish writers to determine the most popular foreign books. The top three were Hemingway's

ON THE EVE of the long-delayed Third Congress of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party (see page 38), it is interesting to examine the available information on Party structure and composition, and its changing trends. First, total Party membership:

#### Total Party Membership, 1933-1958

1933	12,000
1944	20,000
1949	1,368,759
1954	1,296,938
1958	1,023,577

(Sources: 1933—*Polityka* [Warsaw], Nov. 29, 1958; 1944—*Nowe Drogi* [Warsaw], Jan.-Feb. 1951; 1949—*ibid.*; 1954—*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], Mar. 12, 1954; 1958—*Nowe Drogi*, Dec. 1958.)

In 1933, of course, the Party was illegal in Poland. In the Fifties, the level remained at about 1,300,000 until Gomulka's "verification" of membership in 1958, when the apathetic, the unsympathetic and the oppositionists were supposedly expelled. There has been, however, a steady drift in the composition of the Party toward a lower percentage of workers, peasants and young people, and a higher percentage of bureaucrats and white-collar workers, and the "verification" seems to have speeded this trend.

As regards the decline in the percentage of youth:

#### The Percentage of Party members and candidates under the age of 25, 1955-1958

1955	15.9%
1956	13.0%
1957	10.0%
1958	6.8%

(Source: *Nowe Drogi* [Warsaw], December 1958.)

The changing trends in the occupations of Party members are equally striking:

#### Percentage of Party Members by Occupation

	1948	1956	1958
Workers			
(inc. agricultural workers)	60.5%	44.6%	41.8%
Peasants	16.9%	12.8%	12.2%
White Collar Employees	20.3%	39.5%	42.1%
Others			
(handicraftsmen, house-			
wives, etc.)	2.3%	3.1%	3.9%

(Sources: 1948—*Nowe Drogi*, July 1957; 1956—*Ibid.*; 1958—*Nowe Drogi*, Dec. 1958.)

A striking indication of the decline in membership among workers (26 percent fewer workers in 1958 than in 1957) is the fact that in 1957 there were 185 factories with Party groups of more than 500 members; in 1958 there were only 106 such factories. (*Nowe Drogi*, December 1958.) And out of the 41,000 Polish villages, only 20,000, less than half, have any Party cells at all.

"For Whom the Bell Tolls" (24 percent), William Faulkner's "The Wild Palms" and Thornton Wilder's "The Ides of March." Strikingly, in view of the Soviet avalanche of attack, Boris Pasternak's "Dr. Zhivago" placed fourth, with 7 percent of the votes.

### "Illegal German Group" Sentenced

On January 29, the Katowice district court pronounced sentence in the trial of an "illegal German organization" in Upper Silesia that planned to help "change the existing German-Polish frontier." (See *East Europe*, February, p. 49.) The chief defendant, Alojzy Pluta, was sent to prison for 10 years. Five other members of the organization were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 4 to 7 years. (Radio Warsaw, January 29.)

## BULGARIA

### Big Leap Grows Bigger

Bulgaria had scarcely set forth upon its "big leap forward" in which the country was called upon to fulfill the Five Year Plan in "three to four years" (see *East Europe*, January, p. 46), when the Party Central Committee was presented by First Secretary Todor Zhivkov with still another package of radical tasks. To a CC meeting held January 15-17 Zhivkov proposed a sweeping revision of the State administrative system, involving the establishment of 30 "administrative-economic units" in place of the present territorial divisions, and the abolition of seven ministries. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], January 20.) In addition, he called for sweeping reforms in agriculture, similar to those carried out by Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, as well as wage reforms and a wholesale reorganization of the bureaucratic apparatus involving scientific teaching and research. He also supplied, for the first time, specific industrial targets for the years 1962 and 1965, the gist of which was that by the latter year Bulgaria's economy is expected to produce, altogether, from three to four times the output of 1957.

### Thirty New Districts

Zhivkov told the plenary meeting that Bulgaria's present administrative system was overcentralized and too complicated, and that a reorganization would help the economy to function more effectively. The scheme he proposed was obviously borrowed from the *sovmarkhozy* or regional economic councils introduced in the USSR in 1957. In place of the present 13 districts and 117 counties there would be 30 new districts uniting "the entire political, State, economic and cultural life in a given community." The municipal people's council of each district or *okrug* would be responsible for the management and control of the collective farms, industrial enterprises, building enterprises and wholesale and retail trade in its district, and for local economic planning. This assignment of administrative powers to local organs would mean a corresponding reduction in



Part of the Wawel Treasure, the Polish collection of historic objects which was sent to Canada for safe-keeping at the beginning of World War II and has now been returned, in part, to Poland.

the duties of the national government, entailing the abolition of the Ministry of Heavy Industry, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Communal Economy, the Ministry of Food Industry, the Ministry of Electrification and Water Supply, the Ministry of Construction and Construction Materials, and the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare. However, the government would retain its ministries of foreign affairs, national defense, interior, justice, transportation, finance, trade, education and agriculture. Also attached to the government would be: a State Planning Commission; a committee for industry and technical progress; a committee for construction; a labor committee on prices; a committee on health protection and social welfare; a State Control Commission; and a central statistical administration.

All of the existing people's councils in the districts and counties were to be abolished, as well as those in Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna. The new districts would be governed by provisional executive committees pending the election of new people's councils.

### MTS and Compulsory Deliveries Abolished

Zhivkov indicated that Khrushchev's program for Soviet

## Current Developments—Bulgaria

agriculture is to be copied wholesale in Bulgaria: "the gradual rise from cooperative [i.e., collective] ownership of the means of agricultural production to the level of national ownership, the perfected application of the Socialist principle of labor remuneration in agriculture, and the gradual reduction of the differences in payments for work equal in quantity and quality in the different collectives . . . [so that farm labor] can become another variety of industrial labor." He said that the Machine Tractor Stations have "exhausted their political, economic and organizational functions" and that their machinery ought to be sold to the collective farms. He called for the abolition of compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce and their replacement by a system of State purchasing. He expressed dissatisfaction with the system of payment according to labor days in collective farms and proposed that the farms gradually "change over to a fixed advance payment to kolkhoz members for their labor on the basis of a guaranteed minimum monthly and annual cash remuneration." Zhivkov admitted, however, that it would be some time before farm workers could be paid in the same manner as industrial workers. Like Khrushchev in the USSR, he came out cautiously in favor of abolishing the collective farmers' private plots.

Bulgaria's newly amalgamated collective farms (shrunk in number from 3,450 to 625) are to be expanded still more by absorbing the cooperative trading organizations in the villages. They will also take over the artisan co-operatives and certain local industrial enterprises such as flour mills, lime kilns, feed grinders and other ancillary operations.

State industry will also be reorganized by amalgamating enterprises on the local level that are engaged in the

same kind of production. Each of the 30 new districts will have its own construction enterprise and its own unified wholesaling enterprise. The central State planning organs will in the future concentrate on basic and long-range plans, leaving the details to the new district people's councils. Zhivkov spoke vaguely of the need for better economic planning, charging that it was too centralized and tended to "great passiveness," failing to take into consideration the "creative activity of the masses."

### Most Ambitious New Economic Targets

Zhivkov also produced quantitative goals for industry and agriculture in the coming seven years, demonstrating that the Third Five Year Plan (1958-1962) has now been abandoned despite the slogan of fulfilling it "in three to four years," and that its place has been taken by a hastily improvised seven-year-plan coinciding with that of the USSR. It is easily the most ambitious plan ever produced in the Satellite countries. While the Soviet Union aims to increase its industrial production by 80 percent in the next seven years, Bulgaria's industry must, according to Zhivkov, produce twice as much in 1962 as it did in 1957 and treble or quadruple its output by 1965. The original goal for the years 1958-1962 was only a 62 percent increase. Likewise, the total volume of agricultural output—previously scheduled to rise from 15 billion *leva* in 1957 to 20 billion in 1962—must soar to 40-45 billion *leva* in 1962 and onward to 60 billion in 1965. National income was to rise from 30 billion *leva* in 1957 to 45-50 billion in 1962, but the new plan sets targets of 80-85 billion for 1962 and 110-110 billion for 1965. Freight carried by the railroads must double by 1962. Zhivkov listed the following targets for industrial and agricultural products:

**Kurier Polski**

10 TYS. KOP. 10  
GRUDNIA  
1958  
CENA 30 GR.

**WSZYSTKO DLA WSZYSTKICH**

**Plan na rok 1959**  
**i ustawa o samorządzie**  
**robotniczym**

— tematem plenarnych  
obrad Sejmu

Ważny udział  
w Świątecznym  
Konkursie  
Filmowym

organizowany przez  
"KURIER POLSKI"  
i  
"PRACOWNIKI  
AKTORÓW FILMOWYCH"



Pani **BARBARA MODELSKA**  
znana aktorka teatru i filmu.

"Moim ulubionym aparatem radiowym jest  
**"SONATINA"**  
produkcji  
ZAKŁADÓW RADIOWYCH "Diara" w Dzierżonowie."

Polish advertising is far ahead of that of the rest of the area both in its scope and in its use of Western techniques. The usual advertisement in the Communist press is a small, demurely-worded, un-illustrated box on the back page. Here, however, is an advertisement which not only appeared on the front page of *Kurier Polski* (Warsaw), December 20-21, 1958, but uses an endorsement by a theatrical celebrity. The text reads: "Barbara Modelska, famous theater and film actress, says 'My favorite radio set is the Sonatina.'" The advertiser is a State enterprise.

## Current Developments—Bulgaria

	1962 (Original)	1962 (New)	1965
Pig iron (thousand tons) . . . . .	200	230	700
Steel . . . . .	350	400	900
Rolled steel . . . . .	270	320	700-800
Lead . . . . .	33	45	90
Electrolytic copper . . . . .	12	17	25
Bituminous coal . . . . .	...	970	1,200
Electric power (billion kwh) . . . . .	5	6-7	10
Plastics (thousand tons) . . . . .	8	16	30-40
Cellulose . . . . .	48	78	200
Paper and cardboard . . . . .	100	175	260
Chemical fertilizers . . . . .	890	1,000	1,600
Cement . . . . .	1,700	2,300	3,000
Cotton fabrics (million meters) . . . . .	210	280-300	350-400
Woolen fabrics . . . . .	18	25	30
Shoes (million pairs) . . . . .	8	10-12	13-15
Automobile tires (thousand sets) . . . . .	170	350-400	700
Fodder grain (thousand tons) . . . . .	2,238	5,500	6,600
Sunflower seed . . . . .	297	500	550
Cotton (unginned) . . . . .	66	170	210
Oriental tobacco . . . . .	80	130	130
Sugar beets . . . . .	1,500	2,680	3,000
Grapes . . . . .	871	1,500	2,244
Meat and poultry, live . . . . .	521	1,180	1,300
Wool . . . . .	20	30	35
Cows (thousand) . . . . .	650	800	1,000
Sheep (million) . . . . .	9.5	12	13-15
Pigs . . . . .	2.1	5	6
Poultry . . . . .	18	45-50	70-80
Eggs . . . . .	1,170	4,000	6,800
Milk (million liters) . . . . .	1,255	2,560	3,300
Wine (thousand liters) . . . . .	207,000	397,500	....
Sugar (thousand tons) . . . . .	211	348	....
Vegetable oils . . . . .	90	200	....
Canned fruit . . . . .	110	227	....
Canned vegetables . . . . .	128	228	....
Oriental tobacco, processed . . . . .	64	110	....
Meat . . . . .	145	384	....

### Living Standards

Zhivkov promised that efforts would be made to improve the population's living standards—although a substantial improvement "can be achieved only after the successful fulfillment of the tasks necessary for the accelerated development of our Socialist economy." He noted that, while the average industrial wage is said to be over 700 *leva* per month, the average conceals a large segment of workers who are paid much less. He proposed to raise the wages of the lowest-paid: "From now on the lowest wage must be from 400 to 600 *leva*. Increases in other wages must be made more gradually." However, he put more emphasis on a proposal to raise the number of married women in the labor force by broadening the facilities for community feeding, laundering and child care.

"... in order to improve decisively the standard of living of each family, it is necessary to create conditions which would permit every able-bodied member of the family to work and receive an income. . . . In future years the need for labor in industry, construction and branches of production will increase very much. . . . In this respect the main task that emerges is to relieve women from housework. . . . The feeding of the family must cease to be a problem. . . . It is necessary gradually to organize . . . public kitchens and canteens . . . the production and sale of semi-prepared foods . . . the electrification of the home kitchen . . . children's crèches, children's homes and nursery schools . . . more public laundries and baths. . . ."

At the same time he promised the gradual introduction of a 42- or 40-hour workweek "in the next few years," without specifying exactly when, and a rapid improvement in housing and cultural facilities. "It is understandable that all these very important measures for a new and considerable improvement in the material lot and cultural level of the people cannot be implemented at once. In



Part of the current Bulgarian drive for a great speed-up in industrial production involves a campaign to get youth out of schools and into factories. This cartoon is a good example of the attempts to shame young people into the factories: the mother, clutching her son, says, "My mama's darling! Mama will not let them make you go work in a factory."

Cartoon and caption from *Sturshel* (Sofia), January 23, 1959



## A Letter from a Peasant

THE FOLLOWING LETTER was printed in the Polish provincial newspaper *Rolnik Polski—Gromada*, November 19, 1958. Both in substance and in tone it is typical of the peasant not in Poland alone, where the Gomulka regime so far has permitted collectivization to wither, but in the rest of the area as well, where economic and political pressures have forced a high degree of collectivization.

"I have never written to you before but, having read the directives of the 12th Plenum, I must. In case you should think I am a rich man or an enemy of People's Poland I must tell you that I am the son of a workman and fought for People's Poland. Now, as a military veteran, I have 7.48 hectares of land and manage to get along.

"From the end of the war until 1948 I was still glad that I had fought for such a Poland because peasants were given land and industry was nationalized. But when collectivization started one really no longer wanted to live. I am sure you remember how in 1956 Comrade Gomulka explained in his speech what [misfortune] collectivization had brought to Poland. Life started anew after that [1956 speech]; people were eager to work, to increase farm production, cultivate land, etc. My brother-in-law and I even started an account in the general savings bank so as to buy

a 'Zetor' [tractor], which is excellent for farming, and to raise cows instead of horses.

"But when we read the directives we became very embittered, because that was the end of our hopes. The plague of kolkhozes was again hovering over Polish farming. Don't people in high positions see this?

"Comrade Gomulka has said that as long as there was no collectivization there would be no equality and the rich would grow richer and the poor, poorer. But we see that there is no equality in the world and the man has not yet been born who can establish it.

"Now tell me, people from Gromada, am I to abandon farming or the newspaper or both, because the minute my wife reads an article on collectivization she starts pestering me to drop farming because there will be a kolkhoz. [Signed] Mikolaj Pietruszka, Zareba Post Office, Lubin District, Wroclaw Province."

In reply, the newspaper tried to reassure farmer Pietruszka that no forced collectivization was in sight, and that as the State depends so largely on individual farms for agricultural production it will not, since production is its main goal, discriminate against them in the supply of manufactured goods. "Individual farms must be supplied better so that they can produce better." As for joining a kolkhoz: "That is up to you; if you want to join, fine, if not, it doesn't make any difference."

general they will be carried out gradually over a five- to six-year period, and some of them will need more time."

### Shakeup in Science

Zhivkov severely criticized Bulgarian science as "seriously lagging" and as not satisfying "the requirements of Socialist practice." He demanded that the physical and technical sciences be applied more fully to the solution of the tasks set forth in the Party's economic program, and that the social sciences and cultural fields "contribute toward the consolidation of Socialist ideology in all domains of our public life . . . and wage an implacable struggle against any manifestations of remnants of bourgeois ideology and morals." He called for a general overhaul and expansion of scientific research, more cooperation with Soviet science and more careful selection and training of scientific workers. "[The institutes] must not admit to scientific research people who are lacking the necessary political and scientific qualities. They must remove those who have proved that they lack essential qualities for such work."

### Discussion at the Plenum

The Central Committee approved Zhivkov's "theses" and stated in its decision that they would be presented to the next session of the National Assembly and published for public discussion. In a final speech Zhivkov took note of certain criticisms that had been levelled at his program from both foreign and domestic sources. He observed that

the London *Economist* of January 3 had characterized it as "wildly utopian" and a "leap in the dark." He said, to the contrary, that the economic and moral strength of the "Socialist camp" made such "unprecedented economic leaps" an objective possibility. He also indicated that there had been significant misgivings within the Central Committee itself, particularly over the administrative and economic reorganization:

"... individual comrades have expressed doubt in one form or another about the abilities of district Party, State and economic leadership—a doubt of the abilities of our local cadres to cope with the tremendous responsibility now being placed on their shoulders as a result of administrative and economic reorganization in our country. In my opinion, these comrades exaggerated our difficulties. They also exaggerated the role of the economic ministries. We must have greater confidence in our cadres, who have on several occasions proved their devotion to the cause of Socialism and their ability successfully to organize the struggle for fulfillment of tasks. We are about to implement reforms which are far-reaching and revolutionary . . . we are directly attacking the heart of bureaucracy and over-centralization. . . . Under the new conditions, however, it is possible that other tendencies and sentiments may appear here and there, arising from so-called 'local patriotism.' . . . Such tendencies, wherever they occur, must be decisively beaten down and eliminated."

Zhivkov ended by admitting that the projected changes represented "a difficult program" for the country, and that the Party would have to spur the people to "labor, labor and more labor."

## HUNGARY

### Stagnant Agriculture

Hungarian officials now admit quite openly that they have failed badly in developing the country's agricultural economy. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Janos Mulato, told interviewers last December that exports of farm products are far below the prewar level, and that agriculture "is not keeping pace with either domestic demands or export requirements." He said that wheat yields in 1956 were only 13.2 quintals per hectare as against 30.2 in East Germany and 36.3 in the Netherlands. In sugar beets the yield was 169 quintals per hectare, compared with 243 in East Germany and 330 in the Netherlands. Hungary had only 38 head of cattle and 82 pigs per 100 hectares, in contrast to Austria's 136 and 150. The farm purchasing system is also inadequate:

"It is a well-known fact that we have had to import onions, although the domestic crop could have covered our needs, because our purchasing organs were unable to cope with the task. At present our shops are well stocked with poultry, yet we cannot fulfill our export obligations because the breeding and purchasing of stocks have not been properly organized, a shortcoming which causes a loss of several million forint annually in hard currency."

According to the Central Statistical Office, Hungary had only a fair harvest in 1958, with grain yields running between 70 and 80 percent of the level in the good year of 1957.

### Collectivization to Be Speeded

A meeting of the Party Central Committee in December called for an intensive campaign to collectivize Hungarian agriculture. According to the Party theoretical journal *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), January 1959, the meeting affirmed the correctness of the Party's agricultural policy since the Revolt—which has emphasized collectivization by persuasion together with measures to encourage higher production by the independent peasantry—but decided that "the political and economic situation make it possible to quicken the pace of development of the collectivization movement in 1959." The committee's resolution stated that the conditions for a "sudden development" do not yet exist, but will do so "within a foreseeable time." The measures it set forth implied a substantial increase in pressures on private farmers to join a collective or some form of cooperative group, along with greater economic support for existing collectives.

The article made the following points:

1. "Within a year, all village Party organizations must organize a widespread network . . . of collective farm members, teachers, agronomists and others in prominent positions in the villages, absolutely faithful to the People's Democracy, in agreement with the Socialist reorganization of agriculture and therefore ready to fight. . . .
2. "Five hundred comrades politically staunch, much experienced in political and organizational work, well-



Three Hungarian peasant women who travel from village to village, singing folk songs. The caption, on the front page of *Nok Lapja* (Budapest), January 5, 1959, calls them "the three Fates."

trained and in general of peasant origin . . . have to be sent to the villages. . . .

3. "Collective farms that are newly-formed or weak must be strengthened by politically staunch and well-trained experts. . . .

4. "Alongside the county Party committees, an active group of 50 to 100 well-trained Communists should be organized in each county. The task of these groups is to help the local village leaders in the organization of collective farms and propaganda. The Central Committee proposes . . . that eminent, influential private farmers should be called upon . . . and that the question of collective farming should be discussed thoroughly with them. It is desirable to call together separately the new farmers of the villages and to discuss thoroughly with them the question of collectivization. . . .

5. "[All members of mass organizations should be induced to join collectives.] The 'village youth collectives' organized by the Communist Youth Association . . . must be supported by every means. . . .

6. "The village Party organizations and councils should organize committees . . . numbering 20 to 40 persons. . . . The committee should draft a program for collectivization or expansion of collectives already existing. To achieve this program, the committee should carry out methodical propaganda organizational work. This work should not be given up after the first favorable results,

## Current Developments—Hungary

but continued until the majority of the individual working peasants of the district or village have joined . . . and even until the village is turned into a cooperative village."

The resolution contained a number of other provisions designed to bring social and economic pressure upon the peasantry. State organs were to give preference to collective farms in every possible way, through favorable marketing agreements and prior access to livestock, machinery, fertilizers, building materials, etc. The farmers' cooperative groups and production associations, which represent the preliminary stages of collectivization, are to be pressured to convert themselves into collectives. Land commassation will be carried out where necessary, but preferably through "unofficial" means. "The formation of plots by official intervention . . . can take place only if other methods have failed. . . . Plots should be formed in that part of the village in which the joint area of the scattered fields of the collective and the State reserve plots amount to at least 51 percent of the collective land. The farmers affected by this ruling should get plots of similar quality in exchange. . . ."

Departing from past practice, the Central Committee proposed that strong collectives be permitted to purchase universal tractors for their own use, and that some of the largest and most prosperous should even be allowed to have heavy-duty tractors for ploughing. It reaffirmed however, "for the time being," the importance of the old Communist institution of Machine Tractor Stations.

### Status in December

Hungary had 2,776 collective farms at the end of 1958, according to an official government spokesman, comprising 848,000 hectares and 144,000 members. In addition there were 784 cooperative groups with a membership of 30,000 cultivating 102,000 hectares of land. Another 118,000 farmers belonged to cooperative associations with 93,150 hectares. (Radio Budapest, January 23.) Collectivization had advanced relatively little since April 1957, when there were said to be 2,439 of the higher-type collectives with 123,600 members. At its highest point, in June 1953, Hungary's collectivized area embraced about 27.9 percent of the arable land. It fell to 20 percent in December 1953, during the first Premiership of Imre Nagy, was about 16.1 percent at the end of 1955, and fell again after the October Revolt. Collectives now occupy about 12 percent of the arable land.

### Diplomatic Clash with US

Although Radio Budapest on January 28 claimed that the Hungarian government desired to establish more friendly relations with the United States, and had sent a diplomatic note to this effect, the contents of this note, published a few days later, consisted largely of an attack on the American Legation in Budapest. According to Radio Budapest, February 1, the Hungarian government had underlined "the untenable situation which arose from the continual subversive activity of the American Legation . . . and of illegal American organizations [operating] against the State and the social order in the People's Republic." When the American Legation refused the note because

of its threatening nature, the Hungarian government stated that it would take the "necessary steps" to end the activities of the Americans now "endangering the State."

### 1958 Plan Fulfillment

Hungary's economy has trudged along slowly and cautiously since Kadar consolidated his power in the shambles of the 1956 Revolt. The surviving Communists, drawing the moral from the unfinished grandiose projects left by their predecessors, have kept their planning well within the bounds of the possible. The Report of the Central Statistical Office for 1958 (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], January 18, 1959) sounded almost desultory in comparison to the brisk figures emanating from other capitals. While most industries registered large percentage increases over the preceding year, and State industry as a whole was stated to have exceeded its plan target by four percent, much of the gain represented recovery rather than progress.

Crude oil production, which went up 23 percent in 1958, was still only half of what it had been in 1955 before the flooding of the oil field at Nagylengyel. Crude steel output returned to the 1955 level, but bauxite mining—though it gained 15 percent—was at only 85 percent of the 1955 fig-

### Man Here Blows Fine Stack

THE REGIMES in both Romania and Bulgaria seem to be having troubles with popular music. In the former country, *Informatia Bucarestilor* (Bucharest), November 26, announced that the Musical Office of the House of Popular Creation has published lists of songs from which orchestras in restaurants may make a choice. The paper went on to complain, however, that "although the orchestras are obliged to submit in advance every month the selected repertoire, in November only half of the orchestras respected this obligation." Many such orchestras, it appears are committing the sin of "cultivating rhythm for rhythm's sake," and display "bad taste and musical decadence" by playing songs not on the approved list.

In Bulgaria, *Narodna Kultura*, November 29, examined the kinds of phonograph records produced by the State enterprise Radioprom in 1957, and concluded that all is not well. "Dance music" comprised 53 percent of the records and "entertaining music" a further 12 percent, while "Soviet music" was represented by a mere 0.5 percent and "songs about the people's democracies" only 2 percent. Even worse, the enterprise, "taking into consideration the 'demand' for some records," produced discs with "Western dance music of doubtful artistic qualities, alien to our Socialist life, which flooded the entire country. One example: while 200 copies of 'Drujna Pesen' [a Bulgarian 'Socialist' march] were produced, some dance music, such as 'Mambo Italiano' sold 9,500 records during 1957 and the first half of 1958." Another best seller was "Venice Boogie."

ure. On the other hand, there were significant advances in some of the items which Hungary needs most: electric power (up 19 percent over both 1955 and 1957); nitrogenous fertilizer (92 percent above 1957, 154 percent above 1955); cement (32 percent over 1957, 11 percent over 1955) and consumer items such as knitgoods, shoes, butter and meat.

The report gave specific figures for 1958 production as follows: coal, 24.2 million tons; electric power, 6.5 billion kwh; crude oil, 829,000 tons; bauxite, 1,053,000 tons; crude steel, 1,627,000 tons; rolled steel, 1,076,000 tons; aluminum, 39,500 tons; motorbuses, 1,414; trucks, 3,683; lathes, 1,858; motorcycles, 55,800; television sets, 37,000; sulfuric acid, 130,000 tons; nitrogenous fertilizer, 153,000 tons; bricks, 1,416 million; cement, 1,302,000 tons; woolen fabrics, 218 million sq. meters; knitgoods, 6,867 tons; leather shoes, 15.2 million pairs; butter, 16,900 tons; meat, 157,000 tons; beer, 3,067,000 hectoliters; cigarettes, 15 billion.

Like Poland, Hungary has been faced with a foreign trade crisis and is desperately seeking export markets to balance its increased import requirements. The report said that exports were higher than planned in 1958 and thus enabled some reduction in short-term debts. Machinery and equipment exports were one-third above the 1957 level and comprised 36 percent of total exports; exports of telecommunication items and of precision equipment, which the regime is pushing hard, rose by 50 percent. Radio Budapest reported on January 31 that exports in 1958 were the highest since 1945.

### Trials to be Concluded

Laszlo Gyaros, press officer for the Hungarian Cabinet, stated at a press conference on January 22 that "the trials of those indicted for participation in the October 1956 counterrevolution will be concluded." He added, however, that "the writers convicted for the same offense will not be released." Such prominent writers as Tibor Dery, Gyula Hay and Istvan Bibó are still serving jail sentences, together with 30 to 35 lesser literary figures. In apparent contradiction to the above statement was the report from reliable Western sources that Sandor Fekete, a young Communist writer and journalist, had just been arrested; no mention of this was made in the Hungarian press.

### Factory Councils

After the destruction of the workers' councils following the 1956 Revolt, the regime established so-called factory councils, with the aim of increasing Party control over the workers. Now, however, it appears that in several cases the factory councils have seriously attempted to represent the workers. Radio Budapest, January 25, stated that "in many instances there is no harmony between management and the factory councils . . . [since] these councils lack the experience which characterizes other similar social organizations."

On February 3, the radio reported a meeting of trade union leaders of the steel and metal industry where the main points under discussion were: improving the living



Mari Takacs, left, recently selected as Hungarian television's first full-time announcer. Miss Takacs, 19, is a philosophy student. Right, her fiance watches her at work.

Photos from *Nok Lapja* (Budapest), January 22, 1959

and working conditions of the workers, with particular emphasis on the elimination of factory accidents which seem to have risen recently; more efficient law enforcement in the plants. According to the commentator, violation of the law and of new decrees have become almost epidemic.

### Church Sponsors "Peace" Resolution

On the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the World Peace Movement, a meeting of the Executive Committee of "Opus Pacis," the Party-controlled organization for Catholic clergy, and the Catholic Committee of the "National Peace Council" was held January 22 under the chairmanship of Bishop Endre Hamvas. A declaration, adopted at that time and accepted by the Catholic Bench of Bishops, followed the Soviet propaganda line on US missile bases in Western Europe:

"We look with profound anxiety upon the unlimited experimental atomic blasts . . . the construction of rocket bases, equipped with atomic weapons, on our continent (beginning with the Scandinavian peninsula, extending through West Germany and Italy down the Mediterranean coastline). [Such] a so-called policy of force is based on the mistaken and criminal assumption that it is acceptable and should be followed." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], January 24.)

### Soviet Withdrawal

No general information has been released on the number of Soviet troops withdrawn from Hungary since the suppression of the 1956 Revolt, but for the last few months the Hungarian press has been publishing articles describing "farewell parties" given in various towns in honor of the departing soldiers. On January 30, Radio Budapest announced that 12,000 Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Hungary and discharged from the army. This figure apparently represents 10-12 percent of the total Soviet forces stationed in the country.

### Youth Labor Brigades

The current drive to send youth groups, intellectuals and bureaucrats to work in the fields and factories gained new



momentum with the announcement in *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), January 7-8, that a labor brigade of the KISZ (Communist Youth Association) had assumed the task of building a large power plant on the Danube. This was apparently decided at a meeting of the KISZ Central Committee and included in a resolution which also stated that "the politically indifferent but otherwise decent youths of worker extraction must be won over." Later, Radio Budapest, February 2, lyrically described the advantages of belonging to a youth labor brigade: "according to a member of KISZ, there is nothing more exciting and more adventurous than to break corn in the field in the rain."

### Natural Gas from Romania

A pipeline to Romania, linking Tiszapalkonya in north-eastern Hungary with the Romanian natural gas fields at Csenger in western Transylvania, was completed in December. (*Nepszava* [Budapest], December 19.) The pipeline extends for 135 kilometers in Hungary and 230 kilometers in Romania. It will supply the chemical plants in Tiszapalkonya, now under construction, as well as the steelworks in Diosgyor and the city of Miskolc.

### Students Abroad

The Party organ *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), January 1, announced that 6,000 students will study in Soviet bloc countries in 1959. Of these, 1,400 students will go to the USSR, 3,000 to East Germany, 1,000 to Czechoslovakia, and the remaining number will be split into groups of 200 each, for distribution throughout the other Satellites. From these figures it is evident that by far the greatest percentage of young people will study in countries whose policies most closely reflect the Soviet Union's. Particularly significant is a comparison between Poland and East Germany: before the 1956 Revolt a large number of Hungarians studied in Poland and few went to East Germany. Now, 50 percent of all students abroad will study in the latter country.



Students from Arab countries in Czechoslovakia, where, after a year spent learning Czech, they attend technical schools. Czechoslovakia is in the forefront of the Soviet-bloc drive for influence on the "neutralist" nations.

Photo from *Slovenka* (Bratislava), January 5, 1959

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Trade Expanding with Mid-East, Africa

Czechoslovakia sent trade missions to Iraq, Ethiopia, Ghana and Guinea at the end of 1958, according to Radio Prague, January 8. The delegation to Iraq signed a three-year trade agreement on December 14, and an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Czechoslovakia will deliver capital goods and engineering equipment in exchange for dates and "certain raw materials." Iraqi specialists will come to Czechoslovakia for training in industry. Czechoslovakia also agreed to participate in the construction of sugar refineries, electric power stations, wheat silos, a shoe factory and other projects.

With Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia signed a five-year contract for the supply of medical equipment. The mission to Ghana negotiated the expansion of exports of textiles, costume jewelry and other goods in exchange for agricultural products. Economic relations were established with the new republic of Guinea, including an agreement for "an initial commodity exchange worth several million dollars."

On February 10 *Rude Pravo* reported the signing of a three-year trade agreement with the United Arab Republic. The agreement provides for a total trade of about 81 million dollars during the first year, making the UAR Czechoslovakia's second-ranking non-Communist trade partner, after West Germany.

### MTS Downgraded

The regime's stubborn defense of the Machine Tractor Stations, which began to falter after Khrushchev abolished the Soviet MTS early in 1958, has now given way again. On January 30 *Pravda* (Bratislava) reported that the Politburo had decided in December to approve the sale of heavy machinery to collective farms. "This year machines, mostly of a lighter type, will be sold to the collective farms; gradually, over several years, the collectives are expected to acquire all the essential types of machinery available at the MTS." The paper estimated that during 1959 the collective farms will acquire 30 percent of all the wheel tractors in the possession of the MTS, and an equal number from factory production. Caterpillar tractors, combines and other expensive, specialized machinery will remain in the possession of the MTS for the time being.

"In extraordinary cases, when one or perhaps two MTS production centers service only one collective farm which is sufficiently strong politically, organizationally and economically, it will be possible even this year to sell to such a collective farm all the machinery of the MTS, including caterpillar tractors and combines. If the collective purchases all the machines and tractors of the MTS, measures must be taken to transfer the MTS experts to the collective. The collective may, in this case, also purchase the buildings and other equipment of the MTS. . . . The sale of farm machinery should be completed by March 15, and in southern Slovakia, where spring work begins earlier, even prior to that date."

The Ministry of Agriculture's newspaper, *Zemedske Noviny* (Prague), warned on February 1 against the views of "zealots" who would dissolve all the MTS right away. It said that the MTS should not be dissolved because they are needed to service the weaker collective farms which cannot yet afford to buy heavy machinery. Moreover, it argued, the MTS still retain their important political function in the current drive to finish collectivizing Czechoslovakia's agriculture. They are to serve as a symbol of "Socialism" wherever it is necessary "to convince the community of the advantages of production in common."

Hostility to the MTS has been evidenced in the past by demands from collective farmers for the possession of their own machinery. The regime has resisted the demands with various arguments, although at the Third National Congress of Collective Farms in March 1957, it granted a concession by allowing the collectives to purchase certain small machines. During the past year there have been many complaints from the collective farms over the unsatisfactory work of the MTS (*Mechanizace Zemedelstvi* [Prague], December 20, 1958), and *Rude Pravo* admitted on January 20, 1959, that "at the more mature collective farms the present relationship with the MTS prevented a more substantial increase in agricultural production."

### Writers Under Pressure

Throughout the Satellite bloc, writers are being increasingly forced to adhere more closely to the Party line (see Poland, above). In Prague, January 27, after some 600 artists and other members of the intelligentsia had met to discuss "cultural developments" in the capital, a resolution was adopted which called for fuller participation of artists in "public life." (*Literarni Noviny* [Prague], January 31.)

At a similar meeting of 80 Slovak writers in Bratislava, a young writer, Petr Sevcovsky, stated: "One-half of the young authors whom the editorial office of *Tvorba* sent for a two-week stay in our villages were unable to create anything worthwhile. . . . There was a basic lack of knowledge of problems concerning our people, and it is absurd to think they can be grasped in two weeks. . . . Please send us the young ones for a longer period, at least for three months or more, to study life at our construction sites of Socialism, at enterprises, and at cooperatives." (Radio Bratislava, February 3.)

Another group of the "foremost cultural and artistic workers" also met in Prague, January 15, and elected a preparatory committee for the Congress of Socialist Culture, which is slated for this June.

### "Crimes" Against "Socialist" Property

At its meeting on January 9, the Czechoslovak Ministerial council complained that the criminal code designed to combat the pilfering of "Socialist" property was not being stringently applied. It was stressed that in cases where the "criminals" were "class enemies," it was necessary to apply the provisions of the code requiring the confiscation of the wrong-doer's property. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], January 11.)

Among the recent reports of trials for such crimes was that of Oldrich Subrt, manager of the railroad station restaurant at Vsetaty, who allegedly stole 260,337 *koruny* in less than a year by over-charging the patrons. He received a sentence of five years. (*Prace* [Prague], January 3.) The criminal court in Prague also put on trial a group of financial officers who had been bribed by tax-payers, thus defrauding the State of "many hundreds of thousands of *koruny*." (*Prace*, January 13 and 18.) Another case of bribery involved Frantisek Groll, who set the "norms" at the Buildings Works in Prague. He was accused of accepting bribes from the employees in order to determine favorable "norms" and increased earnings. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. (*Prace*, January 17.)

### Priest Jailed

The arrest of Father Berka of Moravska Trebova was reported in *Rude Pravo*, January 18. The Roman Catholic priest was accused of "amorous adventures" and of "undermining the morals of school children between eight and thirteen years of age."

### Private Medical Practices Abolished

January 1, 1959 was the date set for most of the remaining private doctors and dentists to close their offices. As a result, in the city of Brno, for example, out of the 350 private practices which had been operating after the war, less than 20 now exist; according to Radio Prague, January 6, most of those left are being operated by "aged doctors." In Prague there are apparently only 56 doctors and 12 dentists remaining in private practice, and many of them have pledged to shut their offices by the end of the year. (*Svobodne Slovo* [Prague], January 7.)

### Ministry Changes

According to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), January 20, Foreign Trade Minister Richard Dvorak has been made Ambassador to the USSR. Replacing Dvorak was Frantisek Krajcir, formerly Minister of Internal Trade. Krajcir's post was filled by Ladislav Brabec, First Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.

## ROMANIA

### Romanian Writers Criticized

The Romanian literary journal, *Gazeta Literara*, February 6, as reported in *Borba* (Belgrade), the following day, revealed that at a Plenum of the Romanian Writers' Union, held at the end of January, several writers and three periodicals were criticized for straying from the road of "Socialist realism." Writers Lucian Blaga, Gyula Szabo, Ana Novac, Doina Salajan, Toma Spataru and others were reprimanded for spreading ideas "hostile to the working class" and taking "anti-Party attitudes."

(Continued on page 56)

# Texts and Documents

## REVEALING KADAR DECLARATION

*The following is, with few deletions, the text of a major review of his policies by Hungarian Party leader Kadar. The article, which appeared in Nepszabadsag, Jan. 25, is one of the frankest expositions to date of past designs and future plans.*

IT MUST BE CLEAR even to the outsider who knows only the broad outlines of the facts that, in 1948, the working classes, led by the revolutionary Party and its ally, the working peasantry, scored a decisive victory over the reactionary, bourgeois forces. With great élan, the creation of an economic foundation and Socialist culture for a Socialist society, was started.

Another undeniable fact is that in the fall of 1956 the proletarian dictatorship in Hungary was weakened, the line of Socialist building suffered a break and the counterrevolutionary uprising, supported, incited and touched off by the imperialists, threatened the very existence of the Hungarian People's Republic.

It is also clear, even to those who are unfamiliar with conditions in Hungary that, at the end of 1958, the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship—the Hungarian People's Republic—was again strong, indeed stronger than before the counterrevolutionary uprising. This is expressed in every field of Socialist building and was shown by the indisputable results of the November 16, 1958 National Assembly and council elections.

Naturally, our Party cannot be, and definitely is not, satisfied with merely stating that our development is now progressing on a healthy course and that Socialism is on the upswing in our country. As a true Marxist-Leninist Party our Party believes that it is its never-ending duty to analyze causes behind events, the fluctuations in our development—the high point in 1948, the low of October 1956 and the unprecedented peak of November 1958—and to learn from both our victories and setbacks. . . .

The current political line of the Party is not new. True, Socialist building suffered from mistakes and distortions before 1956, but this does not alter the fact that in spite of this Socialism won ground in our country. Today our Party merely continues the policy of Socialist building. This means that the main political line of our Party did not change, even after 1956. At the same time, there are new and not insignificant factors in the Party's work. The new and sound characteristics are primarily due to the fact that, having learned from past mis-

takes, the Party [now] applies Marxist-Leninist principles with greater consistency [taking into consideration] the particular circumstances in Hungary.

And now I wish to speak of the experiences and new factors in the class struggle in Hungary.

THE HUNGARIAN CLASS struggle, and particularly the 1956 counterrevolution, proved in actual fact the absolute validity of the Marxist-Leninist teachings on proletarian dictatorship and class struggle. "The elimination of the classes," says Lenin, "is brought about by a long, difficult and arduous class struggle and even after the overthrow of the capitalist rule, after the destruction of the bourgeois State, after the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, this class struggle will not disappear; it will only change in its manifestations and, in many aspects, will become even more embittered."

After the seizure of political power, the destruction of the bourgeois economic power is a relatively simple task. However, by dispossessing the bourgeoisie, we have not yet conquered it. A much longer and more complicated task is to free the vast majority of the working people from bourgeois ideological and political influence and to win them over to the Marxist-Leninist camp. Only when this is achieved will our victory be permanent.

The 1919 and 1956 counterrevolutions in Hungary clearly prove that the exploiters will not resign themselves to the loss of power. Months before the counterrevolutionary uprising, revisionists spread throughout the country the false and dangerous views that the class struggle stops in the period of Socialist consolidation. The spreading of these views was to a great extent responsible for the fact that the counterrevolution found the Party unprepared. In the Fall of 1956, the class struggle in Hungary took on more violent forms than at any other time in the history of our people's democracy.

During the transition period various, opposing trends assert themselves in the class struggle. The increasing Socialist forces limit the resisting and attacking potentialities of the bourgeois elements,

and they help the lower middle classes to shake off bourgeois influence. All this creates a lull in the class struggle. On the other hand, a weakening of the Socialist forces for any reason whatever, or a blow suffered by the proletarian dictatorship, encourages and fortifies the bourgeoisie and consequently the class struggle is intensified. The intensity of the class struggle within various countries is also influenced by international events. If the forces of Socialism and peace are successful, the reactionary elements withdraw and become helpless; but if tensions arise in the international situation, if an imperialist provocation occurs somewhere, reaction on the home front is stronger.

The working classes, the Communist Party, do not favor greater tension, for the peaceful building of Socialism serves their interest. In 1919 as well as in 1945 the Hungarian proletariat came into power without a shot. But what of the bourgeoisie? In 1956, just as in 1919, it joined forces with the international reactionaries and forced a civil war on us. We do not intensify the struggle but, if we are attacked with arms, we must defend ourselves with arms.

### "What Lenin Said"

When, in an effort to crush the counterrevolution, the Hungarian Socialist forces struck back at the rebels, the whole international reactionary world resounded with cries of "terror"; the revisionists, the bourgeois "humanists" were horrified. Yet, what did the proletarian dictatorship do? It merely reacted to the horrors of the counterrevolution. We can say what Lenin said in 1919: "The charge of terrorism, whenever it is justified, applies to the bourgeoisie and not us."

However, the class struggles in Hungary reflect not only these truths of general validity but also the very particular characteristics rooted in Hungarian historic development. . . .

Prior to 1918 all opposing social factors were present in Hungary: there were the bourgeoisie and the labor classes, the big feudal landowners, and the peasantry. There were also conflicts—indeed very sharp ones—among the various ethnic groups. This situation was further aggravated by the conflict between the Hungarian people and the foreign ruling power, the Hapsburg dynasty, the dependence of the country on Austria. It is not through coincidence that Hungary was among the first of the countries to feel the influence of the Great Socialist October Revolution. In 1918 the Communist Party quickly won the support of the majority of the laborers and working classes

and, under the Party's guidance, the Hungarian Soviet Republic was established.

## II

**D**URING THE PERIOD between the liberation of 1945 and the outbreak of the October 1956 counterrevolution, the Hungarian people made great strides in the Socialist transformation of the country: the Socialist forces gained the upper hand. Then, how come that a situation arose—if only temporarily—in which the fate of the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship was endangered?

According to bourgeois spokesmen the counterrevolutionary uprising proves that the working classes became "disillusioned" with Socialism and "Communism was faced with a crisis." The revisionists drew essentially the same conclusion when they spoke of a "spontaneous uprising of the people" against the regime.

However, the theory about the "crisis of Communism" proved to be wrong. Even during the counterrevolution the Socialist forces were much stronger than those of the reactionaries. But conditions in the two conflicting camps were not the same.

Concerning the forces loyal to Socialism:

For years Hungarian labor classes enthusiastically worked building Socialism and listened to the Party. Certain mistakes, made in the course of this construction, caused confusion in their ranks, and so their ties to the Party slackened. The confusion was further aggravated by the subversive activities of the revisionists and treachery which, at a critical juncture, paralyzed the leadership of the Party and the State.

And yet . . . the organized workers of old remained loyal to Socialism, even during the most critical times. Some of them took up arms against the counterrevolutionaries, and this was the segment which recovered most rapidly after the crushing of the counterrevolution.

The most class-conscious elements of the peasantry, the kolkhoz peasants, and a significant portion of the poor peasants, also remained loyal to the proletarian dictatorship. At the time of the marshalling of forces, the wavering increased among the middle peasants, mainly because for some time they had been in opposition to the proletarian dictatorship over certain issues. One of these was the voluntary principle in the Socialist reorganization of agriculture, which they felt had been violated, the second the agricultural price system. But in the crushing of the counterrevolution, particularly in the mopping up operations, the middle peasantry de-

finitely stood as allies to the laboring classes.

From a political point of view, the intelligentsia was divided into various groups. A small segment of it stood its ground all the way at the side of the People's Democracy. Another, also a small section, took active part in the preparatory activities of the counterrevolution and in leading it. The vast majority of the intellectuals wavered. This vacillation springs from the social standing of the intellectuals. After the liberation the social status of the intellectuals changed; together with the rest of the working people they became free, but this change was not reflected in their consciousness. In the majority of the intellectuals there remained the vestiges of bourgeois thinking, nationalist views, the illusion of an above-class democracy. For this reason, this segment of the intellectuals was most deeply affected by the revisionist, nationalist wave and, as a result of the weakening of the proletarian dictatorship, they came under the influence of the counterrevolution, indeed became its important stronghold. After the military, political and ideological defeat of the counterrevolution, this vacillating segment gradually started to turn in our direction. This was so because in Hungary the interests of a large portion of the intellectuals are closely tied up with those of the working classes.

## "The Imre Nagy Clique"

The counterrevolutionary ranks were also swelled by a faltering of the urban lower middle classes. This segment is the ally of the labor classes when the power of the workers is firm, but in times of difficulties, during temporary setbacks, it turns away from the proletarian dictatorship. . . .

The counterrevolutionary forces were well organized and purposeful, they knew exactly what they wanted. Their men even occupied key positions, important for the defense of the People's Republic. The general staff of the counterrevolutionary forces was made up of representatives of the spy and subversive organizations of international imperialism, counterrevolutionary elements living in exile and their cronies within the country, and the Imre Nagy clique which turned traitor. The counterrevolutionary armed gangs were recruited from the remaining elements of the former ruling classes, from Horthyist officers, gendarmerie and the reactionary segments of the police, criminals, bums, as well as from the ranks of misguided young people, and vacillating bourgeois and intellectual groups.

The guiding force of proletarian dictatorship, the Communist Party, was paralyzed by the treacherous act. During this most critical period, the followers of Socialism were left without a leading force, they became scattered and therefore, even though they constituted the majority, they were unable to put up an effective fight. It was due to the well organized state of the counterrevolutionary forces and the disorganization of our own ranks that for a transition period the bigger force was at a disadvantage in the face of the minority.

## III

**T**HE PREPARATION, the touching off and the desperate rearguard fighting of the 1956 counterrevolutionary attack in Hungary exposed the tactics used by international and Hungarian reactionaries against Socialism. The counterrevolutionaries knew that they could not hope for victory if they openly admitted their goal, the restoration of capitalism. Their true purpose was therefore concealed. They spoke not of capitalism—at least at the beginning—but of a "democratic Socialism." "Socialism without dictatorship" was the first move in the counterrevolutionary strategy. They calculated that the slogan "Socialism free of dictatorship" would create a favorable atmosphere for the realization of their real plans. This slogan was meant to deceive the politically unschooled masses.

The next move in the counterrevolutionary strategy was the proclamation of a "pure democracy" without classes. During the days of the counterrevolution, the reactionary elements cast off their masks. Although they went on talking about democracy in an effort to mislead the masses, in reality there was no sign of any kind of democracy; in the streets the bloody counterrevolutionary terror raged. . . .

The counterrevolutionary strategy followed the same principle of gradualness in matters of foreign policy. At first they demanded Soviet-Hungarian friendship based on "equality." This in itself was an attack against the Soviet Union because with this slogan the counterrevolutionaries suggested that Hungarian-Soviet relations were not based on equality. The next step was open instigation against the Soviets, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and then the proclamation of "neutrality." But neutrality would only have been a temporary state, for the ultimate goal was the complete break between Hungary and her friends to hand her over to the NATO imperialists. . . .

In the early days they called for a policy, similar to that pursued by Yugo-



slavia, a country which had broken with the Socialist camp and was actually opposing it. "As a first step we must be satisfied with changes like those made in Yugoslavia," declared certain American politicians, thereby aptly defining the stand of American imperialists and their intentions. It was clear to the imperialist and counterrevolutionary forces that they could count on victory only if they managed to tear Hungary from the camp of Socialist countries. This would have been the first stage on the road leading to the capitalist restoration and imperialistic oppression of Hungary. . . .

It was no accident that the attack was launched on the ideological front, in intellectual circles containing many unstable elements and through which large segments of public opinion could be influenced. The enemy acted on the premise that if the ideology of the Socialist forces could be paralyzed, and if bourgeois thinking could be instilled and promoted in the minds of the people, it would not be too difficult to launch the general political and later, armed attack, against the proletarian dictatorship, against Socialism.

### The Writers

This aim was served by the activities of the well-known group of writers (Tibor Dery, Tamas Aczel, Gyula Hay and their associates) in the Writers' Association and the Petofi Club as early as 1955 and the beginning of 1956. In both the Writers' Association and the Petofi Club the discussions were, at the beginning, limited to cultural problems. They dealt with the problem of poetry—literature, history, philosophy and pedagogy were subjects often taken up. However, it soon became clear that behind the discussions of cultural subjects and problems lurked a general attack by bourgeois ideology, which actually prepared the way for the counterrevolution.

The spread of hostile ideology was facilitated by the fact that for years the old Party leadership had not conducted a sufficiently consistent ideological battle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois views. The open ideological campaign was, at times, replaced by one-sided administrative measures, the mere silencing of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideals, instead of exposing to the eyes of the masses their reactionary characteristics. Consequently these views disappeared only from the surface, continuing to live in the minds of a great many people, emerging again at the first possible opportunity. This "second-blossoming" of the reactionary bourgeois and petty-bourgeois views in 1956 warned us that in the struggle against

bourgeois ideology no administrative measures, effective as they may be, can replace the open ideological struggle, the ideological unmasking of the enemy. . . .

### "The Multi-Party System"

At one time, between 1945 and 1948, alongside the Communist Party, there were also other parties. However, in the course of an open political battle most of the bourgeois parties were defeated. The Smallholders' Party and the Peasant Party, ridding themselves of their right wing, accepted the leading role of the Workers' Party, the platform of Socialist building, and became members of the reorganized Patriotic People's Front. From then on the independent activities of the parties gradually ceased. By 1956 this problem belonged to the past.

Under conditions created by the counterrevolutionary attack, the re-establishment of the multi-party system would only have served the interests of the reactionary forces. In the newly formed parties there was no Socialist building and no fight against reaction. But one could find in them every shade of feudalistic, bourgeois reaction.

It was hard for the masses to recognize the true face and counterrevolutionary role of the parties in whose ranks, at some past time, there were also progressive elements (the Social Democratic Party, the Smallholders' Party and the National Peasant Party). But these parties, when re-organized, became anti-Socialist and their leaders and organizers came from the ranks of the fierce enemies of the proletarian dictatorship. Right-wing elements took over the leadership and removed from their own ranks those politicians who, in past years, participated in the building of Socialism.

It was proved during the counterrevolution that the attempt to re-establish the multi-party system was directed at the breaking up of worker unity, the undermining of the harmonious relations between the working classes and their allies and, ultimately, at the complete elimination of the proletarian dictatorship.

In the people's democratic system, as a type of proletarian dictatorship, the acceptance of the leading role of the revolutionary Party of the workers is a matter of principle and the lawful course. Without this the people's power and a proletarian dictatorship, a worker-peasant State, cannot exist, a Socialist society cannot be created. This is absolutely clear. At the same time, the fact that there are people's democratic States in which only one Party (the revolutionary Party of the workers' class) functions, and that there

are other people's democratic countries with more than one Party is sufficient proof that the "one Party system" and the "multi-party system" are not the lawful consequence of general principles, but a practical political issue, determined by the special political and social conditions of the country in question. This is how it was considered by our own Party too.

After the crushing of the counterrevolution the overt, right-wing bourgeois parties disintegrated. The so-called "coalition" parties continued to exist and engaged in local activities for another month or two. (In one of the counties a Smallholders' group existed for some time, in Budapest the National Peasant Party, in Csepel the local chapter of the Social Democratic Party, etc.) Their activities were restricted to stubborn efforts to obstruct the consolidation of the Hungarian People's Republic. In November and December of 1956 the "coalition" parties conclusively demonstrated that, under the prevailing historic conditions in Hungary, they were unable to assume a progressive attitude.

Therefore, in December 1956, our Party correctly took a deliberate stand against the re-establishment of the multi-party system and, in the course of a political and ideological campaign, it exposed the strongly counterrevolutionary character of this system under the specific conditions of our country. Now the Party is making concerted efforts to draw the former leaders and members of the coalition parties, those still loyal to the people's democracy, into the work of building in the political, economic and cultural fields. This is done through the People's Front. The tremendous progress which the Patriotic People's Front movement has made during the last two years proves that in this field too the confusion created by the counterrevolution has been eliminated.

### IV

THE COUNTERREVOLUTION was well prepared for the attack, it had a carefully worked out strategy, it did score temporary successes, and yet it could not triumph. In the West heated arguments took place, and are still taking place, speculating about the possible mistakes made. However, the main cause for the failure of the counterrevolution is not to be found in tactical mistakes, but in the fact that those who engineered it underestimated the power of Socialist ideology, the strength of the labor classes, the people and the Socialist forces in Hungary as well as throughout the world. The counterrevolutionaries founded their plans

on the Communist "crisis," the broken-up unity of the Socialist camp, and that is why they failed. . . .

In October and November 1956 it was not only the Hungarian forces of Socialism which clashed with the counterrevolutionary elements. At that time a battle of international scope between Socialism and capitalism took place in Hungary. The counterrevolutionary attack, aimed at the overthrow of the Hungarian People's Republic was organized by the international imperialists. The support given by the Soviet Union and the other people's democratic countries, in the true spirit of proletarian internationalism, played a decisive role in defending the cause of the Hungarian Socialist revolution.

During the two years following the suppression of the counterrevolution we have consolidated our people's democratic system and created conditions favorable for the continuation of Socialist building and Socialist progress. The achievements attained during these two years in the economic and cultural fields, the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship, the marshalling of the working masses behind the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, these are all factors which prove unequivocally that the vast majority of the Hungarian people are irrevocably on the side of Socialism. . . .

### "Types of Distortions"

Useful knowledge has been gained by our party concerning the importance of paying greater attention to the peculiarities of conditions in our country in the interest of the proper application of the lawful principles of class struggle, thereby maintaining the proletarian dictatorship pure and free of all types of distortions. In this connection it was of paramount importance to select from the complicated and many-segmented construction of proletarian dictatorship the main aspects which, at a given time, influence the course of our progress to the greatest degree, so that we could concentrate all our efforts on these.

It depends on actual circumstances and on the character of the tasks ahead which of the suppressing, organizing or educating organs of the proletarian dictatorship come into prominence at any given time. Thus, for instance, it is absolutely clear that during the time immediately following November 4 [1956] the first and unavoidable move, in the interest of the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship, was the breaking up of the counterrevolutionary armed

groups. Consequently, every other task was subordinated to this one main objective.

The successful solution of this task later made it possible for our Party to concentrate its attention and efforts on stabilizing the economic situation. Finally, political and economic consolidation opened the road to the proper solution of ideological and cultural problems. In addition to the political strengthening of the people's power and the handling of economic issues, the aforementioned objectives still constitute one of the most important fields for our endeavours. It is true that the various issues are intertwined, but it is an undeniable fact that concentration on the main task was an indispensable factor in our progress.

In the two years since the counterrevolution an important factor in the class struggle was the two-front character of our battle: against sectarian, dogmatic deviations on the one hand and against right-wing deviations on the other. This assured an effective and successful course for the class struggle.

As is generally known, the degree of intensity in the class struggle depends largely on the attitude of the class enemies. Yet, undoubtedly, it also depends upon the correct or incorrect policy of the Party. For instance the "left-wing" deviations, which occurred before the counterrevolution, as well as the sectarian excesses, unquestionably tended to sharpen the class struggle. The gains in revisionist tendencies, the slackening of the fight against the enemy, enabled reactionary elements to take a firmer stand.

While Communists endeavor to keep the class struggle from assuming too much intensity, they do not believe that a lesser degree of sharpness will necessarily result in the Party's closer relationship to the masses and that, on the other hand, increased intensity will bring about a decline in these relations.

### "Extremely Severe Measures"

Everything depends on what brings about the increase or decline in the intensity of the class struggle; whether the change is a necessary outcome of a real situation or whether it has been brought about by the faulty policy of the Party. For instance, the nine months immediately following the suppression of the counterrevolution constituted a period of very intense class struggle. The Party-guided proletarian dictatorship was forced to take extremely severe measures. But, since these were demanded by reality and because the Party did not go one single

step further than was absolutely necessary, refused to give in either to right-wing views or to "left-wing" excesses, this very intense class struggle resulted in the improvement in the Party's relations to the masses—for the masses understood and approved of the measures. Conversely, before the counterrevolution there were periods when the efforts made for the suppression of hostile forces were not sufficient—mainly because of certain opportunist mistakes—and the Party's mass relations were not satisfactory. . . .

### "Petty Bourgeois Tolerance"

If the existence of the Socialist regime is at stake, any kind of petty bourgeois tolerance must be ruled out. Holding responsible and punishing severely the enemy and those guilty of crimes proved to be theoretically and practically necessary and proper and was fully supported by the Hungarian people's sense of justice.

In addition, we strengthened and continued to consolidate the democratic foundations of our regime. During the past two years a whole series of measures were passed, giving much greater scope to the workers in the direct management of public affairs. For instance, the activities of the National Assembly and the local councils have been greatly expanded and the middle and lower leading organs were given greater independence. The rights and independence of trade unions have been increased, and so were the independence and scope of cooperatives and other self-governing organizations.

A similarly beneficent effort was achieved by the improvement, on a strict ideological basis, of relations between Party and non-Party members. Just a few months after the crushing of the counterrevolution the Party proclaimed the principle that Party members and non-members were completely equal as citizens. Since then, this principle was not only repeatedly reaffirmed but also scrupulously applied. For instance, before the Central Committee of the Party opened discussion on the important issue of the position of the Hungarian worker classes, in addition to the Party members, we also asked for the opinion of the simple non-party worker, and his views received full consideration. The Party asked for the opinion of the non-party people even in cases when it was censuring them (as for instance the case of the populist writers). . . .

The alliance between the worker classes and the peasantry was based on the similarity of their interests. . . . In the course

of the counterrevolutionary events, the majority of the peasantry correctly realized that the high-sounding slogans covered the demands of the former big landowners for the return of their land. Under those circumstances the worker-peasant alliance was expressed in the efforts directed at the protection of the land and in this matter all the working peasantry fought together with the Party. At that time the Party was unable to concentrate all its efforts on the development of kolkhozes and the Socialist transformation of agriculture because under the given circumstances such a course would not have united the whole working peasantry in the struggle against the counterrevolution. The protection of land, taken from the big landowners and distributed among the working peasants, is not in itself a Socialist move, but an act of defending a bourgeois democratic achievement. In this light, the fact that at the end of 1956 this slogan became the basic element in the worker-peasant alliance meant a certain regression to a previously surpassed stage of our development. However, the defense of a Socialist attainment was also involved, because in our country the peasants knew very well that the bourgeoisie would not take away the land from the big landowners to turn it over to them, that the working classes, and the only the workers' power, can protect it for them.

Just as the workers' power has been strengthened since the crushing of the counterrevolutionary uprising, the Socialist principles have come to the fore gradually within the worker-peasant alliance and, among other things, the necessity of protecting kolkhozes was emphasized. It is only natural that the protection of the kolkhozes could not meet the undivided approval of all the farmers, mainly because it served primarily and directly the interests of the most progressive segments of the peasantry. The immediate purpose and inner content of the worker-peasant alliance was further modified when, in addition to the protection of the kolkhozes, the Party recommended the further strengthening of the kolkhoz movement, which brought the socialist reorganization of agriculture to the fore.

The Party openly proclaims that today the aim of the worker-peasant alliance is the strengthening and protection of the people's democratic power and its immediate result, the complete realization of a Socialist society, a part of which must be the Socialist reorganization of agriculture. We can see that conditions are ripe, if not for a rapid, jump-like development, at least for a faster pace in the de-

velopment of the kolkhoz movement. Our Party still guarantees the principle of voluntary joining of kolkhozes and will continue to do so, besides assuring the independently-working farmers of conditions which will make continued production for them possible. At the same time it is worth noting that in full awareness of the above, the peasantry voted unanimously in favor of the Party's policy at the recent elections, which indicates that they consider the party's peasant policy right, have faith in it and that they no longer shrink from the thought of a Socialist future. Thus, even today, the worker-peasant alliance embraces the whole of the peasantry, with the exception of the insignificant portion of rural bourgeois, or rather kulak elements. All this proves that during the various periods of the struggle against the counterrevolution, the Party judged rightly. . . .

### "The Matter of Power"

In a similar manner our Party reviewed the basic class policy concerning the petty bourgeoisie and urban intelligentsia. Experience confirmed the Party's belief that our relationship to them does not depend on special problems concerning them, but rests on the matter of power. The strengthening and consolidation of our regime proved to be the most decisive argument in the winning over of these segments and this was what finally convinced so many of them of the falseness of their views. But we cannot be satisfied with this. While we persist in sharply criticizing wrong ideological views, we intend to place greater confidence in them and show these classes greater appreciation while also pointing out to them a more clearly defined and worthier future. Today these classes see more clearly the reason behind their efforts and the important role which they play in our society. Our valid arguments and practical achievements have brought the intelligentsia and the cities' petty bourgeoisie, the wavering segments of our population who were behind the counterrevolution in those difficult times, to turn and support Socialism. With the end of counterrevolutionary agitation, the end of the hysterical atmosphere, and as a result of our convincing arguments and the deeds which supported these, the ideological and political cleansing process has made great progress. We can observe a welcome change in every segment of the intelligentsia and, what is particularly heartening, even among the teachers. Although the majority of intelligentsia cannot yet say that it has embraced the Marxist-Leninist ideology, a growing in-

terest in these teachings is shown in their circles. The constant search for methods, and their improvement even while applied, to fight the enemy and win allies—these are the fundamental objectives in the present-day class struggle in Hungary.

### V

**D**URING THE WHOLE TWO YEARS of struggle waged by our Party, there were two main issues, which summarized nearly all the problems in question and represented the main points in the clash with the class aliens:

1. Further consolidation of our Party through reorganization; assuring its unity and its leading role.
2. The enforcement of the principles of proletarian internationalism in the policy of the Party and in the thinking of the masses.

During our life-and-death struggle against the counterrevolution we were opposed, on the above two issues, not only by class aliens and the imperialists, but also by the revisionists. In the first days of November 1956, when the fascist, armed counterrevolutionaries were still killing our comrades who were fighting for the reorganization of our Party, internal and Yugoslav revisionists "suggested" that we give up our "futile" efforts directed at the reorganization of the Party. Instead, they said, we should change our political system and transfer power to the "workers' councils," which were obviously acting under counterrevolutionary instructions. However, we defended the cardinal tenets of Marxist-Leninist teachings about the Party and Proletarian dictatorship, we reinforced the revolutionary Party of the Hungarian working classes, secured the unity and the increasingly expanding leading role of the Party. In the practical management of the Party, in the struggle waged on two fronts, we endeavored to enforce the unconquerable Marxist-Leninist ideals in their original purity, free of dogmatic, revisionist distortions.

The experience gained in the Hungarian class struggle again proved that the proletarian dictatorship, led by the Communist Party, is the indispensable prerequisite to the building of Socialism, indeed its most essential instrument, the protection and promotion of which is in the most vital interest of the working people.

Proletarian internationalism is the most essential element in the Marxist-Leninist principles on which the revolutionary Party of the worker classes is correctly founded. The Party only carries out its

basic international duties when it fights, without compromise, for the complete destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie and for the complete liberation of the workers and for the realization of a Socialist society.

For more than forty years the relations to the Soviet Union have been the criterion for the internationalist attitude of the labor parties. For nearly a decade and a half the relationship to the unity of the Socialist camp has been the criterion for internationalism. One of the crucial points in our struggle against the counterrevolution was our friendship with the Soviet Union, our unyielding loyalty to the unity of the countries of the Socialist camp, our open and consistent proclamation of our internationalist prin-

ciples. We may state that the unwavering, staunch internationalist policy of our Party played an important role in winning the support of the working masses and in the achievements of the last two years.

During the present historical times it is particularly true that while the working classes of a country fight their own reactionary bourgeois classes, they are at the same time fighting the power of international imperialism. Currently, the imperialist ruling circles of the United States play the role of the "world gendarmerie." They took it upon themselves to "liberate" or "free" people from Communism. This, of course, is and will remain a vain dream, never to be realized. But the fact that they really mean to carry out this dream was demonstrated

by the 1956 counterrevolutionary attempt. This, on the other hand, forces the Communist Parties of the people's democratic countries not to tolerate any effort aimed at the loosening of unity between the Socialist countries, whether it be attempted by international imperialism or domestic reactionaries and revisionists.

Our Party and its membership adheres with staunch loyalty to Marxist-Leninist principles, to Socialist patriotism, to proletarian internationalism, because it wants to serve faithfully the interests of the working classes and of the Hungarian people. All the more, because we know that our Party, our working classes and our people can become unconquerable only through loyalty to these principles.

### Current Developments continued from page 50

Editorial boards of three Romanian literary magazines, *Utunk*, *Steaua*, and *Tribuna* were apparently "reorganized" after they were accused at the Plenum of propagating "harmful, chauvinistic and nationalistic ideas."

#### Germany Demands Repatriation

According to West German spokesmen, Bonn has temporarily broken off trade relations with the Romanian government, due to Bucharest's reluctance to allow the repatriation of Germans whose families have been separated since the war's end. In reply, Radio Bucharest, January 15, stated that "the Romanian government accords this problem due understanding . . . but will not permit any outside interference relating to a matter which falls exclusively under its own jurisdiction." (See article on minorities, pages 3-14, for background on the German problem as well as the latest information on Jewish emigration from Romania.)

#### Economic "Crimes" Continue

As elsewhere in the area, crimes involving theft and embezzlement of so-called "people's property" remain a prime source of irritation to the regime. In order to combat these activities, the Romanian government last year created "Judgment Councils" in all "enterprises and establishments" to try workers whose thefts did not exceed 200 lei (see *East Europe*, November 1958, p. 45). Apparently such "Councils" have not been particularly effective. The Trade Unions' organ *Munca* (Bucharest), January 10, stated that "there are still enterprises and institutions [where] the trials conducted by the Judgment Councils are attended by only two or three people. Without widespread participation by the workers from the factory to which the accused belongs, the judgment lacks the educational effect which is its essential element."

Another measure taken to curtail "economic crimes" was the establishment of "inspection teams," composed of housewives and workers, who were to report any abuses com-

mitted by managers and employees of State-owned shops. According to *Informatia Bucurestilor* (Bucharest), December 24, 700 such teams have been formed in Bucharest alone. To dramatize the severity of the courts in dealing with these crimes, *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), January 9, announced sentences ranging from 5 to 20 years imprisonment for half a dozen "embezzlers."

In this connection, on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Militia, the Deputy Minister of the Interior took pains to point out that "some members of the Militia continue to show a conciliatory spirit toward the enemies of the State [and] there are still cases of embezzlers who have not been identified." (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], January 23.)

#### Amnesty Declared

At the same time as the drive against "economic crimes" was increasing, the government published a decree in honor of the centenary of the unification of the Romanian principalities, granting full amnesties to those sentenced to less than three years in prison, as well as to people over 60, pregnant women, and women with small children, who had been sentenced up to five years. The nature of these crimes was not specified. (Radio Bucharest, January 24.)

### ALBANIA

#### Collective Farms Merged

Radio Tirana announced on February 4 that 20 collective farms had been merged into one. The new farm, in the southern village of Cakran, covers 2,958 hectares and has a total labor force of 2,600. There were indications that other mergers may be on the way. At the end of 1958 Albania had a total of 1,935 collective farms, covering 76.2 percent of the arable land and including 63.2 percent of the peasant households. (Radio Tirana, January 31.)



## Recent and Related

**The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-1958: A Documentary Record**, edited by Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury (Prospect Books, \$3.00). A record of the great Communist schism. In his introduction Professor Hans Kohn puts the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy in historical perspective and calls attention to the fundamental conflict between Communism and nationalism. By a judicious choice of documents pertaining to the original controversy and subsequent relations between the two states, the book provides the material necessary for an accurate understanding of these momentous developments. The documents are arranged chronologically and divided into four chapters: "Yugoslavia and the Cominform, 1948," starts with the earliest available material, a letter to the USSR from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The exchange of letters between Moscow and Belgrade is followed by the Cominform Resolution of June 1948 expelling the Yugoslav Party. "The Road to Brioni" contains two essential papers relating to the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation in 1955. "The Yugoslav Road to Socialism and the Hungarian Revolt" starts with Tito's speech at Pula and includes documents concerning Yugoslav and Soviet attitudes towards the Hungarian Revolt. "The Schism Revived," presents material pertaining to the renewed conflict. The book is much more than a simple collection of relevant documents. Each section is preceded by an introduction describing the background and significance of reprinted material. Each single document is, in turn, preceded by additional remarks concerning its origin and importance. Numerous footnotes provide information about persons, institutions and events to facilitate the understanding of the sometimes abstruse ideological exchanges.

**Soviet Writings on Earth Satellites**, edited by Ari Sternfeld (Citadel Press, \$3.95). The book presents current Soviet writings on the earth satellites and background material necessary to understand the launching and operation of the Sputniks. Ari Sternfeld, winner of the International Incentive Award in Astronautics, supplies the historical and other background in Part I, from ancient Greek legends through the launching of Sputnik I. On the theoretical side, he presents the problems confronting man as he moves into outer space, discusses artificial satellites and the observations gathered from the Sputniks, the uses of satellites and possible trips to the moon and to the planets. Part II, "The Sput-

nik," contains Soviet announcements and writings by various Russian scientific authorities, all on scientific data obtained from the Sputniks. The scientists analyze life on the Sputniks, interplanetary communication, rocketry, biological aspects of space travel, possibilities of flight to the moon and to the planets and other aspects of cosmic flight. Forty-one illustrations, table of equivalents, index.

**The Rise of Khrushchev**, by Myron Rush (Public Affairs Press, \$3.25). This book, based on a study for the Rand Corporation, grew out of the author's unorthodox hypothesis, formulated as early as 1955, that N. S. Khrushchev was bidding for Stalin's successorship, or at least for powers equivalent to those which Stalin exercised prior to the purge of the mid-thirties. Dr. Rush asks and answers two questions: How did Khrushchev gain his victory over his rivals in June 1957? and, Why did he indict Stalin's tyranny on February 25, 1956, in his now famous secret XX Congress speech, when he had lamented Stalin's death only one week earlier? Emphasizing Khrushchev's ambition as a motivating factor behind his rise, the author demolishes the view, which Moscow offers to the world at large, that Khrushchev rose to power by default and in the process of defending his position against his colleagues. Eight chapters establish the background and the steps of Khrushchev's climb, and a final chapter discusses the outlook for the future. Dr. Rush has used special techniques in evaluating the contents of his sources and applied them to analyzing the mechanics of the post-Stalin struggle for power; he has gone over the pronouncements of Soviet leaders to show how minute changes in their conventional verbal formulas were often indicative of major impending moves in Kremlin politics. Appendices, references, index.

**Ukraine and Russia**, by Konstantyn Kononenko (Marquette University Press). A history of the economic relations between the Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917. The author is an Ukrainian expert on agriculture who was arrested by the secret police on five occasions, but was each time released upon the intervention of the Ukrainian Commissariat of Agriculture; he ended up by working as a slave laborer in the Soviet Union from 1930 to 1936. In 1943 he went to Germany, but is now living in the United States and since 1952 has been associated with Prolog Research and Publishing Associates, Inc., a New York

group engaged in research on Ukrainian liberation problems. The purpose of the book is to substantiate the thesis that Ukraine has been consistently exploited economically by Russia and that "economic relations between Ukraine and Russia prior to the revolution were based upon principles of national oppression." Tables, bibliography, index.

**Titoism in Action**, by Fred Warner Neal (Univ. of Calif. Press, \$6.50). An analysis of Titoism as a deviant form of Communism. The author, a political scientist and former correspondent of the Wall Street Journal, has first-hand knowledge of Eastern European problems. He describes the origin and development of the Yugoslav "National Communism," the peculiarities of the Yugoslav League of Communists and the role of Tito. The bulk of this extensive study is devoted to domestic problems, such as the new governmental system, management and control of the economy, and the reforms in local government and in agriculture. This analysis leads to some general conclusions about the nature and significance of Titoism, while the final chapter illustrates Yugoslavia's unique position as manifested in its foreign policy. Among other things, the author discusses the Djilas case and the possible effects of Titoism on other Eastern European countries. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index.

**A Polish Chapter in Jacksonian America**, by Jerzy Jan Lerski (University of Wisconsin Press, \$5.00). The first in the "Poland's Millennium" series of the Kosciuszko Foundation. It discusses the exodus of Poles after the Russian conquest in 1831, their immigration to the United States, and their reception by the Americans of the 1830's. The author believes this little-known affair has its parallel in the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 and the US reception of the exiles from Hungary. Six chapters present the European background, the American sympathy for Poland in the 1830's, the Committee in Paris, the exiles' arrival in the US, the first Polish-American organization here and the unsuccessful "Little Poland" in Illinois. Appendix, bibliography, index.

**Selected Writings**, by Boris Pasternak (New Directions, \$1.35). A paperback collection consisting of "Safe Conduct" (autobiography), four short stories, and a small anthology of poems; there is a short introduction by Babette Deutsch. An excellent short supplement to "Dr. Zhivago."



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